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Foreword 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, unanimously endorsed 
by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, have received a lot of attention, both at 
the political and academic level. However, for a long time, domestic lawyers have, 
in European jurisdictions at least, paid them relatively little notice. Moreover, 
academic discourse seems to have generally been limited to that among Human 
rights lawyers. All this is in spite of the fact that the Principles are closely linked to 
national law in their content, and that different national laws have been 
instrumental in the process leading to the adoption of the Principles.  
The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law has started developing an interest in 
comparative aspects of the UN Guiding Principles over recent years, initially, as part 
of research commissioned in the context of the political debate on implementing the 
principles in Switzerland (see Volume 79 in the series). However, the scarcity of 
discussion in private international law, a core area of research of the Swiss Institute, 
was striking. For this reason, the Institute organized a conference in 2014 on the 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles in the area of private international 
law. The conference had two aims: first, to illustrate experiences and approaches in 
other jurisdictions, and second, to start a discussion in Switzerland on the 
implementation of the Principles and access to remedies under private international 
law. It gave rise to interesting debates and exchanges.  
The proceedings of the conference are published in this volume. They bring together 
general considerations on the Principles and some of their potentially controversial 
aspects, analyse relevant case law, and conclude with some future perspectives for 
Switzerland and the European Union. 
We would like to express our gratitude to several people who contributed in one or 
another way to this publication: First of all, our thanks go to the authors of this 
volume and to the contributors to the conference held at the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law. Second, we would like to thank Andrea Bonomi, co-organiser of 
the conference, who, due to other commitments (and a sabbatical abroad) could 
not participate in the editing of this volume. Finally, we would like to thank all the 
people who contributed to the formal realisation of this publication, especially 
Françoise Hinni, secretary, who prepared the final formatted version of this book. 
The linguistic revisions were carried out by Victoria Garrington. Without the help of 
all these people, this publication would not have been realized.  
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Last but not least, we would like to pay tribute to the late Henry S. Dahl who passed 
away unexpectedly before the publication of this volume was finalized. Henry S. 
Dahl was a true pioneer in the promotion of access to justice on a worldwide basis 
and in the field of dispute resolution involving corporate human rights violations. 
He was also a citizen of the world. His openness and passion for his work will 
hopefully inspire future research in this area. 
 
Lausanne, 15.10.2016 
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Public international law and Private international law are commonly considered 
as two separate areas of law. Public international law is traditionally seen as the 
law that essentially regulates the rights and obligations of States and the relations 
between States. It is a true international law: a State-centric system regulating 
 
*  Legal Adviser at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, LL.M., Avocat (Brussels). 
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horizontal relations. This explains why, in addition to international custom and 
general principles of law, treaties – agreements between States – are a main source 
of Public international law, and why these typically deal with matters that are of 
interest to States. In stark contrast, Private international law is traditionally 
considered as the law that regulates the transboundary relations between private 
actors such as individuals and corporations; it is generally seen as part of the 
municipal domain, which is organized along vertical lines. This explains why, 
traditionally, domestic statutes and decisions of domestic courts have been the 
principal source of Private international law. Private international law essentially 
covers conflicts of jurisdiction, conflicts of laws and issues of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decisions.1 
However, when confronted with the reality of international relations, this 
traditional divide appears questionable.2 The international stage is no longer the 
exclusive privilege of States. Next to States, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, individuals and corporations have made their 
appearance. More than ever, issues such as the safeguarding of the environment or 
the economic, security or financial crisis are transnational by nature. Disputes with 
a transnational element often concern both public and private interests, and 
involve both public and private actors. Hence, we are witnessing a high level of 
permeability between Private and Public international law, which can be observed 
at various levels (section 1). 
Rather than being a static phenomenon and a source of confusion, such 
permeability between Public and Private international law can be seen as 
developing its own dynamics. In several ways, the permeability between these two 
traditionally separated worlds has been used in a constructive way, showing that 
Public international law may contribute to the development of Private 
international law and vice-versa (section 2).  
Such permeability and complementarity of Public and Private international law 
can be observed in the area of international human rights law. In particular, the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
“UN Guiding Principles”)3 offer a useful illustration of both phenomena. The UN 
 
1  This is also the comprehension of the term followed for the purposes of the present 
article. 
2  See in particular: DE BOER, Living apart together, 183-207; see also FERNÁNDEZ 
ARROYO & LIMA MARQUES (eds.) Private International Law and Public International Law: 
A Necessary Meeting; WEERAMANTRY, Universalising International Law. 
3  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
See also: UN Human Rights Council, res. 17/4, Human Rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, 16 June 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/ 
17/4, 6 July 2011. 
P U B L I C  A N D  P R I V A T E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L A W  
 13 
Guiding Principles set up a number of guiding principles to be followed by 
business enterprises and States in order to prevent human rights violations and 
ensure access to remedy in case of such violations. By nature, these principles 
illustrate the permeability and interrelationship between Private international law 
and Public international law as they address, in an international instrument, the 
complex issue of human rights violations by transnational corporations. Moreover, 
the UN Guiding Principles also show how addressing global issues of our times, 
including that of ensuring corporations’ respect of human rights wherever they 
exercise their activities, requires a close cooperation and interaction between 
these two areas of law (section 3). 
1. Permeability of Public and Private 
International Law 
Although Public and Private international law are generally considered to be two 
separate branches of law, one can observe, in recent years, a renewal4 of 
convergences between Public and Private international law. One can observe such 
permeability between Public and Private international law at several levels: 
material sources (1), object (2), subjects (3) and dispute settlement mechanisms 
(4). 
1.1. Material Sources of Public and Private International 
Law 
Public international law is traditionally considered to have its sources in treaty, 
international custom and general principles of law. Such sources are essentially 
State-centric in the sense that they require for their emergence some level of 
participation of States: this is fundamentally the case for international treaties, 
international custom and general principles of law. It is also indirectly the case for 
judicial decisions since the existence and the legitimacy of interstate dispute 
settlement mechanisms that issue such judicial decisions are based on the consent 
of States who participate in it. 
However, next to these formal sources of Public international law, the recent past 
has seen the emergence of solutions that are not included in the formal sources 
but that nevertheless constitute an important source of inspiration for the 
 
4  It is referred to a renewal as indeed in its early theoretical development, Private 
international law was often seen as part of a broader corpus of the “Law of Nations”. 
See e.g.: MILLS, Rediscovering the public dimension of private international law; 
BERMAN, Is Conflict of Laws becoming passé?. 
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development of Public international law.5 These instruments, which are generally 
referred to as soft-law instruments, consist of principles, guidelines, codes of 
conduct, standards and practices. They are generally developed and adopted by a 
plurality of non-State actors such as international organizations,6 non-
governmental organizations, professional associations or experts committees.7 Of 
course, such instruments are not – and never could be – a formal source of Public 
international law. However, through their process of emergence, they 
nevertheless may play an important role in the identification of new rules of Public 
international law. Indeed, soft law enables States to agree on principles that they 
wish to test, at the international level but also at the domestic level, before 
agreeing to their internationally binding character.  
A similar shift in sources can be witnessed in the field of Private international law. 
As the law that regulates the transboundary relations between private actors such 
as individuals and corporations, Private international law is traditionally seen as 
being largely grounded in municipal law. As a result, its main sources are domestic 
statutes and decisions of domestic courts. Nevertheless, as a result of ever increas-
ing trends of globalization, international sources tend to increase. Indeed, new 
Private international law situations emerge such as in the field of Internet-related 
disputes, the global terrorism threat or surrogacy arrangements. So as to address 
these new issues, two particular approaches may be followed. First, States may 
endeavour to develop unified substantive rules to regulate certain transnational 
relations. Such substantive rules offer a solution to issues of a private international 
law nature. This is, for instance, the case of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods.8 Second, States may choose to develop harmonized or 
unified rules of Private international law. Indeed, harmonized or unified rules of 
private international law enable States to follow a similar, if not identical 
approach. This offers a more efficient way to solve transnational issues of our 
times, or at least reduce discrepancies between municipal laws, which in turn 
would ensure enhanced predictability in the system. Such common or harmonized 
 
5  Soft law instruments play an important role also in the development of private 
international law. See for instance, UNIDROIT Principles on International commercial 
contracts; UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured transactions, available at: 
www.unidroit.org (01.09.2016). This effect is however less relevant for the purpose of 
this paper. 
6  See for instance: The UN Guiding Principles were developed under the auspices of the 
Human Rights Council; see also the unanimous endorsement of the UN Guiding 
Principles by the Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011, which provided a special 
aura to this soft law instrument: UN doc., 6 July 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/4.  
7  See for instance: The Council for international organizations for medical sciences in 
the field of biomedical research for instance. See: BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 
Gouvernance et régulation au 21ème siècle, p. 26. 
8  See e.g.: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Vienna, 11 April 1980. 
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rules are developed by States through international conventions or regional 
legally binding instruments. This effort towards increased cooperation between 
States so as to develop harmonized rules of Private international law has resulted 
in a trend towards internationalization of the sources of Private international law. 
From essentially municipal law, sources of Private international law have evolved 
to more internationalization.  
Hence, while material sources of Public international law can increasingly be 
found in soft law instruments developed by non-State actors, sources of Private 
international law increasingly result from agreement between States. 
1.2. The Object of Public and Private International Law 
Public international law is traditionally considered as regulating the relations 
between States. However, increasingly since the end of the Second World War, 
Public international law has witnessed the development of new areas of focus that 
are not merely State-centric but rather directed towards individuals or 
corporations. This is the case for international human rights law and international 
criminal law, which may qualify as areas of Public international law that have an 
impact on individuals. Similarly, international trade law and investment law are 
fields of Public international law that have an impact on business activities. These 
areas of law, which are generally speaking considered to be part of Public 
international law, embody relations at the international level between States on 
the one hand, and individuals or corporations on the other hand. Public 
international law therefore also regulates relations where individuals and 
corporations are involved. 
Similarly, Private international law is commonly considered to regulate 
transnational relations between individuals and/or corporations. However, in our 
globalized world, new situations always arise which require new rules of Private 
international law. Moreover, situations arising from transnational relations 
between individuals and/or corporations may always potentially develop in 
conflicts between the States of nationality of the persons involved, whether legal 
or natural. Indeed, judicial decisions on a Private international law issue rendered 
in a State bind that State at the international stage towards the other State(s) 
concerned, and may potentially create an interstate conflict.9 Similarly, when 
States adopt unified rules of Private international law, the object of Private 
 
9  See, for instance: Jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Belgium vs. Switzerland), Application, 21 December 2009, available at: 
www.icj-cij.org (30.10.2015); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany vs. Italy: 
Greece intervening), judgment of 3 February 2012, I.C.J. Reports, 2012, p. 99; Case 
concerning the application of the Convention dated 12 June 1902 governing the 
guardianship of infants, (Netherlands vs. Sweden), I.C.J. Reports, 1958, p. 55. 
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international law appears de facto to be double: while it regulates transnational 
relations between individuals or corporations, it also governs relations in a specific 
area between two or more States.  
As a result, the object of Public and Private international law are no longer 
considered to be hermetically separated from each other. 
1.3. The Subjects of Public and Private International Law 
Similar to the evolution as to the object of Public and Private international law, the 
subjects of Public and Private international law – namely, the persons whose 
relations are governed by each area of law – no longer seem to be drastically 
different. While formal subjects of Public international law are, and remain, States 
and international organizations, our contemporary world shows that numerous 
other actors intervene on the international stage, sometimes with considerable 
authority. Among such actors, the most important are persons, whether natural or 
legal. Indeed, the protection of individuals at the international level has developed 
considerably since the end of the Second World War. Nowadays, many 
international rules – whether under international treaties or customary 
international law – provide rights to the benefit of individuals and companies, 
with the possibility for these actors to enforce these rights on the international 
stage. For instance, it is widely recognized under customary international law that 
States must ensure to aliens present within their territory a minimum standard of 
protection.10 Similarly, in the field of international human rights law, several 
international treaties provide international rights to individuals, allowing them, in 
case of violation by a State, to take their complaint before either international 
courts such as the European Court of Human rights, or political organs of 
international organizations such as individuals’ communications or complaints 
mechanisms of international human rights treaties.11 Some authors claim that, as a 
 
10  The international minimum standard is a norm of customary international law which 
governs the treatment of aliens, by providing for a minimum set of principles which 
States, regardless of their domestic legislation and practices, must respect when 
dealing with foreign nationals and their property. See in particular: ROTH, The 
Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens; BROWNLIE, Principles of 
Public International Law; ROUSSEAU, Droit International Public.  
11  For instance: The Committee against Torture (CAT) of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights may consider individual complaints alleging 
violations of the rights set out in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  by States parties who have made 
the necessary declaration under article 22 of the Convention. Similarly, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights may consider individual petitions alleging 
violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination by States parties who have made the necessary declaration 
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result, individuals and companies have some degree of international personality, 
but the whole subject remains highly controversial, in particular since only States 
can confer international rights to individuals or companies12. This being said, it is 
clear that individuals, whether natural or legal entities, play an increasing role at 
the international level. 
While the subjects of Private international law are traditionally persons, whether 
legal or natural, Private international law is increasingly becoming a question of 
states’ relations. For instance, several cases of the International Court of Justice – 
deciding upon disputes between States only – in fact originate from a dispute 
between persons, whether legal or natural. For instance, the case concerning 
Jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters13 
originated from an international dispute between the Swiss and Belgian 
shareholders of Sabena, the former Belgian national airline company. The case 
concerning the application of the Convention dated 12 June 1902 governing the 
guardianship of infants14 originated from the guardianship-situation of a private 
person, Ms. Marie Elisabeth Boll. Finally, the case concerning Jurisdictional 
immunities of the State15, opposing Germany to Italy, with the intervention of 
Greece, originated in decisions rendered by Italian domestic courts on the 
initiative of individuals. 
As a result, the increasing permeability of Public and Private international law can 
also be witnessed at the level of the subjects involved in both areas of law. 
1.4. The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Public and 
Private International Law 
The post-second world war period has seen an important development of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms. Whereas the area of Public 
international law is traditionally seen as the exclusive realm of States and 
international organizations, it is apparent that other non-State actors slowly gain a 
certain access to international dispute settlement mechanisms at the international 
stage. They may first intervene as amicus curiae or “ami de la Cour”. This might be 
 
under Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.  
12  For instance : ALVAREZ, Are corporations « subjects » of International Law?; PETERS, 
Beyond Human Rights. 
13  Jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Belgium 
vs. Switzerland), Application, 21 December 2009, available at: www.icj-cij.org 
(30.10.2015). 
14  Case concerning the application of the Convention dated 12 June 1902 governing the 
guardianship of infants, (Netherlands vs. Sweden), I.C.J. Reports, 1958, p. 55. 
15  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany vs. Italy: Greece intervening), 
judgment of 3 February 2012, I.C.J. Reports, 2012, p. 99. 
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the case, for instance, with the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
organization. Panels have in fact made use of their discretionary right to accept 
and consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs, albeit infrequently. The Appellate 
Body of the WTO also maintains that it has the authority to accept and consider 
any information it considers pertinent and useful in deciding an appeal, including 
unsolicited amicus curiae submission.16 But private actors also intervene through 
more formal procedures, for instance, as already mentioned, in the field of 
international human rights law before the European Court of Human rights or 
before political organs of international organizations.17 
More generally, the recent past has seen an increase in the number of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms that can operate a high degree of 
flexibility as to the parties involved, the applicable law, the procedure and the 
persons who will decide upon the dispute. In particular, several international 
arbitration centers have set up such type of dispute settlement mechanisms at the 
international stage and welcome corporations and other private actors as parties 
to a dispute. This is in particular the case of the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Such 
international arbitration centers have experienced, in the recent past, an 
important increase in the number of cases which have been decided under their 
rules and authority.18 
The shift in dispute settlement mechanisms has equally occurred in Private 
international law. Indeed, Private international law disputes have also been 
brought before dispute settlement mechanisms that are typically of a Public 
international law nature. For example, as already stated above, States have 
brought before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) several disputes, the 
object of which was a disagreement on the application or the interpretation of 
Private international law rules or principles. Yet, the institution, as the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations,19 is fundamentally and in its essence known 
as the “temple” of Public international law.  
 
16  WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/D58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 19998, DSR 1998, VII, 2755, 
para. 104 ff. 
17  See above: note 9. See also: Complaint procedure for individuals before the 
Inspection Panel at the World Bank. More information available at: http://ewebapps. 
worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUS.aspx. See also: BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 
Gouvernance et régulation au 21ème siècle, p. 31. 
18  See: ICSID caseload, Statistics, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ 
icsidweb/resources/pages/icsid-caseload-statistics.aspx (01.09.2016). See also: 
ROMANO, Trial and Error in International Judicialization, p. 120-121. 
19  Charter of the United Nations, article 92. 
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Indeed, in the case concerning the application of the Convention of 12 June 1902 
governing the guardianship of infants, opposing the Netherlands and Sweden, the 
Court had to decide on whether Sweden had violated its obligations under a 
multilateral treaty the object of which was Private international law. More 
recently, the International Court of Justice was seized by Belgium in its dispute 
with Switzerland on the interpretation and application of the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(the so-called 1988 Lugano Convention), as well as the application of the rules of 
general international law governing the exercise of State authority, in particular in 
judicial matters.20 Although the case was discontinued upon Belgium’s request, it 
still offers a useful example of disputes on a Private international law issue being 
brought before an international dispute settlement forum. Finally, in the case on 
Jurisdictional immunities of the State, between Germany and Italy, with the 
intervention of Greece, the ICJ decided on an issue that lies at the crossroads of 
Public and Private international law: while State immunities concern the status of 
State as a subject of Public international law, it also constitutes an exception to the 
exercise by national courts and other authorities of their jurisdiction as well as 
their powers to enforce judicial decisions against foreign States, which is typically 
a question of Private international law.21 
As a general conclusion, one can observe that while Private and Public 
international law are typically seen as two separate worlds, they actually seem to 
share, as a result of ever increasing globalization trends, many common features 
including similar objects, subjects, sources and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
This allows us to refer to a high level of “permeability” between Public and Private 
international law. 
2. Complementarity of Public and Private 
International Law 
The existing “permeability” between Public and Private International law refers to 
the mere existence of features that are common to the two areas of law. In reality 
however, such permeability is used to foster the advancement of goals of Public 
and Private international law. In other words, the permeability combines with a 
certain level of complementarity between Public and Private international law, 
allowing Public international law to contribute to the development of Private 
international law (2.1) and vice-versa (2.2). 
 
20  Jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Belgium 
vs. Switzerland), Application, 21 December 2009, available at: www.icj-cij.org 
(30.06.2015). 
21  Jurisdictional immunities of the State, (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), 
judgment of 3 February 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99. 
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2.1. Contribution of Public International Law to the 
Development of Private International Law 
When Private international law rules are contained in municipal law, each State 
may establish different rules to solve the same situation, which may result in 
unpredictability problems. Indeed, depending on where the situation arises or the 
States where a judicial decision is sought, different solutions may be brought to 
one single situation. States seek to reduce such negative impact by adopting 
unified or harmonized rules of Private international law. Hence, Public 
international law may contribute to the optimal development of Private 
international law through the recourse to one of its main traditional sources, 
namely international treaties. By developing unified, or at least harmonized, rules 
of Private international law, States considerably reduce the risk of having similar 
situations solved differently depending on the State where the solution is sought, 
and as a result, increase the level of predictability. Developing unified rules of 
Private international law also contributes to a smoother resolution of conflicts 
between individuals in an international context, enabling organs of States to 
operate according to the same rules. Hence, their agreement on unified rules of 
Private international law contributes to an optimal development of Private 
international law. 
However, it seems that even unified or harmonized rules of Private international 
law are no guarantee for enhanced predictability for the end beneficiaries of rules 
of Private international law, i.e. individuals and corporations, and eventually 
States. In particular, predictability requires not only unified rules but also a single 
approach to the application and interpretation of such rules among the States 
concerned.  
Indeed, domestic tribunals may for instance develop an interpretation of 
provisions of an international treaty of Private international law that is either not 
satisfactory for the system put in place by the treaty, or different from that of other 
domestic courts.22 Moreover, the treatment of Private international law issues by 
regional courts, such as the European Court for Human Rights, might not be 
satisfactory either. For instance, a regional court may in its decision interpret a 
provision of an international convention the membership of which is way larger 
than that of the regional court. While the interpretation of this international 
convention will carry an important weight for the States that are parties to the 
international convention and the regional court, it is unlikely that it will have the 
 
22  See for instance: US Supreme Court, Société nationale industrielle Aerospatiale et al. 
v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, No. 85-1695, 482, U.S. 
222; 107 S. Ct. 2542. See also VAN LOON & DE DYCKER, The role of the International 
Court of Justice, p. 109-110. 
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same importance for a State party to the international convention that is not part 
of the regional court system.23  
Public international law may here contribute to fostering a harmonized 
interpretation of international rules of Private international law. Indeed, 
international law has set up rules on the interpretation of international treaties, 
which have been considered as part of customary international law.24 More 
generally, the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, dated 23 May 1969, also 
offers many solutions to issues relating to treaty law, which are of relevance to all 
treaties independently of their object, for as long as States are parties to this 
Convention. Finally, decisions of international courts and tribunals may also 
contribute to a harmonized interpretation of treaties. Indeed, a thorough analysis 
of the case law of ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (hereinafter the “PCIJ”), shows the existence of several judiciary 
presumptions relating to the interpretation of international conventions, which 
may assist in the settlement of disputes relating to the interpretation of a treaty, 
whatever the nature of the rules contained therein.25 
Moreover, Public international law may contribute to the development of Private 
international law through its courts, in particular through recourse to the 
International Court of Justice. Indeed, as already shown,26 States do bring their 
disputes of a Private international law nature before the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations. In doing so, the International Court of Justice may contribute 
to developing a harmonized interpretation of rules of Private international law. 
Considering the fact that the Court’s function is “to decide in accordance with 
 
23  See for instance: ECHR, Neulinger and Shuruk vs. Switzerland (App. 41615/07), 6 July 
2010; see also: VAN LOON & DE DYCKER, The role of the International Court of Justice, 
p. 109-110; BEAUMONT & WALKER, Post Neulinger Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the Hague Child Abduction Convention, p. 17-30.  
24  The customary status of the interpretation rules included in article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties was confirmed by the International Court of Justice 
at several occasions: LaGrand (Germany vs. United States of America), judgment of 27 
June 2001, I.C.J Reports, 2001, p. 501, para. 99; Avena and other Mexican Nationals 
(Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment of 31 March 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 
p. 48, para. 83; Legal Consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 174, para. 
94; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 60, 
para. 160. 
25  Examples of such assumptions include the assumption of internal coherence 
between the different notions within an international convention, the assumption that 
the terms in a treaty translate the intention of the Contracting Parties and the 
assumption that the terms of a treaty have been used in their natural meaning. See: 
SANDONATO DE LEON, Les présomptions judiciaires en droit international public. 
26  See supra: section 1.4. 
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international law such disputes as are submitted to it”,27 Private international law 
rules that are at stake before the Court are to a wide extent rules of international 
law, whether part of an international convention or constituting general principles 
of law or customary international law. However, this is not to say that municipal 
law plays no role at all before the Court. An analysis of its case law as well as that 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice shows that municipal law may 
have a decisive influence on the Court’s decisions.28 This seems even truer in cases 
involving aspects of Private international law, since these cases often arise out of a 
wrongful application of municipal law, or the wrongful operation of municipal 
courts.29  
States’ decisions to bring their Private international law disputes before the 
International Court of Justice seem to be prompted by the fact that the Court, as 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has a unique universal radiance. As 
a result, even if the decision rendered by the Court is only binding upon the States 
parties to the dispute, its judgments have a wide authority, expanding to States 
that are not parties to the dispute. Such universal radiance is a result of several 
factors: first, the permanent institutional character of the Court ensures its 
continuity in time; second, the composition of the Court, in particular the fact that 
judges together represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal 
systems of the world,30 ensures an approach that is acceptable to all forms of legal 
traditions; finally, the fact that all State members of the United Nations may in 
principle bring a dispute before the Court is an important factor for its universal 
radiance.  
Through its universal radiance, as principal judicial organ of the United Nations, 
the World Court is in the best place to foster a harmonized approach on the 
interpretation or the application of rules of Private international law. 
2.2. Contribution of Private International Law to the 
Development of Public International Law 
The complementarity between Private and Public international law may present 
itself the other way around, namely, Private international law contributing to the 
development of Public international law. 
Public international law governs relations between States and international 
organizations. As we have already mentioned, non-state actors increasingly play a 
 
27  Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38. 
28  PELLET, Commentary on article 38 of the Statute, para. 116. 
29  On the role of municipal Law before the International Court of Justice, see:  
DE DYCKER, Private international law disputes before the International Court of 
Justice, p. 475-498.  
30  Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 9. 
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role on the international stage. Non-State actors may be holders of specific rights 
at the international level. Sometimes they can even enforce them on the 
international stage.31 But this is not always the case. States often disagree as to 
providing direct international rights to non-State actors such as individuals or 
corporations. Similarly, if direct international rights are provided to non-State 
actors, Public international law lacks the ability to complete them with efficient 
enforcement means at the international level. In such situations, Public 
international law proves to be inadequate. The main reason for this situation is the 
lack of agreement among States to impose direct international rights and 
obligations to certain non-State actors or to provide for efficient enforcement 
mechanisms at the international stage.  
This is, for example, the case in the field of human rights protection. Human rights 
covenants are conventions under international law and therefore agreements 
between States. This means that, in the first instance, States are responsible for the 
implementation of human rights. In the debate on better global implementation of 
human rights however, the activity of multinational enterprises is playing an 
increasingly important role. Political developments on the international stage in 
this field have demonstrated that it is difficult – if not impossible at this stage – to 
find an agreement among States on a binding legal international instrument 
ensuring that human rights are respected by multinational enterprises. 
In such scenarios, States may tend to adopt a pragmatic approach searching for 
the indirect recognition of rights and obligations of non-State actors at the 
international level. In doing so, States agree on setting up international 
obligations to provide in their municipal law for rights and obligations to non-
State actors. They may reach an agreement in the form of the text of an 
international convention;32 rather than a formal agreement, States may also 
develop international soft law instruments. This is for instance the case of the UN 
Guiding Principles33 In doing so, States provide for such rights and obligations of 
non-State actors as part of their municipal law. In such configuration, although it 
would be difficult to enforce rights and obligations of non-State actors directly at 
the international stage, there is still a close connection with international law: 
State negligence in providing for an efficient system of rights and obligations with 
respect to non-State actors as requested under an international agreement may 
trigger a State’s responsibility at the international level. In case the agreement at 
 
31  For instance, individuals may bring claims before the European Court of Human 
rights. One may also think of ICSID as an international dispute settlement Center 
where investors, i.e. corporations, may bring claims against States. 
32  See e.g.: The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 18 December 1979; the International Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 13 December 2006.  
33  Infra, section 3. 
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the international level takes the form of a soft law instrument, thereby excluding a 
State’s responsibility in case of non-compliance, political pressure against the non-
compliant State, including by civil society may still be exercised so as to encourage 
and promote full compliance.  
The rules that are adopted by States in their municipal law, as a result of their 
international (soft law) obligations, have different forms: they can be substantial 
legal norms providing for rights and obligations of individuals or corporations. An 
illustration of such norms may be found in the fundamental rights included in 
most countries’ Constitutions, which are inspired in a large part from international 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was adopted 
on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. But in a 
context where the activities of the non-State actors concerned are in a large part 
transnational, it is important that such substantial municipal law rules be 
complemented by other rules, especially of a Private international law nature. 
Indeed, an efficient system to solve situations of conflicts of jurisdiction and 
applicable law is a clear contributor to an efficient enforcement mechanism of the 
substantial rights and obligations recognized to non-State actors at the 
municipal – and eventually international – level.  
In this scenario, the role of Private international law appears clearly: By 
complementing rules and obligations States have recognized for non-States actors 
at the municipal level as a result of their international (soft law) obligations, with 
an efficient system to solve conflicts of jurisdiction and applicable law as well as 
rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, Private international 
law contributes to the advancement of Public international law. Without 
municipal substantial legal norms and Private international law norms, it is highly 
probable that there would be no recognition of such rights and obligations of non-
State actors at the international level whatsoever. Indeed, the only alternative is 
an enforcement of such rights and obligations at the international level, which has 
proven to be difficult for States to accept.  
But one can also consider that the adoption and application of Private 
international law rules constitute relevant State practice, which in turn could 
contribute to the emergence of international standards, general principles of 
international law, and eventually customary international law. Over time, State 
practice in Private international law could also lead to the adoption of 
conventional rules with the same content. In this sense too, Private international 
law may contribute to the development of Public international law. 
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3. The United Nations Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 
The UN Guiding Principles offer a useful illustration of the permeability and 
complementarity between Public and Private international law. After a general 
presentation of the UN Guiding Principles (3.1), this section will concentrate on 
how the UN Guiding Principles include common features of both Public and 
Private international law (3.2) and how they illustrate the existing 
complementarity between Public and Private international law (3.3). 
3.1. General Presentation of the United Nations Principles 
on Business and Human Rights 
Business and human rights has long been the object of debates within the 
international community. Some important steps have been achieved in the last 
decade. In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights (later the Human Rights 
Council) asked the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint a special 
representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. The Secretary-General appointed Professor John 
Ruggie with the mandate among others to “identify and clarify standards of 
corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regard to human rights” and to “elaborate on the 
role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, 
including through international corporation”.34 
Ruggie’s appointment resulted from the decision of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, in 2004, not to adopt an earlier instrument that proposed to define the 
legal responsibilities of corporations with respect to human rights.35 The draft 
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” were presented in 2003 by a sub-
commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights. These draft norms took the 
approach that although States have the primary responsibility to protect human 
rights, “transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of 
society, are also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”,36 and that they have, as a result, 
 
34  UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/69, Human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, 20 April 2005. 
35  UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/116, Responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights, 20 April 
2004. 
36  Ibidem. 
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within their sphere of activity and influence, corresponding legal duties. The UN 
Commission on Human Rights reacted coolly: it granted that the document 
contained useful elements and ideas but added that it had not requested it and 
that, as a draft proposal, it had no legal standing.  
Professor John Ruggie proposed in 2008 a concept for human rights and 
companies based on three pillars: (a) the State duty to protect against human 
rights abuses; (b) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and finally 
(c) access to effective remedy for victims of human rights abuse.37 The “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework was designed as a response to “governance gaps 
created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. These 
governance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by 
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation”.38 
The first Pillar covers the existing international legal duty of States to protect 
persons within their jurisdiction from human rights violations, including those 
committed by business or in which business is complicit.  
The second Pillar relates to the business responsibility to respect human rights. 
Such general business “responsibility to respect” is articulated as a duty assumed 
“because it is the basic expectation society has of business”.39 The term 
“responsibility” rather than “duty” is meant to indicate that respecting rights is not 
currently an obligation that international human rights law generally imposes 
directly on companies, although elements of it may be reflected in domestic laws. 
It is a global standard of expected conduct acknowledged in virtually every 
voluntary and soft-law instrument related to corporate responsibility, and now 
affirmed by the Human Rights Council itself. Such responsibility to protect entails 
two components: a duty not to harm, i.e. not infringing the rights of others, and a 
due diligence responsibility, i.e. “a process whereby companies not only ensure 
compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm 
with a view to avoiding it. The scope of human rights-related due diligence is 
determined by the context in which a company is operating, its activities, and the 
relationships associated with those activities”.40 
 
37  Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human rights, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
38  Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human rights, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, p. 3, par. 3. 
39  Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human rights, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, pp. 4-5, par. 9. 
40  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, p. 9, para. 25. 
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Finally, the third Pillar of the Framework requires a remedy for victims when 
human rights violations occur. States have a responsibility to provide both judicial 
and non-judicial remedies, while business has a responsibility to provide non-
judicial remedies for violations in which it is involved.41  
Professor Ruggie's “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework was largely 
welcomed because it clearly distinguished between the responsibilities of the 
various players and clarified the complex interface between human rights and 
companies. 
Based on these three pillars, Professor Ruggie developed the UN Guiding 
Principles, which were endorsed by consensus by the UN Human Rights Council in 
June 2011.42 The UN Guiding Principles contain 31 Principles together with a 
commentary on each Principle, following the same structure as the UN 
Framework. Principles 1 to 10 cover the State duty to protect; Principles 11 to 24 
cover the business responsibility to respect; and Principles 25 to 31 address the 
need to provide victims an access to remedy. Importantly, these Principles do not 
impose new legal obligations, or change existing human rights instruments, but 
aim to articulate what these established instruments mean, and to address the gap 
between law and practice. 
As a follow-up, the UN Human Rights Council established a Working Group on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations to promote the 
dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles. The Working Group 
has particularly encouraged States to adopt National Action Plans to implement 
the UN Guiding Principles. The UN Guiding Principles emphasize that States have 
a critical role to play and can use a “smart mix of measures – national and 
international, mandatory and voluntary – to foster business respect by for human 
rights”.43 
The results in practice of the UN Guiding Principles have given rise to significant 
debate among governments and with the human rights community.44 Some 
argued that the UN Guiding Principles were still new and that the stakeholders 
needed more time to implement them, whereas others considered that the UN 
 
41  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, p. 22 ff. 
42  UN Human Rights Council, res. 17/4, Human Rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, 16 June 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2011. 
43  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, 
Principle 3. 
44  See, in particular: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, Needs and Options for a New 
International Instrument in the field of Business and Human rights, Guidance on 
National Action Plans on Business and Human rights, version 1.01, December 2014. 
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Guiding Principles were in any event too weak to impose themselves to business 
enterprises and that a more effective, “hard law” tool was needed. 
On 26 June 2014, following an initiative of certain States, the Human Rights 
Council also adopted a resolution, according to which an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group was established with mandate to elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights.45 Yet, one day later, the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted another resolution which does not support a 
binding legal instrument governing business-related abuses, and instead opts to 
continue the mandate of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
for another three years. It further reaffirms the normative content of the UN 
Guiding Principles, focusing on strengthening domestic measures through 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles and improving access to remedies 
for victims of business-related.46 
3.2. The UN Guiding Principles as an Illustration of the 
Existing Permeability of Public and Private 
International Law 
The UN Guiding Principles serve as an ideal illustration of international “legal” 
instruments of a new generation, lying at the crossroads of Public and Private 
international law. More precisely, the UN Guiding Principles appear to be the 
result of a modern conception of international law where Private and Public are 
not hermetically separated but rather show a high level of permeability. Various 
reasons appear to allow such conclusion. 
First, the UN Guiding Principles are a soft law instrument, not a traditional hard 
law instrument, and it was developed within the framework of an international 
organization, the United Nations, and in particular, the UN Human Rights Council. 
Hence from a Public international law perspective, it is part of the new 
instruments that are not a formal source of Public international law but that may 
nevertheless play an important role in the emergence of new rules of Public 
international law. From the perspective of Private international law, the UN 
Guiding Principles may be considered as an international instrument designed at 
offering solutions to new issues of private international law, that is preventing and 
offering adequate remedies to violations of human rights committed abroad by 
non-State actors, especially companies with transnational activities. In this way, 
 
45  Human Rights Council, Resolution, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, 26 June 2014. On the 
open-ended intergovernmental working group’s activities: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/Session2.aspx (01.09.2016). 
46  Human Rights Council, Resolution, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22, 27 June 2014. 
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the UN Guiding Principles appear as a material source of both Public and Private 
international law. 
Second, as to their object, the UN Guiding Principles appear also to be at the 
crossroads of Public and Private international law, as they intend to regulate 
international relations between non-States actors but are at the same time a soft 
law instrument that is addressed to States. Indeed, as their full title indicates 
clearly, the UN Guiding Principles are directed towards individuals and 
companies, hence non-State actors. In addition, some obligations provided for by 
the UN Guiding Principles are clearly directed to business enterprises. This is in 
particular the case of the companies’ responsibility to respect human rights as 
contained in the second pillar and their responsibility to provide non-judicial 
remedies for violations in which they are involved, as included in the third pillar. 
But this does not mean that States are excluded: the UN Guiding Principles have 
been developed and adopted within an international organization the members of 
which are States. More precisely, the UN Guiding Principles provide for direct 
obligations upon States under the first pillar, in particular, an obligation to protect 
persons within their jurisdiction from human rights violations. Under the third 
pillar, the UN Guiding Principles provide that States must ensure that individuals 
affected have access to effective remedies. But the UN Guiding Principles also 
count on States for the implementation within their domestic law of other 
obligations, in particular those directed to companies such as the responsibility of 
business enterprises to respect human rights. 
Third, the same conclusion can be drawn from the subjects involved in the UN 
Guiding Principles. In the same manner that the UN Guiding Principles regulate 
relations between non-State actors as well as between State actors, they concern 
both subjects that are non-State actors, i.e. individuals and corporations, and 
traditional Public international law subjects, i.e. States. 
Fourth and finally, as to dispute settlement mechanisms, the UN Guiding 
Principles provide, in the third pillar, that States must ensure that those affected 
by human rights abuses within their jurisdiction have access to effective remedies, 
whether State-based or non-State based, judicial or non-judicial. In doing so, 
States are encouraged to set up effective dispute settlement mechanisms under 
domestic law. This can occur through different means, including by providing 
specific rules of Private international law so as to extend competence of the 
existing judicial system under domestic law to disputes arising out of violations of 
human rights involving non-State actors and to determine the applicable law in 
such cases. It could also occur through the setting up of an international dispute 
settlement mechanism like an international court with specific competence to 
decide on human rights violations’ international disputes between non-State 
actors. 
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3.3. The UN Guiding Principles as an Illustration of the 
Complementarity of Public and Private International 
Law 
In the previous section, we have shown that the UN Guiding Principles offer a 
useful illustration of the permeability of Private international law and Public 
international law. However, the UN Guiding Principles also are a good example of 
how Public and Private international law complement each other and are mutually 
supportive in the advancement of their common goal, i.e. the prevention and 
remedy of corporate human rights violations. 
As a soft law instrument, the UN Guiding Principles cannot impose rights and obli-
gations in the international relations between States or non-State actors. But, as 
any soft law instrument, the UN Guiding Principles may encourage and promote 
action taken by States to either adapt their municipal law so as to ensure 
enforcement of such rights and obligations at the domestic level, or to push further 
their negotiation to finally reach an international binding agreement under the 
form of a multilateral treaty. Such action would, in the case of the UN Guiding 
Principles, result in a situation where Public international law contributes to the 
advancement of Private international law. Indeed, developing an international 
treaty on business and human rights would entail reaching an international 
agreement on rules of a Private international law nature designed at ensuring that 
business enterprises can be sued everywhere by victims for violations of human 
rights or determining the applicable law to such disputes. The elaboration and 
adoption of such type of multilateral treaty would mean that Public international 
law contributes to the advancement of Private international law.  
But the UN Guiding Principles also show the opposite, namely that Private 
international law may contribute to the development of Public international law. 
Indeed, States’ implementation of the UN Guiding Principles within their domestic 
legal system, including through the development of Private international law rules 
aiming at ensuring effective judicial remedy for the victims of human rights’ 
violations, may contribute to the advancement of Public international law. Such 
rules of a Private international law could for instance consist in extending 
jurisdiction of domestic courts to decide on disputes arising from corporate 
violations of human rights, wherever these violations have been committed. By 
developing such rules of Private international law, States contribute to the 
emergence of a relevant practice, which may eventually – next to opinio juris – end 
up in the recognition of a customary international obligation to provide for the 
means ensuring effective judicial remedy for corporate human rights’ violations. 
At least, such States’ practice could contribute to developing a political context 
favorable to the negotiations between States of an internationally binding 
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instrument requiring from States that they provide effective remedy for the victims 
of corporate human rights’ violations.  
In more general terms, one could also conclude that the increasing global social 
expectation that companies should respect international human rights standards 
as provided in the second Pillar of the UN Guiding Principles, combined with 
States’ increasing adoption and implementation of domestic law rules of a Private 
international law nature – e.g. extraterritorial jurisdiction rules in view of 
ensuring a better protection to human rights – could change the nature and 
possibility of developing a firmer basis for corporate legal accountability for 
human rights.  
Both Private and Public international law appear to be mutually supportive in the 
advancement of a common goal: the prevention and remedy of corporate human 
rights’ violations. 
4. Conclusion 
When confronted with the reality of international relations, one can observe a 
high level of permeability between Private and Public international law, which can 
be witnessed at various levels. Material sources of Public and Private international 
law, as well as their object, their subjects and their dispute settlement mechanisms 
appear no longer separated. On the contrary, Public and Private international law 
seem to increasingly share common features. 
More than a static phenomenon and a source of confusion, such permeability 
between Public and Private international law can be seen as developing its own 
dynamics. Indeed, in view of the advancement of their goals – which in our 
interrelated world appear to be common – Public and Private international law 
may complement each other. 
The UN Guiding Principles appear as a direct product of such permeability as it 
shows aspects of both Public and Private international law. Moreover, the UN 
Guiding Principles show that such permeability between Public and Private 
international law has been used in a constructive way, showing that Public 
international law may contribute to the development of Private international law 
and vice-versa. More than ever in our inter-related world, our “Global Law” 
combines aspects of both Public international law and Private international law. 
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In the reports on Business and Human Rights by John Ruggie, “access to remedies” 
cq “access to justice” appears to be a key element. 
Rules of Private International Law (referred to as “PIL”) can be seen as key factors 
in achieving access to remedies cq access to justice: PIL rules act like hinges that 
allow doors – granting access to a specific court and to a specific legal norm - to be 
opened or to be kept closed; thus, as PIL deals with issues of international juris-
diction and applicable law, PIL rules are of paramount importance in determining 
access to a specific court and access to a specific legal norm. 
In his Guiding Principles, Ruggie addresses the responsibility of States for issuing 
suitable legislation and “access to remedies”; it can certainly be argued that PIL 
legislation (rules on jurisdiction and applicable law) and the interpretation of this 
legislation should also be examined in this context. 
The focus of this article is the hypothesis that plaintiffs typically want to bring an 
action before a EU Member State court. When focusing on this hypothesis, one can 
observe that at least some PIL-aspects are covered by rules of PIL of European 
origin – the regulation of some other aspects is still left to the EU – Member States 
themselves. To what extent do these rules allow or deny access to remedies cq 
access to justice? 
In this article, some rules and issues of mainly European PIL – both jurisdiction and 
applicable law – that deserve attention from this perspective will be highlighted in 
an introductory way. 
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1. Corporate Human Rights Violations and Private 
International Law  
1.1. Ambition: Study of the Potential Role of Private 
International Law  
1.1.1. A Self-Evident Rule that Should Apply in Full … 
It seems to go without saying that victims should be able1 to hold those involved in 
a human rights violation liable for any damage or loss caused; setting out the legal 
arguments for this rule should be a mere formality:. this seems to be not only a self-
evident rule but also one that should apply in full.  
It is conceivable – and this is the central hypothesis of this contribution − that a non-
European subsidiary of a European parent company will violate human rights 
outside Europe – in a conflict area2 or otherwise – and that the European parent 
company will also be involved in that violation. The twofold fact that (a) the 
defendants (those causing the damage) are collectively a non-European subsidiary 
and its European parent company and (b) the plaintiffs (or claimants) are non-
European victims who have sustained damage or loss outside Europe should be no 
reason to depart from the above-mentioned self-evident rule. But on closer scrutiny, 
it becomes apparent that several hurdles must be overcome in this specific situation. 
If these hurdles are not taken, there is a risk that plaintiffs will be deprived of 
compensation.  
1.1.2. But the Road is Paved with Hurdles… 
Some of the legal hurdles to be cleared by plaintiffs are found in the area of private 
international law (“PIL”), because damage/loss can only be recovered if two basic 
conditions are satisfied: first, that an action can be brought before a competent court 
and second, that the legal norms on which the plaintiffs rely can be invoked before 
this court. In PIL terminology, this concerns the jurisdiction of the court before which 
the action has been brought and the law to be applied by this court, respectively. PIL 
rules have, in fact, traditionally provided the answers to both these issues: in 
 
1  Possibly, in addition to criminal prosecution. As for some PIL aspects in relation to the 
interwovenness of civil and criminal liability, see infra Article 7(3) of the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation (former Article 5(4) of the Brussels I Regulation – see on the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast Regulation infra n. 14) (concerning 
jurisdiction) as well as infra see n. 72, 86 and 88 (concerning applicable law). 
2  The fact that damage is caused in a conflict zone does not make any essential 
difference for the purposes of this contribution: the fact that damage is caused in a 
conflict zone does not give rise to a completely different PIL system. Even so, I will 
mention some special items to be addressed in the case of conflict situations. 
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private-law relationships with an international aspect, PIL rules determine what 
court has jurisdiction and what law has to be applied by that court.3  
1.1.3. Recognition of PIL Hurdles Attached to the Hypothesis that 
Multinational Corporations Are Confronted with Liability 
Claims in their Home Countries for Violations Committed 
outside Europe… 
The question now arises what PIL rules apply in cases where non-European plain-
tiffs want to bring civil proceedings against a European parent company and/or a 
non-European subsidiary of this European parent company. Suppose, in particular, 
that following a human rights violation a plaintiff wants to file a lawsuit in an EU 
Member State court4 – the court of a jurisdiction that purports to attach great value 
to human rights. A European parent company and its non-European subsidiary must 
then account to a European court for the damage/loss caused by the subsidiary 
abroad. In cases of human rights violations, the question arises whether non-
European victims have any opportunity to bring a lawsuit in a competent court in 
Europe and whether rules of applicable law automatically refer to the relevant 
human-rights norm. The question can also be defined in broader terms:5 let us first 
assume that legal systems of non-European countries and those of European 
countries compete with each other in this area and that the rules of the one legal 
system are much more favourable to plaintiffs than the rules of the other legal 
system.6 It is also important to recognize the dynamics of transnational business 
 
3  Please note, however, that PIL is national law, in principle: each country may, as a 
general rule, determine in what situations its own courts have international jurisdiction 
and what law they have to apply. However, PIL sources are sometimes supranational. 
Europe is currently undergoing a process of Europeanization or communitarization of 
PIL: the PIL of the EU Member States in increasingly European in origin, with national 
PIL sources losing ground all the time.  
4  The (European) “home country” of the European Parent company. On the subject of 
potential barriers to and disadvantages of litigation in the (non-European) “host 
country”, see, inter alia, ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 4. 
5  “Broader” in the sense that attention is focussed not only on human rights violations 
but also on other types of unauthorized actions that are liable to sanctions. 
6  See, for example, ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 28, who takes the view that the 
substantive law of the home country is usually more favourable to the victim than the 
substantive law of the host country. In this article I do not assume that the substantive 
law of the home country is more favourable by definition than the law of the host 
country; rather, I address the question whether the law of the home country can be 
applied if this turns out to be advantageous to the victim. In this context, I will not 
discuss any substantive law itself and nor will I attempt to identify specific human 
rights. 
  On the contrary, I will confine myself to PIL mechanisms that permit or require the 
application of a specific rule, with a few comments on the possibility of invoking norms 
that are independent of PIL.  
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that could be relevant to this matter and realize that multinational corporations 
may very well try to manipulate the differences in legislation by focusing their 
operations in countries where norms less strict than in the “home country” apply.7 
Can we then conclude that PIL rules ensure that plaintiffs (victims) can invoke the 
substantive rules most favourable to them or, by contrast, are these PIL rules partly 
responsible for denying these plaintiJs − the “weaker parties”8 − legal protection 
by subjecting them to the substantive legal norms that are least favourable to them? 
Even if plaintiffs can take their matter to a court in a European Member State, can 
they be denied access to the “highest norms” after all – usually the norms of the 
home country of the parent company or, as the case may be, the norms derived from 
international law − and are they systematically “pushed back” to the lower norms 
– usually those applicable in the host country where the subsidiary has operated its 
business? If so, this would amount to “giving with one hand and taking away with 
the other” and the plaintiffs have then been fobbed off with empty promises: even 
though they are formally granted access to a legal system of a European Member 
State, through the application of PIL rules concerning jurisdiction − specifically by 
enabling them to start an action before a court in Europe − the plaintiJ’s eJorts 
come to nothing due to the application of substantive PIL rules concerning 
applicable law of the relevant European legal system:9 in that case, the plaintiffs 
cannot invoke rules that offer a remedy but are referred to rules that are 
unfavourable to victims. In that case, PIL rules would by no means have any 
regulatory effect on the conduct of multinationals; on the contrary, PIL rules would 
then contribute to “liberalisation” dynamics.10  
1.1.4. The Necessity of Exploring European PIL Hurdles in this Area  
This contribution seeks to explore and analyse the PIL rules that are important in 
this area. Given the central hypothesis of this contribution – that plaintiffs want to 
bring an action before an EU Member State court – this exploration and analysis is 
based on the European PIL perspective. Where European PIL sources are available, 
 
7  On these dynamics, see e.g. WRAY, Transnational Corporations. 
8  On the inequality of the parties, see, inter alia, ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 33 
and Leigh Day et al., “Proposal to change EU law would deny justice to multinationals’ 
human rights victims”, 13 January 2010 (available at http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/ 
2010/January-2010/Proposal-to-change-EU-law-would-deny-justice-to-mu), p. 3 and 
p. 8.  
9  Which are part of every legal system too. Where victims thought they could “use the 
legal system of a European country”, the PIL rules of the legal order of that country – 
PIL rules that are therefore part of that legal system too – may prevent them access to 
all or some of the rules of substantive law of that legal system. 
10  On the liberalising or regulatory role of PIL rules in dynamics triggered by competing 
legal norms, see also VAN DEN EECKHOUT, Competing norms. See also, more recently, 
i.a. BRIGHT, L’accès à la justice civile, GRUSIC, International Environment Litigation and 
VAN CALSTER, The Role of Private International Law. 
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these are discussed, including any processes for amending these rules. Indirectly, a 
substantive comparison with American PIL will be made occasionally and some 
differences with the American Alien Tort Claims Act (the “TCA”) will be highlighted 
as well.  
The PIL analysis will address both rules on jurisdiction and rules on applicable law, 
because plaintiffs must clear both PIL hurdles: in an argument, which resembles a 
two-stage rocket, the plaintiff must prove (a) that the EU Member State court seised 
of the matter has international jurisdiction and (b) that this court can apply the 
norm invoked. For this reason, PIL rules are of paramount importance in 
determining access to a specific court and to a specific legal norm. Thus, it turns out 
that PIL rules act like hinges that allow doors – granting access to a specific court 
and to a specific legal norm − to be opened or to be kept closed. PIL rules grant or 
deny “access”. 
1.2. Access to Justice as a Central Key Concept; Access to 
Justice and PIL  
“Access to justice” happens to be a key concept in the debate on this issue: in the 
reports by John Ruggie11, “access to justice” is a key element; various aspects of 
access to justice are highlighted in this context. It follows that PIL rules, too, are a 
key factor in achieving access to justice in this field. In his “Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework”, Ruggie addresses the responsibility of States for issuing 
suitable legislation and “access to remedies” and it may be well argued that PIL 
legislation should be examined in this context, too.  
Moreover, in recent years, the European institutions have defined access to justice 
to be one of the central objectives of the broader ongoing process of 
Europeanization12 of PIL: PIL is defined as a policy instrument to achieve better 
access to justice and a true Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.13  
In short, given the importance attached to access to justice in both Ruggie’s reports 
and in PIL itself, it is appropriate to analyse the access to justice content of PIL rules 
 
11  Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Business and 
Human Rights. See Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 2002. On 21 
March 2011, the “Guiding Principles” were issued. See www.business-humanrights. 
org/SpecialRepPortal/Home.  
12  This concerns the process where an increasing number of PIL rules are determined at 
the European level (cf. supra n. 3). 
13  Incidentally, reference is often made to “access to justice of Community citizens” or 
“easing European citizens’ daily lives”. The question arises whether European PIL rules 
are also designed to ease the lives of non-European citizens who stay outside Europe 
and who have suffered any loss or damage there; or does PIL constitute a factor that 
makes their lives even harder?  
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in the context of corporate human rights violations. Below, the analysis of the access 
to justice content of PIL rules that are important in this context will be divided into 
two parts, based on the two classical PIL issues − two key stages relating to litiga-
tion: first (in Chapter 2), the issue of jurisdiction, and next, (in Chapter 3), the issue 
of applicable law. 
2. Issues of Jurisdiction  
2.1. PIL Sources: Brussels I Recast Regulation and National 
PIL  
Bringing an action before an EU Member State court for the purpose of holding a 
European parent company and/or its non-European subsidiary liable is subject to 
the preliminary condition that one – or more – EU Member State court(s) have 
international jurisdiction. To determine whether an EU Member State court has 
jurisdiction, this court must assess the relevant facts by reference to the rules of the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Brussels I Regulation)14 or − if this regulation 
is found to be inapplicable – by reference to jurisdiction rules included in a national 
PIL source. The crucial factor in determining whether the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation or the national PIL source must be applied is the question whether or 
not the defendant is “domiciled” in a European Member State.  
Under Article 4, in conjunction with Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation 
(former Article 2 in conjunction with Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation), an 
action taken by non-European plaintiffs against a European parent company comes 
within the scope of application of the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Under Article 4 
of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation), 
an action may be started before the court of the country where the defendant is 
domiciled. Under Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 60 
of the Brussels I Regulation), this concerns the country where a company has its 
“statutory seat” or “central administration” or “principal place of business”.15 
 
14  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast), L351/1, OJ 20.12.2012 (former Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I 
Regulation”)). 
15  For example, the jurisdiction of the Dutch court in the “Shell case” (pending in appeal) 
against the parent company was based on the fact that this parent company has its 
principal place of business in the Netherlands; the plaintiff could also have opted for 
an action before the English courts based on the fact that the parent company’s 
registered office (“statutory seat”, as it is known in the Brussels I Recast Regulation 
c.q. Brussels I Regulation) is located there. For the decisions of the District Court of 30 
January 2013, see http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Rechtbanken/Den-Haag/ 
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Accordingly, with the exception of cases where there is a choice of forum, juris-
diction is based on the general rule of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, 
even in actions where it is argued that human rights have been violated: the Brussels 
I Recast Regulation does not provide for a special legal ground for cases involving 
human rights violations.16 Even so, one or more additional EU Member State courts 
may have jurisdiction under Article 7 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former 
Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation), subject to certain conditions. In this context, 
it is worth pointing to Article 7 paragraph 3 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation 
(former Article 5(4) of the Brussels I Regulation), under which a court that has 
jurisdiction in criminal proceedings may also acquire jurisdiction in civil liability 
proceedings. Another option is to seek the application of Article 7, paragraph 2 of 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Brussels I 
Regulation), which confers jurisdiction on the EU Member State court of the “the 
place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”. The case law of the 
European Court of Justice17 shows that where there is any discrepancy between “the 
place where the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of the damage” (known 
as the Handlungsort) and “the place where the damage occurred” (known as the 
Erfolgsort), both the court of the Handlungsort and the court of the Erfolgsort have 
jurisdiction; thus, where “the event”/the Erfolgsort/the Handlungsort occurred or is 
situated in a European country, jurisdiction may be conferred on such EU Member 
State court(s) under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 
5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation). 
In the relevant legal literature,18 the following comment was made on the 
interpretation of the Handlungsort: “It can be argued that the Handlungsort is the 
place where the parent company is seated, as this is where decisions were made that 
resulted in the harmful effect abroad”. In this context, it is important to bear in mind 
that the court of the country where the parent company is seated will already have 
 
Nieuws/Pages/DutchjudgementsonliabilityShell.aspx and https://milieudefensie.nl/ 
shell-in-nigeria/rechtszaak/pers/juridische-documenten. On these decisions, see e.g. 
ENNEKING, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability. 
16  On this subject, see also VAN HOEK, Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility. It 
follows from the foregoing that pursuant to the Brussels I Recast Regulation, an EU 
Member State court will have jurisdiction in any action against a European parent 
company – the court of the country where the company has its seat. If the defendant is 
not domiciled in a Member State, the Brussels I Recast Regulation is not applicable 
and another PIL regime must be resorted to.  
17  Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Polasse d' Alsace SA [1976] ECR 
1735. For a commentary on the recent Öfab case (ECJ, 18 July 2013, Case C-147/12 
(Öfab) in which the Court ruled on Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, see A.A.H. 
van Hoek, Doorbraak van aansprakelijkheid in het ipr, noot bij HvJEU 18 juli 2013, zaak 
C-147/12 (ÖFAB) Ars Aequi 2013, p. 948-954. 
18  See, in particular, JÄGERS & VAN DER HEIJDEN, Corporate Human Rights Violations,  
p. 846.  
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jurisdiction under Article 4 in conjunction with Article 63 Brussels I Regulation 
(former Article 2 in conjunction with Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation). To 
ensure that Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation) provides for an additional ground of jurisdiction, it is 
required that this article should allow jurisdiction to be conferred on an EU Member 
State court other than the court(s) that already has/have jurisdiction under Article 
4 in conjunction with Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 
2 in conjunction with Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation) – for example, where 
decisions have been taken in a Member State other than the Member State where 
the company is seated and that country is regarded as the Handlungsort!? 
If plaintiffs wish to summon a non-European subsidiary before any EU Member State 
court, the requirement of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former 
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation) that the defendant must be “domiciled” in a 
Member State is clearly not satisfied. In that case, the question concerning the 
jurisdiction of this court may be resolved by reference to the national PIL rules of 
the country of this court.19 Whether these national rules allow a plaintiff to start an 
action against the non-European subsidiary depends on the contents of the relevant 
national provisions, for example, concerning “related actions” or forum necessitatis. 
The precise possibilities may vary from country to country.20 In the Shell case, which 
is currently pending in appeal in the Netherlands, the court based its jurisdiction 
with regard to Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary on Article 7 of the Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure, which deals with related actions;21 the defendants later attempted to 
induce the Dutch court to stay the proceedings, because there was already an action 
pending in Nigeria. In doing so they invoked the lis pendens rule, as enshrined in 
Article 12 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure,22 however the Dutch court decided 
to continue the proceedings.23 
 
19  Compare the distinction made in the Shell case in the consideration of the jurisdiction 
with regard to the European parent on the one hand and the non-European subsidiary 
on the other hand. 
20  For a comparative law survey, see NUYTS, A. et al., Study on Residual Jurisdiction’, 
European Commission Study LS/C4/07-30-CE) 0040309/00-37, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf 
21  See the judgment of the District Court of The Hague of 30 December 2009, JOR 2010/41, 
with a note by R.G.J. de Haan.  
22  Rather than the rules of lis pendens of the Brussels I Regulation, see also infra n. 33. 
23  See the decision by the District Court of The Hague, dated 1 December 2010. 
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2.2. Scrutinization of Former Proposals to Reform the 
Brussels I Regulation for their Impact on Access to 
Justice  
2.2.1. Extension of the Scope of Application of the Brussels I 
Regulation to Non-European Defendants – Introduction of 
Forum Necessitatis  
As the law stands at present under the regime of the Brussels I Recast Regulation – 
and as was already the case under the regime of the Brussels I Regulation -, cases 
involving non-European defendants are, in principle, subject to national PIL 
regimes; however during the preparation of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, a 
process for the revision of the Brussels I Regulation was under way,24 which might 
have changed this: there were plans to extend the scope of application of the 
Brussels I Regulation to include non-European defendants.25 It was conceivable 
therefore that after the revision of the Brussels I Regulation, questions concerning 
the jurisdiction of EU Member State courts in proceedings against non-European 
subsidiaries would have to be answered by reference to the (revised version of the) 
Brussels I Regulation as well. To enable plaintiffs to commence an action against a 
non-European defendant, it was proposed to include a forum necessitatis in the 
Brussels I Regulation26 in an attempt to prevent déni de justice and ensure access to 
justice.27 Incidentally, this forum necessitatis may well provide special possibilities 
in the event that in the non-European country where the subsidiary operates its 
business a conflict situation arises, rendering it difficult to litigate in this country. 
 
24  See the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters COM(2009)0175 final, 21.04.2009. In September 2010, the European 
Parliament issued a resolution (European Parliament Resolution of 7 September 2010 
on the implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(2009/2140(INI)); in December 2010, the Commission presented a proposal (Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
COM(2010)748 final, 14.12.2010). The proposals discussed in this chapter have not been 
performed as such in the final version of the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
“Brussels I Recast Regulation.” See however, on lis pendens, the new article 33 
Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
25  See the proposed amendment to Article 4 of the Brussels I Regulation in the 
Commission’s proposal, as well as Recital 16 of the proposed preamble that goes with 
it.  
26  See Article 26 of the Commission’s Proposal. 
27  See the Green Paper COM (2009)175 final, 21 April 2009 and the Impact Assessment 
24. On this subject, see, inter alia, KESSEDJIAN, Commentaire de la refonte, p. 1-14 and 
WEBER, Universal Jurisdiction, p. 17-18. 
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Apparently, Article 6 ECHR plays a role in the background. In national PIL regimes, 
incorporation of forum necessitates has indeed already quite often been inspired by 
Article 6 ECHR.28  
To the extent that national PIL regimes already include a forum necessitatis, the fact 
that the jurisdiction issue would have been governed in the future by the ground of 
jurisdiction of the Brussels I Regulation, rather than any national ground of juris-
diction, cannot be considered a step forward or a step back on the road to achieving 
access to justice: the PIL source relied on will be different but the substantive 
outcome remains more or less the same. Yet, to the extent that specific national PIL 
regimes currently do not provide for any possibility of invoking forum necessitatis, 
the revision of the Brussels I Regulation seemed to be an improvement. In this 
context, the following point should however be made: including forum necessitatis 
in the Brussels I Regulation should have been assessed in the context of the entire 
revision process. The plans to revise the Brussels I Regulation left no room for 
invoking national grounds of jurisdiction against non-European defendants. This 
would have resulted in the disappearance of national grounds of jurisdiction other 
than forum necessitatis that are currently recognized in some EU countries and that 
provide alternatives in some cases − for example, national PIL provisions 
concerning related actions.29 This means that forum necessitates might well have 
become the only option in proceedings against non-European defendants. If the 
scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation were extended and national 
jurisdiction rules were indeed abolished, it seemed reasonable to therefore amend 
Article 6 of the Brussels I Regulation, which deals with related actions, so as to 
include a ground of jurisdiction based on related actions with respect to non-
European defendants. The Commission’s proposal to revise the Brussels I 
Regulation did not provide for this amendment of Article 6.30 Thus, an issue of 
 
28  As to the parliamentary history of Article 9 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, see, 
e.g., Kamerstuk [“Parliamentary Paper”] 1999-2000 (House of Representatives), 26855, 
no. 3. The rationale of Article 6 ECHR is a relevant factor in the background, but it 
should be possible in any case to subject the precise conditions of forum necessitas to 
the test of Article 6 ECHR. 
29  See, in particular, the Shell case, in which it was found unnecessary in the action 
against the non-European subsidiary to turn to the “last resort” of forum necessitatis 
(Article 9 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure), because it was possible to invoke Article 
7 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure concerning related actions.  
30  In the literature, some authors had advocated an extension of Article 6 in a general 
sense. See, for example, WEBER, Universal Jurisdiction, p. 8 and p. 23. Incidentally, 
amending Article 6 so as to include non-EU defendants would create possibilities for 
non-European victims especially if the present case law of the Court of Justice 
concerning a flexible approach of Article 6 of the Brussels I Regulation is also followed 
in situations where non-European defendants are involved too. In the decision of the 
District Court of The Hague concerning the application of Article 7 of the Dutch Code of 
Civil Procedure (see supra footnote 21), this case law was cited. 
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concern can be found here if one argues that the plans to revise the Brussels I 
Regulation should have been effectively “scrutinized for their impact on access to 
justice for third-country victims of human rights and environmental abuses by 
European parent corporations and/or their third-country subsidiaries.”31  
2.2.2. Amendment of the lis pendens Rule 
The next issue to be addressed concerns the lis pendens rule. Under Article 34 of the 
Commission’s proposal, the new version of the Brussels I Regulation would also 
have provided for a lis pendens rule in cases where there is an action in a non-
European country – for the final version, see Article 33 of the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation. As matters stood at that point in time, the lis pendens rule applied only 
between EU Member States; in lis pendens situations involving non-EU Member 
States, the Member States’ national PIL rules had to be resorted to.32 Here, too, it 
seems at first sight that amending the Brussels I Regulation would have made hardly 
any difference, but again, a critical note is in order here, particularly if the case law 
of the Court of Justice concerning the refusal to sanction parties’ abuse of 
jurisdiction rules is taken into consideration:33 the risk existed that the party who 
expects to be summoned in an action before a non-European court deliberately 
initiates an action in the non-European country where the subsidiary is seated and 
subsequently relies on the lis pendens rule of the Brussels I Regulation. This point 
needed to be addressed. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the 
Commission’s proposal, the EU Member State court had the opportunity − rather 
than the obligation − to stay the proceedings if another case is pending before a 
non-European court. It is also worth mentioning that the court’s assessment may 
take account of considerations relating to the fact that the non-European country is 
facing a conflict situation.  
 
31  See the appeal to this effect in the Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and 
the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European 
Union, University of Edinburgh, October 2010, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ 
euenterpriseslf/ and VAN DEN EECKHOUT, The Liability of European Parent Companies. 
32  This is why, as stated above (see supra n. 22), the dispute concerning lis pendens in the 
Shell case centred on Article 12 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure rather than the 
lis pendens provision of the Brussels I Regulation. 
33  See, in particular, the judgment handed down by the ECJ in the Gasser case, Case 
C116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH and MISAT Srl, 9 December 2003, where the Court strictly 
adhered to lis pendens provisions. Even though the revision process of the Brussels I 
Regulation included plans to reverse this decision – and finally the Brussels I Recast 
Regultion has been amended on this particular point - , this relates only to cases where 
the parties have made a choice of forum and either party subsequently goes to another 
court all the same. In the actions discussed in this contribution, it is unlikely that the 
parties have selected a EU Member State court as the forum, as is shown by the frantic 
efforts made by the defendants in the Shell case to persuade the Dutch court to decline 
jurisdiction. 
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2.2.3. Introduction of forum non conveniens? 
A revision of the Brussels I Regulation that would almost certainly have had an 
adverse effect on non-European defendants was an amendment permitting the 
courts of the EU Member States to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens: an 
EU Member State court that formally has jurisdiction under the jurisdiction rules of 
the Brussels I Regulation would then still be able to refuse to take jurisdiction 
because there is a more appropriate forum available to the parties. The risks that 
this entails for non-European defendants, particularly with regard to their “access 
to justice” – even the phase “denial of justice” is being used in this context – have 
been elaborated in response34 to the English proposal to revise the Brussels I 
Regulation along these lines.35 Forum non conveniens may be at odds with Article 6 
ECHR.36 What is more, it must be recognized that declining jurisdiction with respect 
to the European parent on the ground of forum non conveniens might also have had 
negative consequences for jurisdiction for the non-European subsidiary, because it 
would no longer be possible to invoke jurisdiction with regard to the non-European 
subsidiary on the ground that the action is related’37 to the action against the parent. 
In brief, the consequences of the introduction of a forum non conveniens plea in the 
Brussels I Regulation could have been immense. Nevertheless, the resolution of the 
European Parliament included a proposal for a forum non conveniens.38 And even 
 
34  See Leigh Day et al., “Proposal to change EU law would deny justice to multinationals’ 
human rights victims” (supra, n. 8). See also the above-mentioned (supra, n. 31) 
Edinburgh study, which is also very critical on this subject.  
35  The earlier rejection of the use by English courts of this Anglo-American forum non 
conveniens (see the decision of the Court of Justice in the Owusu case, ECJ C-281/02, 
1 March 2005) would then be reversed as a result of the amendment of this regulation. 
Incidentally, EU courts that never had the tradition of applying forum non conveniens 
could also start using it. This potential development already triggered the following 
comment: “A Phoenix rises from the ashes … and flies over all of Europe” (see 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/european-parliament-resolution-on-brussels-i/ ).  
36  See also the discussion by ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 18 et seq.  
37  Based on national PIL or, if an amendment extending Article 6 of the Brussels I 
Regulation would have been implemented, based, at that moment, on the Brussels I 
Regulation.  
38  In the resolution (no. 14), reference is made to the rules embodied in Article 15 of the 
Brussels II bis Regulation, which are already applicable, but in Brussels II bis, the 
relevant rules concern a situation between courts in Europe, whereas the resolution 
also concerns situations where a non-European court that is deemed better placed to 
hear the case – which may possibly mean that not a single court may have any 
jurisdiction left. Where at present litigants can be certain – under Article 4 in 
conjunction with Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 2 in 
conjunction with Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation) – that at all times some EU 
Member State court has jurisdiction and must take jurisdiction in an action against a 
European parent company, this certainty would be undermined if forum non 
conveniens is introduced. On this subject, see the critical comments by VAN DEN 
EECKHOUT, The Liability of European Parent Companies.  
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though the Commission’s proposal did not contain any explicit forum non conveniens 
provision, the planned extension of the lis pendens rule of the Brussels I Regulation 
to include situations where actions are pending in a non-European country was 
sometimes represented as inspired by forum non conveniens.39 Continued vigilance 
was – and is - called for. Should any forum non conveniens option have been included 
in the Brussels I Regulation, victims would lose a great advantage of the European 
rules compared to the American Aliens Tort Claims Act (ACTA),40 because under 
the system of the ATCA, forum non conveniens may be invoked. 
2.3. Acceptance of Jurisdiction of One or More EU Member 
State Court(s) as a Stepping Stone towards and a 
Preliminary Condition for Access to the Legal Standard 
Required  
The application of the above jurisdiction rules result in a decision to allow or dis-
allow a plaintiff to conduct proceedings before a specific EU Member State court. 
The effects of this decision can be significant for the continuation of the action. If an 
action is started before an EU Member State court, the rules of applicable law of the 
court seised must be applied. If an action is started before a non-European court, 
other rules of applicable law apply, which can easily lead to a very different result.41  
Below (in Chapter 3), I will assume that one – or possible even more than one42 − 
EU Member State court definitely has jurisdiction. In that case the court seised must 
apply a PIL regime concerning applicable law of European origin or – if the case is 
not governed by any PIL regime of European origin – its national PIL. At the outset, 
I would like to draw attention to the characterization of a question of law as being 
a question of applicable law concerning torts/delicts, concerning company law or 
concerning contracts.43 Incidentally, it is conceivable that the characterization of 
 
39  See KESSEDJIAN, Commentaire de la refonte, as well as WEBER, Universal Jurisdiction, 
p. 14-15. Through lis pendens provisions, a disguised form of forum non conveniens 
plea could then have been entered, specifically in situations where proceedings are 
already pending in another country.  
40  See ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 16 as well as JÄGERS & VAN DER HEIDJEN, 
Corporate Human Rights Violations, p. 849. 
41  See also VAN DEN EECKHOUT, The Liability of European Parent Companies. 
42  See the above-mentioned alternatives offered by Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation (former Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation) as well as Article 7(2) 
Brussels I Recast Regulation (former Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation). 
43  As for the applicable law concerning contracts, see the Rome I Regulation (Regulation 
(EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome I Regulation”). Through the possibility 
of “accessory connection”, as included in Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, the 
rules of this PIL regime may be significant, too. It should also be borne in mind that 
parties to international contracts may invoke force majeure or hardship in the 
hypothesis of conflict zones. 
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specific legal relationships within Europe differs from court to court.44 Any char-
acterization as a question of applicable law concerning contracts or company law 
and the corresponding application of the relevant PIL regimes may offer plaintiffs 
new – possibly alternative45 – possibilities, as well as create new hurdles.  
In Chapter 3 the focus will be on the situation where the Rome II Regulation, which 
contains rules of applicable law concerning “torts/delicts”, constitutes the 
applicable PIL regime. In analysing this regulation, I will endeavour to explore the 
extent to which the Rome II Regulation allows the application of a legal norm that 
is “favourable” to plaintiffs.  
3. Issues of Applicable Law  
3.1. Selection of the PIL Regime to Be Used – PIL Regimes 
of European and National Origin  
The Rome II Regulation46 has a very broad substantive scope and universal 
application. It is worth pointing out the restriction in the temporal scope of 
application, however:47 If a case is excluded from the temporal scope of application 
of the Rome II Regulation, other sources of applicable law concerning torts/delicts 
must be resorted to: in that case, national regimes may be applicable after all.  
It is difficult to give a general answer to the question whether the Rome II 
Regulation is an improvement compared to the national PIL rules of the EU Member 
States:48 the national regimes differ. Earlier,49 I pointed out that the European rule 
of applicable law concerning environmental damage is an improvement compared 
to the Dutch rules. But a more thorough analysis of the Rome II Regulation is 
necessary before it can be concluded that the regulation meets the needs of non-
 
44  For a comparative law analysis of proceedings for “piercing the corporate veil”, see 
VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the corporate veil.  
45  On this subject, see VAN DEN EECKHOUT, International Environment Pollution. The 
importance of a PIL classification is also shown by the Shell case, for example, in 
relation to the question who may act as plaintiff and in the context of the application for 
disclosure.  
46  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II Regulation”). 
Denmark is not a Member State. 
47  The tort/delict must have been committed after a specific date. There was for some 
time some controversy about whether the relevant date is 11 January 2009 or another 
date; on this subject, see ECJ, 17 November 2011, Case C-412/10 (Homawoo). On issues 
of the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation, see also DEN TANDT & VERHULST and 
VERHULST, The Temporal Scope of the Rome II Regulation after Homawoo. 
48  Cf. the question put by ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 30.  
49  VAN DEN EECKHOUT, Competing norms. 
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European victims who want to seek recourse against a European parent company 
and/or its non-European subsidiary. 
3.2. The Hypothesis that the Rome II Regulation is the PIL 
Regime to Be Applied  
3.2.1. Basic Rule and Exceptions to the Rome II Regulation 
3.2.1.1. Basic Rule  
Given the absence in Europe of a system like the American ATCA, as well as the 
absence of any unified European tort law50 − by which aspects such as regulation 
of “complicity” and “negligence” are regulated differently within the Member 
State51 − the rules of applicable tort law play a crucial role in Europe, as these rules 
determine what tort law has to be applied.  
As for the question of what law should be applicable in a situation where non-
European plaintiffs start an action against a European parent company and/or the 
non-European subsidiary, some have argued in favour of the application of the law 
of the country where the European parent company is seated: “Although the events 
took place thousands of miles away, it is right that this British company is made to 
account for its actions by the British courts and made to pay British levels of 
damages for what happened. A British company should act in Abidjan in exactly the 
same way as they would act in Abergavenny”, according to an attorney in the 
Trafigura case.52 The application of the basic rule of the Rome II Regulation, 
however, appears to have achieved exactly the opposite result: based on Article 4(1) 
of the Rome II Regulation, the lex damni is declared applicable, or “the law of the 
country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in 
which the indirect consequences of that event occur.” Consequently, in situations 
where the Handlungsort and the Erfolgsort are different, the law of the Erfolgsort is 
declared applicable. 
Regarding the choice to include this rule as the basic rule in the Rome II Regulation, 
the preamble53 provides that in applying the lex loci, “a fair balance between the 
interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage” is 
achieved and that this is in line with “the modern approach to civil liability”. It 
includes a negative assessment, however, of the impact of this rule on the issues 
raised in this contribution. The effects of adopting this “modern tort law vision” 
 
50  ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 20-21 and p. 25, points out that this is not expected 
to change in the near future.  
51  See VAN HOEK, Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility. 
52  Quoted by ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 28. 
53  Preamble 16. 
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would, in particular, be very unfair for non-European victims, who are considered 
“weaker parties”.54 This is because the application of Article 4(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation means that there is not much chance that a European legal system 
applies in situations of this kind, which is considered disadvantageous to the 
plaintiffs55 and liable to increase the parties’ inequality even further. Van Hoek56 
writes that “the torts arising out of violations of human rights – or out of crimes 
committed against the victim – do not fit well into this modern tort policy” and that 
“(…) conflicts rule may be ill-adapted to deal with serious human rights violations 
and other crimes.” 
Even if it is argued that in the case of complicity of European companies – through 
“negligence” or “failure of supervision” – the Handlungsort is situated at the 
company’s European headquarters, this alone does not justify the conclusion that 
the law of a European country can be declared applicable: Article 4(1) of the Rome 
II Regulation does not attach significance to the locus actus (the Handlungsort), 
rather to the locus damni (the Erfolgsort).  
If it is assumed that the systematic application of non-European law has an adverse 
effect on non-European victims but if one nevertheless wishes to be loyal to the 
system of the Rome II Regulation, it is important, naturally, to ascertain whether 
the Rome II Regulation permits57 departures from the basic rule. Various possibilities 
of making exceptions to the basic rule and/or making a reservation are discussed 
briefly58 below. 
3.2.1.2. Exceptions and Reservations. Exploration of the Various Avenues 
Allowed by the Rome II Regulation  
First, it should be observed that the basic rule of Article 4(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation59 applies without prejudice to Article 4(2) and Article 4(3). The 
 
54  See supra n. 8. 
55  In the words of WRAY (WRAY, Transnational Corporations, p. 26), this results in a failure 
to achieve “true access to justice for victims”. 
56  VAN HOEK, Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility.  
57  Possibly as an alternative: because it is not inconceivable that the application of the 
basic rule is favourable to victims. Cf. supra n. 6. 
58  In earlier studies, written in Dutch, I dwelled on some of these possibilities in much 
greater detail; see VAN DEN EECKHOUT, International Environment Pollution and VAN DEN 
EECKHOUT, The Liability of European Parent Companies. Each of these possibilities, 
which will be briefly dealt with below, turned out to have its own hurdles and chances. 
59  As to the possibility of interpreting Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation in the case of 
an “offence of omission” such that reference is ultimately made to the law of the 
country where the parent company has its seat or the law of the country where the 
parent company should have taken decisions, de Boer's discussion of a Dutch decision 
(based on Dutch rules of applicable law) concerning an offence of omission might 
provide reference points, see the Dutch Supreme Court decision dated 2 October 2001, 
NJ 2002, 255, with a note by T. M. DE BOER, particularly where de Boer deals with various 
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requirements imposed by Article 4(2), particularly that both the victim and the per-
petrator should have their habitual residence in the same country, being a country 
different from that where the damage occurred, will not be easily satisfied in cases 
to which the central hypothesis of this contribution applies.60  
As it is based on a manifestly closer connection of the legal relationship with any 
law other than the law that would apply pursuant to Article 4(1) (or 4(2)), Article 
4(3) − known as the “escape clause” − may provide a solution in more cases. 
Nevertheless, the Castermans report61 observes somewhat cautiously that invoking 
this escape clause should be permitted only in exceptional cases, given the 
requirement of legal certainty; on the other hand, as the European legislator has 
deliberately opted for including this exception in the regulation, it should not be 
impossible to invoke it; incidentally, I could refer, mutatis mutandis, to the grounds 
taken by the Court of Justice in its judgment in the Intercontainer case62 with respect 
to its position on how to deal with the escape clause of Article 4(5) of the Rome 
Convention: in its judgment, the Court of Justice dismissed too strict an 
interpretation of the escape clause embodied in the Rome Convention. In addition, 
it is remarkable that in the literature63 the question had already been raised as to 
whether the legal system considered to be more closely connected could be the legal 
system of the Handlungsort: if so, the law of the Handlungsort could be declared 
applicable after all. Naturally, establishing the Handlungsort or locus actus is of 
paramount importance in this respect.  
In applying the special reference rule of Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation, which 
derogates from Article 4(1), a locus actus must be specified in any case: Article 7 of 
the Rome II Regulation includes a special rule in respect of environmental damage, 
 
views on the “localisation” of an offence of omission, including the concurrence of act 
and harmful consequences in the place where action should have been taken; in line 
with this view, it should be argued in this context that the direct consequences of 
complicity occur in a European country, too. 
60  See, however, the comments on the residence of parties in the Shell case in connection 
with the appearance of Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Nederlandse Milieudefensie) 
as co-plaintiff in this action and the question whether this could ultimately result in a 
decision concerning residence of the plaintiffs in the Netherlands. 
61  CASTERMANS & VAN DER WEIDE, The Legal Liability, p. 5. 
62  ECJ 6 October 2009, Case C-133/08 (Intercontainer). More recently, the Court also 
ruled on the escape-clause of article 6 Rome Convention in the Schlecker-case (ECJ 
12 September 2013, Case C-64/12 (Schlecker); on the Schlecker-case and the possible 
implications of the Schlecker-case for issues of Corporate Social Responsibility 
discussed under Article 4(3) Rome II regualation, see VAN DEN EECKHOUT, The Escape-
Clause and VAN DEN EECKHOUT, “Schlecker and beyond. New input in debates about 
international labour law and CSR?” posted 13th December 2013 on “Leiden Law Blog” 
(http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/schlecker-and-beyond.-new-input-in-debates-
about-international-labour-law-a ). 
63  See FENTIMAN, The Significance of Close Connection, p. 98-100. 
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where the victim is offered a unilateral right to choose between lex damni on the 
one hand and “the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred” on the other hand (the law of the Handlungsort). This rationale behind 
this special rule is concern for environmental pollution.64 To enable the victim to 
opt for the law of a European country might also require that the Handlungsort be 
interpreted as the law of the country where the parent company law is seated 
and/or the law of the country where the parent company takes policy decisions or 
where these should have been taken.65 
The question whether, under specific circumstances, the Handlungsort can be in a 
European country may also arise in the context of the application of Article 17 of the 
Rome II Regulation. Article 17 provides that “in assessing the conduct of the person 
claimed to be liable, account shall be taken (...) of the rules of safety and conduct 
which were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the liability”. 
Accordingly, if Article 17 is interpreted to mean that “rules of safety and conduct” 
could be the rules of a European country, specific EU Member State rules could be 
applicable after all. 
Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation may also66 give rise to a possibility that, even 
though the law of a non-European country has been declared applicable in prin-
ciple, specific EU Member State rules may be relevant all the same: Article 16 of the 
Rome II Regulation provides for the possibility that rules characterized as 
“overriding mandatory provisions” prevail over the law that is otherwise applicable. 
However, this concerns only overriding mandatory rules of the law of the court 
seised, or “foral” overriding mandatory rules.  
Finally, Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation provides for the possibility of invoking 
the plea of international public policy – of the forum – and setting aside the rules of 
the law that is otherwise applicable. As for the law that should then be applied, the 
explanatory memorandum to the Rome II Regulation proposal referred to the 
application of lex fori as “surrogate” law;67 the Rome II Regulation itself does not 
refer to this. Remarkably, the national systems of the separate EU Member States do 
not systematically prescribe that the lex fori be applied after foreign law has been 
set aside by virtue of the plea of international public policy.68 Incidentally, legal 
 
64  See the explanatory memorandum to the Rome II proposal (COM(2003)427 def). 
65  For a rejection of this interpretation, see the Castermans report, p. 53. On the other 
hand, see especially ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 23, as a supporter of this 
interpretation; see also VAN DEN EECKHOUT, International Environment Pollution, for the 
arguments for this interpretation.  
66  See on the importance of the articles 16 and 17 Rome II Regulation also, briefly, the 
report “Holding Companies Accountable. Lessons from transnational human rights 
litigation?”, available on www.ecchr.de 
67  See page 32 of the explanatory memorandum to the Rome II proposal. 
68  See the national reports in ESPLUGUES, IGLESIAS & PALAO, Application of Foreign Law.  
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systems may also differ with respect to the required connection with their own legal 
order before the plea can be invoked.69  
3.2.2. Potential Differences in Outcome Depending on the European 
Court Seised  
The foregoing shows that, even though the Rome II Regulation is a unified PIL 
regime applicable within Europe, it is conceivable that the actual application of the 
Rome II Regulation may have different outcomes, depending on the EU Member 
State court in which the lawsuit has been filed: for example, the courts may deal 
with the plea of international public policy of Article 26 in different ways, 
particularly given the fact that Article 26 concerns the “public policy of the forum”; 
courts may apply a different surrogate system of law after the plea has been 
invoked; or different overriding mandatory rules may be applied given the fact that 
Article 16 refers to overriding mandatory rules “of the forum”. Finally, if the 
Handlungsort of Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation is interpreted as “the country 
where the parent company is seated”, differences could also arise from the fact that 
some EU countries apply the “statutory seat” doctrine, and others the “real seat” 
doctrine.  
If several EU Member State courts are found to have jurisdiction, enabling plaintiffs 
to engage in “forum shopping”, plaintiffs may recognise these potential differences 
in outcome and the latter may affect their decision to bring an action before a 
specific court. In fact, an awareness of these potential differences may also affect 
companies’ decisions on where to establish the company: as Chapter II showed, 
elements such as the place where the company has its seat are relevant in 
determining jurisdiction; by taking account of these elements, companies may 
therefore exercise influence on the debate on jurisdiction as well as on the court(s) 
that will apply the Rome II Regulation.  
If, however, a European/supranational plea of international public policy existed, 
if the rules of surrogate law were European/supranational,70 or if the overriding 
mandatory rules were of European/supranational origin, the same outcome in all 
EU countries could be guaranteed. The question arises whether it is conceivable that 
human rights could constitute the basis for this plea and/or for the relevant 
 
69  See also, briefly, the Edinburgh Study, p. 73, as well as the special in NIPR 2011 issue 
1 in connection with the Conference in Amsterdam by the name of “The impact of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on Private International Law.” 
70  See BOELE-WOELKI, De toepassing van een surrogaatrecht, p. 3-12, concerning the 
possibilities of using “uniform law as laid down in international conventions and 
supranational rules” as well as “general legal principles to the extent these can be 
easily established” as surrogate law. 
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surrogate law, or for overriding mandatory rules or rules of safety and conduct? 
This calls for a closer look at the relationship between human rights and PIL 
3.2.3. Place within or in Addition to this System of International 
Norms and/or Human Rights 
International norms or human rights may be applicable indirectly through PIL rules: 
if the rule of applicable law refers to a legal system that incorporates human rights, 
the application of national law,71 as designated by the rule of applicable law, can 
ensure that human rights are respected. But the question arises whether interna-
tional norms may be applicable otherwise – that is, “directly” – either through 
specific PIL techniques or even separately from PIL. Within the system of PIL rules 
of the Rome II Regulation, it is particularly the plea of international public policy 
and the system of overriding mandatory rules that appear to be mechanisms that 
can enforce respect for human rights.72 If respect for human rights is achieved 
without any rules of applicable law and/or special PIL mechanisms, it is enforced 
independently of PIL rules.73  
Yet, it is a problem, as the law stands at this juncture, that there are only a handful 
of international norms in this field that are direct applicable because they satisfy 
conditions like “direct effect” and “horizontal effect”.74 Experiences gained in the 
 
71  In this context, it is conceivable that international norms may play a role in fleshing out 
“open norms” such as “proper social conduct”, provided for in a specific system of 
substantive law. See NOLLKAEMPER, Public International Law. 
72  See, inter alia, VAN HOEK, Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility and 
NOLLKAEMPER, Public International Law. Incidentally, the comments made by both 
these authors about two other possibilities are worth mentioning too. See, first of all, 
VAN HOEK, where she writes about Article 4(3) of Rome II: “(…) one could argue that the 
escape clause in Article 4 could be used in cases of civil liability based on criminal 
complicity. That would mean that a closer connection is deemed to exist to any state 
which criminally sanctions the litigious behaviour”, and, subsequently, NOLLKAEMPER, 
where he states the following: “(…) it might be argued that the choice of the applicable 
national law should be determined by public international law. (…) Should the court let 
the choice of law be determined by the question whether one of the possible systems 
of law is more or less acceptable in the light of public international law?”  
73  About establishing a “PIL for fundamental rights”, see, e.g., LABRUSSE, Droit 
constitutionnel; see also the NIPR special of 2011, issue 1. Incidentally, another option 
could be the application of human rights as open norms of a kind that manifest 
themselves in PIL (see, briefly, V. Van Den Eeckhout “De wisselwerking tussen 
materieel recht en internationaal privaatrecht: eenrichtings- of 
tweerichtingsverkeer?”, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1999-2000, p. 1249-1265), which is a 
procedure that is to be distinguished from the above-mentioned (supra n. 71) possibility 
of fleshing out open norms provided for by the law declared applicable. On the 
interrelationship between PIL and human rights in matters related to torts, see 
recently KIESTRA & PONTIER, The Role of Human Rights Law.  
74  See NOLLKAEMPER, Public International Law. 
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application of the ATCA also show that there are not many international norms that 
could be used as a basis.75 The question arises whether Europe should not adopt in 
the future a policy oriented towards allowing more human rights to be invoked.  
3.2.4. Confrontation with the Pretended Goals and Ambitions of 
Europe when Regulating PIL. Need to Revise/Amend the 
Rome II Regulation?  
If the results of the current rules are compared to the goals and ambitions presented, 
such as ensuring “access to justice” or achieving an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, striking “a fair balance”, reflecting “modern tort policy” and fighting envi-
ronmental pollution, the question arises whether Europe should not take some 
further action anyway. As the law stands at this juncture, the prevailing view is that 
the position of non-European victims in this area under the current version of the 
Rome II Regulation is not very good. For example, openings that PIL rules may offer 
are described as “last straws”76 and more generally, PIL rules are represented as “a 
potential obstacle for victims who want to bring a lawsuit against a corporation.”77 
I am of the opinion that the current version of the Rome II Regulation already has 
rather a great deal of potential,78 even though non-European plaintiffs usually have 
to rely on exceptions and/or a “flexible” interpretation of the rules. The mere 
approval by the Court of Justice of these exceptions and options in favour of 
plaintiffs, particularly with regard to the central hypothesis of this contribution, 
might already guarantee a minimum degree of legal protection.  
But even if this potential is recognized, there are restrictions, too, which should be 
recognised. This is why the question arises whether the system of the Rome II 
 
75  See ENNEKING, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 22-23. The violation of an international norm is 
a condition for applicability of the ATCA (As for the extent to which PIL rules are 
relevant to the assessment of complicity in the context of the application of the ATCA, 
see Enneking, Crossing the Atlantic, p. 14, footnote 64, and p. 25, footnote 124; on the 
assessment of complicity under the ATCA, see also Keitner, Conceptualizing 
Complicity). The application of the Rome II Regulation is not conditional upon the 
submission of an international norm. Accordingly, the outcome of discussions such as 
the current one in connection with the Kiobel decision dated 17 September 2010 about 
the (im)possibility of applying the ATCA in cases involving corporations (in respect of 
which specific international rules are said to be lacking) cannot simply be translated 
into the Rome II Regulation: the rules of the Rome II Regulation refer only to a specific 
legal system and in this context, the violation of domestic norms of due care is the 
initial question to be addressed, as these norms define who can be held liable etc. 
However, the question arises whether in the context of the application of the Rome II 
Regulation, submitting an international norm may provide additional possibilities. 
76  VAN DAM, Onderneming en mensenrechten, p. 35. 
77  JÄGERS & VAN DER HEIJDEN, Corporate Human Rights Violations, p. 843. 
78  See also all of my analyses in VAN DEN EECKHOUT, International Environment Pollution 
and VAN DEN EECKHOUT, The Liability of European Parent Companies. 
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Regulation requires amendments and/or whether it should be supplemented with 
a set of rules.  
The special conflict of law rule of Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation may constitute 
a point of departure for a debate on the potential amendment of this Regulation: 
this rule, which offers the application of the basic rule of Article 4(1) as an 
alternative in addition to the application of the law of the Handlungsort, has been 
received well in the literature – at least, if Handlungsort can be interpreted such that 
there is chance that the legal system of an EU Member State may be applicable too.79 
But it remains true that in the current version of the Rome II Regulation Article 7 is 
an exception in a system that has essentially been set up quite differently.80 For this 
reason, some have already advocated applying a conflict of law rule such as the one 
envisaged by Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation in cases other than environmental 
damage; it is argued that this way, rules of international tort law could have an 
effect on the conduct of multinationals.81 With the exception of its Article 7, the 
current version of the Rome II Regulation has been criticized for its failure to 
produce an effect on conduct and to reflect modern ideas in PIL sufficiently.82 In 
modern PIL trends, issues of substantive law are incorporated into PIL rules as well; 
in modern PIL trends, Von Savigny’s reference system, which is traditionally 
indifferent to rules, has been departed from and PIL is given a more instrumental 
function. Really modern PIL rules83 on this subject could be oriented on protecting 
the interests of tort victims a great deal more than is the case at present, particularly 
by issuing PIL rules aimed at a substantive outcome favourable84 to the weaker party. 
By issuing PIL rules to this effect – and in line with modern PIL trends85 − PIL may 
 
79  See supra n. 65. Incidentally, it was already clear that the discussion about the details 
of the Handlungsort can be relevant to the application of Article 17 as well – in addition, 
see also Article 23, which includes a reference to “the event giving rise to the damage”; 
see also the interpretation possibilities of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation (former Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation). 
80  See, for example, the critical comments on the basic system of the Rome II Regulation, 
also in comparison with American PIL developments, in SYMEONIDES, Rome II and Tort 
Conflicts, p. 173.  
81  ENNEKING, The Common Denominator, p. 310. 
82  See, for example, SYMEONIDES, Rome II and Tort Conflicts. 
83  Even though the drafters of the Rome II Regulation pretend, through the issue of Article 
4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, that this regulation is in line with “modern tort law”, I 
already made it clear above that this provision protects the interests of multinationals 
rather than those of victims. 
84  One should always be attentive for potential unexpected cq perverse effects – as to the 
concrete result - of certain ways of “protecting” a weak party through PIL if these ways 
are not focused on the substantive result, see mutatis mutandis in the area of 
international labour law VAN DEN EECKHOUT, The Escape-clause. 
85  Viewed from this perspective, no internal “resistance” is to be expected from the 
discipline of PIL against using PIL rules to lend a helping hand to structurally weaker 
parties. Hence, “modern” PIL may be a good “conductor” of human rights. 
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serve political policy objectives such as achieving access to justice for victims of 
human rights violations and/or regulating conduct of multinationals in 
international situations etc.  
If modern PIL trends are followed, emphasizing the importance of the modern PIL 
mechanism of overriding mandatory rules may well be highly productive. It should 
be recognized that enforcing specific rules – of supranational, unified, or of national 
origin − as overriding mandatory rules86 offers great potential in this area. In this 
context, EU Member States could consider issuing “home state requirements for 
corporate citizens to undertake human rights impact assessments, such as 
environmental assessments, before granting them an investment permit or similar 
instrument”,87 or rules concerning extraterritorial corporate responsibility for 
human rights violations,88 if possible, focusing on situations where multinationals 
operate in conflict situations.  
One way to ensure respect for such rules is codifying a uniform set of overriding 
mandatory rules at European level and issuing these as minimum rules and/or a 
lower limit to be heeded by all courts in Europe, in addition to the Rome II 
Regulation, analogous to the adoption of the Posting Directive.89 Drawing a parallel 
with the regulation of international posting seems appropriate in this context: it was 
recognized that applying classical European PIL rules in the field of contract law to 
situations of international posting – where companies within Europe know how to 
take advantage of a situation of “competing norms” – may well have adverse effects 
on mobile workers;90 accordingly, the European legislator decided on the 
unification of overriding mandatory rules in the Posting Directive. Does the 
European legislator have a similar role to play in the field discussed here? 
 
86  Or – an another option – as rules of safety and conduct within the meaning of Article 17 
of the Rome II Regulation (in which context, rules on extraterritorial corporate criminal 
responsibility for human rights violations could be “taken into consideration”) or as 
rules of surrogate law after the submission of the plea of international public policy as 
envisaged by Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation.  
87  See, e.g., briefly, WRAY, Transnational Corporations, p. 16.  
88  See, e.g., van Hoek’s discussion (VAN HOEK, Transnational Corporate Social 
Responsibility) of Articles 16 and 17 of the Rome II Regulation, where she states that it 
could concern “statutes sometimes not only prescribing an extraterritorial duty of care, 
but also stipulating that violation of that duty will lead to civil liability towards the 
victim.”  
89  One should however, at the same time, be attentive for the possible evolution of such 
an instrument from an instrument of minimum-protection into an instrument of 
maximum-protection, see mutatis mutandis the issues about the Posting Directive in 
the area of international labour law as creating either a “minimum” or a “maximum” 
level.  
90  See, inter alia, the recitals in the preamble on “guaranteeing respect for the rights of 
workers ”as well as“ a climate of fair competition”. 
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Incidentally, it is conceivable that these overriding mandatory rules will be issued 
in the field of company law rather than tort law – as measures in substantive 
company law have been considered, too.91 In any event, whatever measures in 
whatever domain are taken – tort law, company law, contract law – it is paramount 
to ensure that the provisions concerned will be applicable in international situations 
as well: if rules of substantive law are merely amended without considering the 
mechanisms that can ensure the application of such rules of substantive law in 
international situations, amending substantive law may well be futile. Accordingly, 
the system of PIL rules should include either a PIL “vehicle” enabling the preferred 
rules to be applied or a mechanism that allows PIL rules to be overridden.  
A preceding condition is the granting of jurisdiction. Thus, issues of jurisdiction and 
issues of applicable law appear to be interwoven and interdependent. Remarkably, 
during the revision process of the Brussels I Regulation, some already underlined 
the importance of conferring jurisdiction on an EU Member State court for the 
purposes of ensuring application of “mandatory secondary law”, particularly in order 
to protect weaker parties.92 The same reasoning could be applied mutatis mutandis 
in this context. 
4. Conclusion. Private International Law as a Tool 
for Enhancing Human Rights?  
Clearly, PIL can play a key role in the efforts to offer victims of human rights 
violations a real possibility of recovering damage suffered by them in civil 
proceedings against those who were actually involved in this violation. PIL can open 
doors for victims, as PIL can also close doors for victims. 
Care should be taken to ensure that PIL is not reduced to an instrument of power in 
the hands of the stronger party, who can use it in order to benefit even more from a 
situation of “competing norms”. In the dynamics of a situation of competing norms, 
PIL should not lend itself to be used to the detriment of the structurally weaker party 
and close all doors for victims.  
But PIL can also open doors. PIL does have the potential to facilitate rather than 
complicate access to justice for victims. If PIL effectively makes victims’ lives easier 
in this way, it may act as a conductor of human rights, or as a “tool for enhancing 
human rights”. If PIL functions this way, PIL will not be a legal obstacle for victims. 
 
91  For example, several legislative proposals of the MVOPlatform of 11 February 2010 
(available at http://mvoplatform.nl/publications-nl/Publication_3416-nl ), pertain to 
international company law. 
92  Impact assessment SEC(2010)1547, p. 21. 
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Invoking PIL rules will then form a solid part of the rigid technical substantiation of 
their arguments. 
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International business and human rights have, from time to time, a troubled co-
existence. In Kiobel,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has established a jurisdictional 
standard that some see as troubling and many perceive as amorphous. Eight 
subsequent decisions, issued by other American tribunals, have added some 
precision, but not as much as one would hope for. How does this legal landscape 
play out with the U.N. Principles on Business and Human Rights? 
 
*  † (1949-2016), Secretary General of the Inter-American Bar Association. President of 
the Inter-American Legal Affairs Committee, D.C. Bar. Admitted in Washington, D.C.; 
Texas; New York; Madrid; and Buenos Aires. LL.B.; LL.D. (Buenos Aires); LLM 
(London); Stazhor (Leningrad). This paper is based on a presentation held in October 
2014 and was finalized by the author in May 2015. 
1  Esther Kiobel, individually and on behalf of her late husband, Dr. Barinem Kiobel, et 
al., Petitioners v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). For the full 
text see: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15509503170515180438&q= 
Kiobel+v.+Royal+Dutch+Petroleum+Co&hl=en&as_sdt=6,47 (01.09.2016). 
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We are standing before a fluid area of law where important changes are bound to 
happen. It is important to understand what is at stake and what positions the U.S. 
courts are presently holding. 
For contrast and texture, the role of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both organs of the 
Organization of American States, is explained. 
1. Alien Tort Statute Litigation, post-Kiobel –  
A Bird’s Eye View 
The Alien Tort Statute2 (referred to as “ATS”) provides:  
“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
In Kiobel, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the extent to which the 
ATS could be applied. So did eight subsequent cases decided by other American 
courts. This set of nine decisions is examined below, from a bird’s-eye view, stating 
the facts of each case and the main reasons supporting the finding for or against 
jurisdiction. 
Of these nine cases, the following five reject U.S. jurisdiction: 1) Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch; 2) Balintulo v. Daimler; 3) Jesner v. Arab Bank; 4) Bauman v. Daimler; and 
5) Cardona v. Chiquita Brands. On the other hand, the following four cases admit 
U.S. jurisdiction: 1) Mwangi v. Bin Laden; 2) Sexual Minorities v. Lively; 3) Al 
Shimari v. CACI International; 4) Krishanti v. Rajaratnam. 
The common thread running through the following nine cases is how closely (or 







2  28 U.S. Code § 1350, Judiciary Act, 1789. 
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1.1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.3 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
“Nigerian nationals 
residing in the U.S., 
filed suit ... under the 
ATS, alleging that 
Respondents - certain 
Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian corporations - 
aided and abetted the 
Nigerian government in 
committing violations of 




The majority opinion relied on 
the following three tenets: 
• “The presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to 
claims under the ATS and 
nothing in the statute rebuts it.” 
• “The issue is whether a claim 
may reach conduct occurring in 
the territory of a foreign 
sovereign.” 
• “Even where the claims touch 
and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.” 
 
Within the next twelve months, Kiobel was followed by eight other decisions, four 
upholding and four rejecting U.S. jurisdiction. There is no present clear standard 
as to what exactly “touch and concern” with “sufficient force” actually means. 
Although one could determine extreme situations where jurisdiction would and 
would not be proper, a big undefined area remains in between.  
Let’s examine how the eight subsequent cases were decided. 
1.2. Mwangi et al. v. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda4 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
An attack on the U.S. 




ATS applicable and presumption 
against extraterritoriality 
displaced because of strong 
relationship to the U.S. 
 
 
3  Kiobel, op. cit. fn. 1. 
4  For the full text see: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_99-cv-00125/ 
pdf/USCOURTS-dcd-1_99-cv-00125-3.pdf (01.09.2016). 
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• Events “directed at the U.S. 
government, with the intention 
of harming this country and its 
citizens.” 
• “Attackers involved in an on-
going conspiracy to attack the 
U.S., and overt acts in 
furtherance of that conspiracy 
took place within the United 
States.”  
 
Still, the court directed plaintiffs to submit the issue to the D.C. Court of Appeals, 
where the case was still pending at the time of drafting of this contribution. 
1.3. Balintulo, et al. v. Daimler, et al.5 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
The claim stated that 
U.S. companies aided 
and abetted the 
apartheid regime of 
South Africa. Plaintiffs 
specifically alleged that 
defendants had: 
“committed both direct 
and secondary violations 
of the law of nations by 
engaging in workplace 
discrimination that 




vehicles for the South 
African security forces in 
the face of worker 
protests, and assisting 
Jurisdiction 
denied 
Conduct occurred outside the 
U.S. ATS inapplicable 
 
5  727 F.3d 174 (2013); For the full text see: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-
circuit/1641692.html (01.09.2016). 
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security forces in 
identifying and torturing 
anti-apartheid leaders  
[. . .] provided the 
computer hardware, 
software, maintenance, 
and support necessary 
for the South African 
Government to carry out 
geographic segregation 
and denationalization.” 
1.4. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively6 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
A US citizen, in 
conjunction with others, 
committed acts in the US 
and in Uganda, to 
generate “an 
atmosphere of harsh and 
frightening repression 




Reasons for accepting 
jurisdiction: Enough conduct had 
taken place in the US to satisfy 
the “touch and concern” 
requirement under Kiobel: “[A]n 
exercise of jurisdiction under the 
ATS over claims against an 
American citizen who has allegedly 
violated the law of nations in large 
part through actions committed 
within this country fits 
comfortably within the limits 




6  960 F.Supp.2d 304 (2013), For the full text see: http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=16653553466893876211&q=Sexual+Minorities+Uganda+v.+Lively
&hl=en&as_sdt=6,47 (01.09.2016).  
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1.5. Jesner et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC7 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
Bank in Jordan 
distributed money to 




Reasons for denying jurisdiction: 
The law of the Second Circuit 
prohibits plaintiffs from bringing 
claims against corporations 
under the ATS 
 
This is a very short decision. No analysis of the “touch & concern” standard is 
offered. 
1.6. Bauman et al v. Daimler Chrysler8 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
Twenty-two Argentine 
residents filed a lawsuit 
under the ATS, for 
human rights violations 
allegedly committed by 
the Mercedes Benz / 




Daimler (a foreign corporation) 
cannot be sued in California for 
injuries allegedly caused by 
conduct of its Argentine 
subsidiary when that conduct 
took place entirely outside of the 
United States 
 
1.7. Al Shimari, et al. v. CACI9 
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
Claim brought under the 
ATS for acts of torture 




Sufficient facts plead to as to 
overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality:  
 
 
7  Decided under the name Linde, et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC, and related cases, 944 
F.Supp.2d 215 (2013). For the full text see: http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=6198968885252681010&q=PLC,+06-CV-3869&hl=en&as_sdt=3,47 
(01.09.2016).  
8  571 U.S. 1 (2014). For the full text see: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 
13pdf/11-965_1qm2.pdf (01.09.2016). 
9  758 F. 3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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on a foreign person, in 
the Abu Ghraib prison 
• Contractor is a U.S. 
corporation; 
• The employees of contractor 
whose conduct is at issue in the 
case are U.S. citizens; 
• Contractor's contract was 
issued in the United States by the 
U.S. Department of Interior; 
• Contractor’s employees were 
required to obtain security 
clearances from the U.S. 
Department of defense; and 
• Plaintiffs alleged that managers 
of the contractor based un the 
United states approved, 
encouraged, and/or attempted to 
cover up the alleged misconduct 
in Iraq. 
 
The court articulated the following two very helpful explanations of what justified 
jurisdiction in this case: 
Touch and concern standard. “Although the “touch and concern” language in Kiobel may 
be explained in greater detail in future Supreme Court decisions, we conclude that this 
language provides current guidance to federal courts when ATS claims involve substantial 
ties to United States territory. We have such a case before us now, and we cannot decline to 
consider the Supreme Court’s guidance simply because it does not state a precise formula for 
our analysis.” 
Five U.S. contacts. “We conclude that the plaintiffs’ ATS claims ‘touch and concern’ the 
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application based on: (1) CACI’s status as a United States corporation;  
(2) the United States citizenship of CACI’s employees, upon whose conduct the ATS claims 
are based; (3) the facts in the record showing that CACI’s contract to perform interrogation 
services in Iraq was issued in the United States by the United States Department of the 
Interior, and that the contract required CACI’s employees to obtain security clearances from 
the United States Department of Defense; (4) the allegations that CACI’s managers in the 
United States gave tacit approval to the acts of torture committed by CACI employees at the 
Abu Ghraib prison, attempted to “cover up” the misconduct, and “implicitly, if not expressly, 
encouraged” it; and (5) the expressed intent of Congress, through enactment of the TVPA 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens 
of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad. Accordingly, we hold 
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that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the 
ATS, and we vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ ATS claims on 
that basis. 
This is probably the clearest, best articulated post-Kiobel decision.  
1.8. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International10  
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
Alleged that Chiquita 
paid money to a 
Colombian terrorist 
organization, for which 
Chiquita agreed to pay a 
fine to the US 




Defendant in Kiobel was not a 
U.S. corporation, while Chiquita 
is a U.S. entity. Still: “the 
distinction between the 
corporations does not lead us to 
any indication of a congressional 
intent to make the [ATS] apply to 
extraterritorial torts.” 
 
Finding that the conduct happened outside the US, the court ruled that “there is no 
jurisdiction.” 
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's fact-based analysis,11 the Eleventh Circuit 
observed that “our ultimate disposition is not dependent on specificity of fact.”12  
The court conceded that past decisions have found that torture abroad was 
covered by the ATS, (Filartiga v. Pena-Irala13 and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Al 
Shimari14).  
Realistically, the court added, “this is by no means a unanimous conclusion of the 
circuits”, citing the D.C. Circuit's pre-Kiobel decision in Saleh v. Titan Corp.15  
The court decided that:  
“we reiterate that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially ... There is no allegation that any 
torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the 
ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force.” 
 
10  760 F.3d 1185 (2014). For the complete text see: http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=483434646408023404&q=Cardona+v.+Chiquita+Brands+Interna-
tional+&hl=en&as_sdt=6,47 (01.09.2016). 
11  Al Shimari et al. v. CACI, 758 F. 3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
12  760 F.3d 1188 (2014). 
13  630 F.2D 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
14  758 F. 3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
15  580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir., 2009). 
U S  E X P E R I E N C E S  
 71 
Dissent by Judge Martin: “[t]he Kiobel opinion offers little assistance about what 
kinds of domestic connections would be necessary to overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.” In support of his dissent, Judge Martin noted: 
• Key decisions regarding corporate conduct outside the United States were 
made in the United States, an issue not addressed by the majority opinion. 
• This is different from a situation in which plaintiffs are seeking to hold “an 
American company vicariously liable for the unauthorized actions of its 
subsidiaries overseas.” 
1.9. Krishanti v. Rajaratnam16  
Facts of the case Result Reasons 
Claim against U.S. 
citizens who organized 
bombings in the US 
embassy in Sri Lanka. 
Claim filed by foreign 




Jurisdiction lies against a 
corporation that raised funds in 
the U.S. to support a terrorist 
bombing in Sri Lanka 
2. Does the U.S. Position Comply with the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights? 
To begin with, it is hard to determine clearly what the U.S. position is since, as 
shown by the nine cases examined above, solutions vary widely for and against 
U.S. jurisdiction. 
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (referred to as the 





16  2014 WL 1669873 (Dist. N.J.April 28, 2014) Not Reported in F.Supp.3d For the 
complete text see: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=146348160446435 
60123&q=Krishanti+v.+Rajaratnam&hl=en&as_sdt=6,47 (01.09.2016). 
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“A. Foundational principles 
1. States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, 
regulations and adjudication.” 
It seems that the U.S. does comply with the above standard, which does not 
require countries to protect against human rights abuse in foreign (i.e. outside the 
U.S.) jurisdictions. 
This is, of course, a low albeit legal bar. One would expect and hope that a 
powerful nation such as the U.S. would hold itself to a higher standard. As shown 
in the nine cases above, the U.S. sometimes –but not always- follows a high 
standard. 
3. Impact of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) 
At this point, for the sake of completion, one should mention the role of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (the “Commission”), headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. and its counterpart, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(the “Court”), which sits in San José, Costa Rica. These two entities, operating 
under the Organization of American States, play an important role, particularly in 
some instances where the US judiciary is perceived as unwilling to take certain 
cases. 
The following shows a few cases not widely known, where justice was rendered 
against the odds. 
In harmony with the U.N. Principles noted above, the OAS Resolutions and 
Conferences 2002 / 03 /05 / 06 / 07 / 09 / 10 / 12 provide that enterprises are 
obligated “to promote and respect the observance of human rights” and “respect the 
labor and environmental regulations.” 
Jurisdiction was accepted in the following cases filed with the Commission and 
referred to the Court. Arguably, the Court and the Commission have shown more 
willingness to accept international jurisdiction than the U.S. judiciary. Some of 




U S  E X P E R I E N C E S  
 73 
Cases  
Kichwa of Sarayaku v. Ecuador17  Ecuador liable for permitting private 
corporations to violate indigenous rights 
in order to facilitate oil exploration 
Xamok Kasek v. Paraguay18  Paraguay liable for interfering with the 
tribe’s community rights (a few 
corporations included), restricting their 
free transit in that land, preventing fishing 
and collection of food 
Pediatric Clinic v. Brazil19  
 
State failed to inspect and evaluate the 
private clinic, which resulted in the death 
of 10 new-borns 
Saramaka People v. Suriname20  By awarding logging concessions to 
private companies, the State violated 
covenants that protected the Saramaka 
people, such as the right to use and enjoy 
local natural resources. The concessions 
damaged the environment 
 
17  Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Kichwa 
People of Sarayaku and its members against Ecuador (Case 12.465). For the complete 
text see: http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.465%20Sarayaku%20Ecuador%2026 
abr2010%20ENG.pdf (01.09.2016). 
18  Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People and Its Members against 
the Republic of Paraguay (Case 12,420). For the complete text see: http://www.cidh. 
oas.org/demandas/12.420%20Xakmok%20Kasek%20Paraguay%203jul09%20ENG.pdf 
(01.09.2016). 
19  Report nº 70/08, petition 12.242, Admissibility, Pediatric Clinic of the Region of Los 
Lagos admissibility, Brazil, October 16, 2008. For the complete text see: 
http://cidh.org/annualrep/2008eng/Brazil12242eng.htm (01.09.2016). 
20  For the complete text of rulings see: http://search.oas.org/en/iachr/default. 
aspx?k=Saramaka+People+v.+Suriname&s=CIDH. This decision is remarkable 
because of its extensive analysis of indigenous and tribal rights: Indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ rights over their ancestral lands and natural resources, Norms and 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System. For a complete text of 
this section see: http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Indigenous-Lands09/Chap.VIII. 
htm (01.09.2016). 
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Legal Condition and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants21  
American States obligated to respect 
certain employment rights of migrant 
workers, e.g. the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination. The obligation flows 




One could argue that if the OAS Commission and the Court of Human Rights can 
entertain lawsuits against Latin American States, the U.S. Judiciary, with far 
greater resources, could easily do likewise against corporations, be they American 
or foreign. 
4. Conclusions 
The present US Supreme Court is not very welcoming to foreign human rights 
cases. The ensuing cases have been contradictory. At best, there is no clear line as 
to when international jurisdiction will be upheld or rejected. 
It is true, as many commentators say, that foreign nations cannot and should not 
rely on U.S. courts to solve their human rights abuses. 
The real solution to these problems will only arrive when Nations where human 
rights violations are committed finally enact and apply legislation that provides 
swift and effective punishment to the wrongdoers and indemnity to the victims. 
The modernization of international procedural law in each country plays a central 
role in this matter. 
It is not hard for these countries to draft legislation that effectively punishes human 
rights abuses, which often double as torts. The difficulty for the leaders of these 
Nations resides in the necessity to have the clarity and the political will to enact 
these laws. Some countries have done this, for instance Panama, with Law 32 of 
2006.22  
 
21  Report no 78/08, Petition 478-05, Admissibility, Undocumented migrant, legal 
resident, and U.S. citizen victims of anti-immigrant vigilantes. United States, August 
5, 2009. For the complete text see: https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/ 
USA478-05eng.htm (01.09.2016).  
22  For the complete text in English see: http://boudreaudahl.com/en_panama_ley_ 
32_texto (01.09.2016). For the statement of legislative intent in Spanish (Trámite 
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1. Introduction 
For some time, the changing concept of extraterritoriality has been associated in a 
variety of ways with the international protection of Human Rights. It is, for 
example, linked to efforts to make the reparation mechanisms of the UN’s Guiding 
Principles accessible.1 Similarly, the notion is relevant to the States’ formal 
Extraterritorial Obligations (ETOS), which pressure States to fulfil the framework 
established in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
In both cases, the volume and quality of the technical contributions that have been 
produced are remarkable and worth taking into consideration.2 
 
*  Chair Professor of Private International Law, Universitat Jaume I-Castellón- Spain. 
This paper has been conceived as part of the Proyecto Consolider-Ingenio 2010, HURI-
AGE-The Age of Rights, CSD2008-0007, the Acción de Dinamización “Redes de 
Excelencia”-El Tiempo de los Derechos, DER2014-53503-REDT, and the EU Action 
Grant “Business and Human Rights Challenges for Cross-Border Litigation in the EU”, 
2014-2016.Translated by Sandra Kingery. 
1  See, in general, ZERK, Corporate Liability, and GEORGE & LAPLANTE, Commentary on the 
Office of the High Commissioner. 
2  In general, and regarding ETOS, see ZIEGLER, The Right to Food; GANESH, The Right to 
Food, p. 1233 et seq; COOMANS, The Extraterritorial Scope, p. 1 et seq; COOMANS & 
KAMMINGA, Cases and Concepts and LANGFORD et al., Global Justice. See also, MARCHÁN, 
La Responsabilidad de los Estados, p. 79 et seq; SAURA ESTAPÁ, La Exigibilidad Jurídica, 
p. 53 et seq; MARKS, How International Human Rights Law Evolves, p. 173 et seq; 
VANDENHOLE, Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations, p. 804 et seq. and ESCR-Net, 
Global Economy, Global Rights 2014, available at http://www.escr-net.org/ 
node/365621 (17.12.2014). See also General Comment Number 16 (2013) of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, regarding the State’s obligations regarding the 
impact of business on the rights of the child, particularly Section V.C., United Nations, 
CRC/c/gc/16 and, of great interest, DE BOER, Closing Legal Black Holes. 
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In the context of this contribution and its focus on private international law, I will 
however limit my remarks to this particular field. In Section I, I will address 
questions that are arising in the United States following the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Kiobel case. Following that, in Section II, I will introduce a cross 
section of extraterritorial laws that particularly impact the fields under 
consideration here – corporations and human rights – before summing up with 
some concluding remarks.  
At the outset, I would like to point out the need to analyze, based on the perspectives 
and techniques of private international law, how we should interpret the term 
“extraterritoriality”. I believe that debating it within the field of human rights has 
relegated the Conflict of Laws focus to a secondary position, although this approach 
is completely indispensable when tackling this complex web of problems that 
constitutes one of the biggest issues within the sphere of international law. 
Fortunately however, Professor Anthony Colangelo (Southern Methodist 
University) has carried out this analysis in a particularly brilliant manner in a 
recently published article entitled: “What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?”. I will 
follow his lead on this issue.3 
2. Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Imbroglio 
In other forums, such as the AEPDIRI conference at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
in Barcelona (September 2013), I have had the opportunity to express strong 
criticism of the US Supreme Court’s decision in the Kiobel case and then publish my 
opinion.4 I also know that my esteemed friend Professor Henry Dahl will address 
this question here, with much greater success than I could hope to achieve. I will 
not, therefore, offer a general criticism of that decision at this point, focusing 
instead on what most affects the subject of my article, that is, the process of the 
“Touch and Concern” test. This test was sanctioned by the High Court as a way to 
regulate the general doctrine of the canon against the extraterritoriality of laws as 
well as the version updated in the Morrison precedent as applied to the Alien Tort 
Statute.5 Let me point out that it leaves standing the possibility of litigating offenses 
that take place outside the US when multinational corporations are implicated. Let 
me now summarize how this test is reflected within the Kiobel ruling: 
 
 
3  Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363695 (17.12. 
2014). See also COLANGELO, International Law in U.S. State Courts. 
4  See ZAMORA CABOT, Las Empresas Multinacionales y su Responsabilidad, p. 4-8. 
5  Commenting on a recent decision of interest in this matter, see, RICHMAN et al. United 
States: So Much for Bright-Line Tests. See also, PELL & HERSCHMAN, Loginovskaya v. 
Batratchenko. In general, see as well: CHILDRESS, Escaping Federal Law, p. 18 et seq. 
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“On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application… Corporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.”6 
Even those of us who only know the US legal system superficially can intuit that 
these few words afford enormous leeway regarding interpretation by the doctrine 
and, I dare say, with greater repercussions, in the practice of US District and Circuit 
Courts. In fact, despite the short time that has gone by since Kiobel, it is generating 
a doctrinal body of case law that is very relevant to the matters that concern us here. 
Contributions like the aforementioned article by Professor Colangelo stand out, 
along with others that are also of great interest, including articles by Paul Hoffman,7 
Sarah Cleveland,8 Uta Kohl,9 Susan Simpson,10 Jennifer Green,11 etc. 
On the other hand, however, the cases that lead to the application of the “Touch and 
Concern” test are also already generating significant precedents, including a 
division among the federal courts, as recently took place in the decisions of the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in the Al Shimari12 and Chiquita 
Brands Intl13 cases, respectively. In both cases and unlike in Kiobel, the defendants 
are American companies accused of serious human rights violations, related to the 
terrible events at Abu Ghraib. In both cases, the defendants are alleged to have 
provided material support to the group that calls itself the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia, a terrorist organization, now disbanded, that has been shown to have 
been connected to thousands of crimes and victims.14 
Notwithstanding the similar subject matter of the cases, the manner in which the 
two courts addressed the “Touch and Concern” test could not be more different and 
neither could the results they deduced from it.15 Thus, in Al Shimari, the Fourth 
Circuit used an approach stating that claims should implicate United States 
territory, not conduct. Furthermore, upon evaluating the circumstances of the case 
in great detail, through an analysis of diverse factors, it deduced sufficient contact 
 
6  133 S.Ct. 1669 (2013). 
7  HOFFMAN, The Implications of Kiobel, p. 213 et seq. 
8  CLEVELAND, After Kiobel, p. 551, et seq. 
9  KOHL, Corporate Human Rights Accountability, p. 672 et seq. 
10  SIMPSON, Post-Kiobel. 
11  GREEN, The Rule of Law at a Crossroad, p. 1085 et.seq. 
12  Al Shimari v. Caci, No. 13-1937, US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. For comments 
on the decision of the District Court, see KATUSKA, Al Shimari v. CACI Int. Inc., p. 201  
et seq. 
13  Cardona v. Chiquita, No.12-14898, US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit. 
14  See the antecedents of this case in ZAMORA CABOT, La Responsabilidad de las Empresas 
Multinacionales, p. 20-22. 
15  See ALTSHULER, United States: Alien Tort Case Developments.  
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with the United States to deactivate the presumption against extraterritoriality and, 
therefore, retain jurisdiction on the basis of the ATS.16 
In contrast, in Chiquita Brands, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the need to carry out a 
detailed analysis of the circumstances, focusing instead on the foreign nature of the 
conduct, which lead to the blanket application of the aforementioned presumption 
and, therefore, its denial of jurisdiction under ATS. It is also noteworthy, as Judge 
Martin wrote in her dissenting opinion, how the Court refused to consider the many 
components of the aforementioned conduct that could be associated with myriad 
decisions taken at Chiquita’s principal headquarters in the US, as well as the fact 
that, in 2007, the company admitted to federal authorities that it had supported the 
aforementioned terrorist organization, agreeing to pay a 25 million dollar fine for 
that support.17 
So debate about the aforementioned test has been established in relatively short 
order and in the high courts. This is not surprising because, from the beginning, 
placing the application of the ATS in the terrain of extraterritoriality as a conflict is 
forced, artificial, and can only generate sterile problems. The Supreme Court, 
skillfully pushed in this direction by the defense of the Kiobel defendants, agreed to 
unite two aspects of the ATS that should have remained differentiated: the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate and the jurisdiction to prescribe.18 For that reason, the 
statutory presumption against extraterritoriality is not being applied truly, since the 
Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional mechanism, not a substantive rule. Furthermore, 
the lawsuits that are connected to it are based on federal common law rather than a 
specific legal text. What is being applied instead, according to the High Court, are 
the principles underlying that canon,19 fundamentally the avoidance of conflicts with 
other nations. It makes no sense that conflicts would arise when it is a question of 
protecting the heart of jus cogens regarding human rights, something that should be 
imposed on all States. That is also why the US Supreme Court, based on a very weak 
position, found itself obliged to adjust its doctrine, allowing exceptions through the 
repeatedly cited test. But the High Court speaks, on the one hand, about conduct, 
and on the other about claims. Without firm guidelines, therefore, the lower courts 
can and do take opposite paths. It may be that everything is summed up by the 
acceptance or lack thereof of the idea that atrocious conducts may go unpunished, 
that access to justice may be restricted, that the Rule of Law may be forgotten. At 
 
16  See also ALTSHULER, Alien Tort Development. 
17  For comments on this case, see SIMPSON, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality. 
Regarding this same Appellate Court, see their decision in the Baloco v. Drummond 
Co. case, No. 12-15268, 23.09.2014. See also ASSOCIATED PRESS, Colombians Ask US 
Supreme Court. 
18  See, e. g., SIMPSON, The Trojan Horse in Kiobel; see also CLOPTON, Kiobel and the Law 
of Nations, e-1, to e-4. 
19  133 S.Ct.1664 (2013). 
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some point, the US Supreme Court will have to review its doctrine. I hope they do 
so in the manner that is most favorable to the defense of Human Rights and not in 
the manner of the very broadly and effectively protected interests of multinational 
corporations.20 
3. Examples of Extraterritorial Rules  
The fact that extraterritoriality and the Alien Tort Statute are in dispute does not 
mean that extraterritorial norms for human rights cannot or even should not exist. 
I will offer a few brief examples here, in increasing order of robustness and interest 
for our current topic. I understand that the first two do not correspond to the idea 
of extraterritoriality as an unequivocal affirmation of the normative power of the State 
in the face of other States, in the international realm. But the doctrine tends to make 
mention of them, and they may help us place the issue in context.  
The first type corresponds to State rules that establish certain obligations for 
companies derived from their activities abroad. Since they are not accompanied by 
robust mechanisms for monitoring and, when appropriate, sanction, these 
obligations are fundamentally located in the voluntary realm, although their effects 
may afford some degree of relief such as, for example, creating a certain 
environment, a particular mentality. Here, among other rules, we can cite what is 
called the Conflict Minerals Rule, which is found in the Dodd-Frank Financial 
 
20  I strongly recommend the well documented and lucid overview of STEPHENS, The 
Curious History, p. 1467 et seq.. I also find the contribution by Judge Scheindlin from 
the Southern District of New York very significant. She makes it clear that she found 
herself bound to dismiss the complaint in South African Apartheid Litigation because 
of the precedents of the US Supreme Court in Kiobel and by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Balintulo; see, Case 1:02-md-01499-SAS, 28.08. 2014. The 
prestigious Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has already had the opportunity to 
establish their lack of enthusiasm for the “Touch and Concern” test, although from the 
characteristics of the case, it was not fully considered in their evaluation; see John Doe 
I et al. v. Nestlé USA, Inc., et al., No. 10-56739, 04.09.2014, p. 28 and CONGIU, & 
MARCULEWITZ, Ninth Circuit; see also, Mujica et.al. v. Airscan et. al.,9th. Cir. Court of 
Appeals, No. 10-55515. Along similar lines, see the decision of the District Court for the 
District of Columbia in the John Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. case, Civil No. 01-1357 (RCL) 
and Civil No. 07-1022 (RCL), 23.09. 2014, pp. 21-26. Also related to the Ninth Circuit, 
see the decision of the District Court for the North District of California in Doe et al v. 
Cisco Systems, Case No. 5:11-CV-02449-EJD, 05.09.2014, and, in general, see as well 
BELLINGER, In Spate of New; BRABANT et al., The Alien Tort Statute; ALFORD, Human 
Rights After Kiobel, p. 1089 et seq.; MOE, A Test By Any Other Name, p. 225 et seq.; 
CANTÚ RIVERA, Developments in Extraterritoriality and Soft Law, p. 723 et seq; 
SYMEONIDES, Choice of Law, p. 305 et seq.; BOOKMAN, Litigation Isolationism, and 
SPIELMAN, The Alien Tort Statute as Access to Justice, p 179 et seq. 
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Reform Act, Section 1502,21 or its counterpart in the recent European Project of Due 
Diligence Guidance for Conflict Minerals.22 Another example could be the well-
known California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010.23 All in all, the 
difficulty of introducing, in certain sectors, criteria for administering businesses in 
agreement with Human Rights is emphasized, for example, in the appeal brought 
by three business associations regarding the aforementioned Conflict Minerals 
Rule, which was partially resolved in their favor, on the basis of what was called a 
violation of free speech, by the Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, in a decision released 
April 2014.24 
The second type I will mention here refers to those regulations to which the State 
conditions its own response to Human Rights problems that arise abroad.25 One 
well-known case is the US Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, signed into law 
on January 17 that year. In the terms of Section 7042 (d), it prohibits the use of US 
assistance to support any activity in the regions of lower Omo and Gambella, 
Ethiopia, that could result “directly or indirectly” in forced evictions of the 
population. The Act also demands that US Executive Directors of international 
financial institutions oppose the financing of such activities.26 This positive text, 
framed within the fight against Land Grabs, honors the United States and is an 
example for the international community regarding an issue that is, because of its 
 
21  Regarding the implementation of this legal text, see ONSTAD, Conflict Minerals Law, 
and LITTENBERG & DAMANIA, Conflict Minerals Compliance. See also, DRIMMER & 
PHILLIPS, Sunlight for the Heart of Darkness, p. 131 et seq. 
22  See the commentary by BULZOMI, The EU Draft Law; see also AEFIN (Africa Europe Faith 
and Justice Network) et al, Ensuring Robust EU Legislation on Responsible Mineral 
Sourcing, available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/campaign-calls-on-eu-to-
strengthen-conflict-minerals-regulation#c103774 (17.12.2014). Regarding the United 




23  On this issue, see MUÑOZ FERNÁNDEZ & SALES PALLARÉS, Leyes Internas Sobre 
Transparencia, p. 119 et seq. On a specific and important type of supply chains, see, 
MARTÍN-ORTEGA et al. Promoting Responsible Electronic Supply Chains. 
24  See LYNCH & HURLEY, U.S. Appeals Court and RICHMAN, Conflict Minerals. The Court, 
however, has announced (18.09.2014) a reconsideration of his conflict-minerals 
decision. See also, in general, DHOOGE, The First Amendment, p. 94 et seq. 
25  In terms similar to those raised by environmental protection laws, see NASH, The 
Curious Legal Landscape, p. 997 et seq. 
26  See MARIAM, The Race to Save Ethiopians. Regarding Liberia and OPIC see: Liberia: US 
Investigates Abuses, accountability newsletter Summer 2014, available at 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/liberia-opic-office-of-accountability-investigates 
-us-funded-project-after-it-receives-hundreds-of-complaints-of-human-rights-
abuses (17.12.2014), p. 3. 
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centrality, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, problem in the area of Human 
Rights protection.27 
Now I would like to mention some examples of the third type of laws I will present. 
I am referring to powerful regulations that, even if they do not specifically reference 
Human Rights, can influence their defense in an indirect fashion. These are laws 
that can provide criminal punishment and civil actions for damages; they are 
markedly extraterritorial and corporations are also subject to them. This is the case, 
for example, with the well-known Foreign Corrupt Practices Act28 or the also 
familiar Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (the RICO Act).29 
Regarding RICO, for example, the recent decision of the US Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in European Community v. Nabisco, written by Judge Leval and 
issued in April 2014 is worth remembering. In it, the esteemed magistrate and his 
companions overturned the criteria upheld by the US District Court, allowing the 
application of the RICO Act and its civil remedies in the face of a global criminal 
network for drug trafficking and money laundering through legal companies.30 The 
international community increasingly assumes the need to act in the face of all these 
kinds of conducts, and the very negative impact they can have on Human Rights is 
well known. Applying these powerful laws seems, therefore, opportune. Lastly, the 
same is true of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),31 whose civil remedies have also been 
activated, for example, against foreign financial institutions that have been accused 
of having provided material support to terrorist organizations, regarding conducts 
outside of the United States. One example of this is the decision of the US District 
Court, Southern District of New York in the Wultz v. Bank of China case, 2012.32 
The fourth type of extraterritorial rules, with which I will conclude this part of my 
discussion before moving on to my conclusions, refers to those that actively address 
 
27  I had the occasion to study it; see ZAMORA CABOT, Acaparamiento de Tierras. 
28  15 U.S.C.78dd-1, et seq. See on this topic the following blog: http://www.fcpablog. 
com/#. See also GORMAN, The Origins of the FCPA, and MANDELKER & CARABALLO-
GARRISON, Alstom to Pay. Regarding the United Kingdom, see GREAVES, The Long Arm 
of British Anti-Corruption Laws; also the UK Government’s Anti-Corruption Plan 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPlan.pdf (01.01.2015). With references to Canada, 
see also, ROBIDOUX et al., Anti-Bribery Legislation and also LEIBOLD, Extraterritorial 
Application of the FCPA. 
29  18 U.S.C.1961 et seq. 
30  See the commentaries on this sentence by BERGER & SUN, International Litigation 
Update and BAKER & MCKENZIE, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Finds. See also, in 
general, WALLACE et al., Three Different Approaches to RICO Extraterritoriality. 
31  18 U.S.C. 2333. 
32  2012 WL 5378961 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). See the commentary by HALL & VOELKER, Courts Hear 
Suits. Also, on another case, see SMYTHE Trial Starts in U.S. and CLIFFORD, Arab Bank 
Liable. See also, commenting a lawsuit against European banks, PROTESS & CLIFFORD, 
Suit Accuses Banks. 
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the defense of human rights, subjecting multinational corporations as well. The 
most noteworthy example would surely be that of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA),33 endowed with the means for criminal sanctions 
and civil remedies, as was the case regarding the RICO and Anti-Terrorism Acts 
referenced above. One example: on the basis of the TVPRA, the US District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas agreed to move to trial in its 2013 decision in the 
Adhikari et al. v. KBR, Inc. et. al. case.34 This case concerned human trafficking of 
some Nepalese citizens who were recruited in their country to work in Jordan and 
ended up suffering gruelling conditions in a war zone in Iraq, where 12 of them lost 
their lives in a brutal fashion at the hands of a terrorist group from the cruel Ansar-
Al Sunna Army.  
We must point out that the TVPRA is just one part of a normative whole in which 
we could, for example, cite the Executive Order “Strengthening Protections against 
Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts,”35 from September 25, 2012, or the End 
Trafficking in Government Contracting Act,36 from 2013. These Acts reveal the 
current US Administration’s commitment in the face of the heinous trafficking of 
human beings.37 I would also like to point out how events like the catastrophe in 
Rana Plaza are motivating a growing number of legislative initiatives in the 
comparative arena, regarding Supply Chains38 or, with its expressive title, the 
Modern Slavery Bill39 of the United Kingdom. The international community’s 
awareness of these and other questions related to Human Rights is ever 
increasing.40 There are technical channels to confront them, and these diverse types 
 
33  18 U.S.C.1595. 
34  Civil Action No. 09-cv-1237. 
35  Exec. Order No.13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,029 (Oct. 2, 2012). 
36  22 U.S.C.7104 (g). Regarding this and the previous legal documents, see PRELOGAR et 
al., United States: New Human Trafficking Laws; see also, in general, BUCKLEY SANDLER, 
FinCEN Offers Red Flags. 
37  See, in general, FREEHILLS et al, Recent Developments. 
38  In general on these, see PAGNATTARO, Labor Rights, p.1 et seq. Also of interest, are the 
series of Global Horizons lawsuits, see the summary and further documents available 
at http://business-humanrights.org/en/global-horizons-lawsuits-re-forced-labour 
(17.12.2014). 
39  On this topic, see the presentation by the explanation of the United Kingdom 
Government, Modern Slavery Bill, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
news/modern-slavery-bill-published (17.12.2014).and the criticism by CORE, Modern 
Slavery Bill. 
40  On the extraterritorial persecution of war crimes, for example, see the important 
Human Rights Watch study, The Long Arm of Justice, available at http://www. 
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/IJ0914ForUpload.pdf (17.12.2014). See also the 
Information by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre on a Treaty with 
standards connected to business and human rights, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/ 
en/binding-treaty (17.12.2014). See also the Press Release by the European Union: 
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of extraterritorial laws are good examples of them. The States on their own, or 
alongside international organizations, must determine the manner and the intensity 
with which these exterritorial laws should be utilized.41 
4. Conclusions 
The field of extraterritoriality can be favorable for the defense of Human Rights, but 
on its own terms, without distorting it as the US Supreme Court did in the Kiobel 
case, there producing a great weakening of the defense and, on another front, 
because of its decision in Daimler.42 Until that time, federal courts had, on the basis 
on ATS, resolved cases of serious Human Rights violations perpetrated abroad as 
special torts. The specifics resided in the fact that the reservation of the courts’ 
jurisdiction was activated for a restricted number of conducts contemplated by 
treaties and international consuetudinary law, as well as the fact that international 
law, through federal common law, or a state law designed by rules of conflict, would 
provide the substantive content that would determine the solution to the case.43 
Apart from that, it was a question of lawsuits submitted to the full protocol of 
normal questions and instruments, from the proof of the bases for personal 
jurisdiction, to the solution of problems related to the Forum Non Conveniens, 
Sovereign Immunity, the Act of State Doctrine, etc. Lawsuits that, on the one hand, 
could take a lot of time and be subject to every type of resource and guarantee, but 
that were an example for the rest of the world and for the international protection 
of Human Rights. They were also often the only means of reparation for victims of 
atrocious acts. 
On this point, it is worth advocating for a system of bases of jurisdiction and norms 
for choosing the applicable law that allows most of the transnational lawsuits on 
Human Rights to be resolved in the civil order, just as torts are resolved, particularly 
those that correspond, for example, to environmental protections. Rome II, for 
example, affords a possible option for the victims of environmental damages that 
might be useful regarding the lawsuits in question here. Other very similar and 
 
Force Labour: Commission Urges EU Contries to Implement New ILO Protocol, 
11.09.2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-995_en.html 
(17.12.2014) and, in general, STOYANOVA, Article 4 of the ECHR, p. 407 et seq.  
41  It is worth pointing out that even the strong international sanctions laws could play a 
certain role in these matters; see, KRAULAND et al., New US Sanctions Legislation. The 
“Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014”, S. 2142, 113th Cong. 
(2014), subjects foreign persons and legal entities organized under the laws of the U.S. 
42  See ZAMORA CABOT, Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. See also, in 
general, BORCHERS, The Twilight. 
43  Regarding the questions raised in this area by what is called the cause of action, and 
its use in the case by the US Supreme Court, see COLANGELO, The Alien Tort Statute,  
p. 1342 et seq. 
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important questions would also have to be resolved, such as the possibility of filing 
class actions suits and lawsuits against parent companies for the actions of their 
subsidiaries abroad. Also of importance are proper regulations for litigation costs, 
and encouraging the involvement of civil society, etc. All of that will be addressed, 
for example, in the development of an Action Grant recently awarded by the 
European Union. The fourteen participating institutions from six countries are 
charged with the study, proposals for improvement and diffusion of the means of 
access for victims for reparations in the EU area of Human Rights violations 
perpetrated by corporations.44 
In addition to all this, extraterritorial laws, which highlight a will for special 
involvement on the part of the States, can complement the entirety of means 
assigned to the international defense of Human Rights. Their creation and 
utilization will be even simpler when greater awareness exists in the international 
community about the concrete problem covered by laws. The case of initiatives that 
extend throughout the world regarding means of reparation, prevention and the 
punishment of human trafficking, forced labor, etc., are good examples to 
consider.45 
I have spoken about extraterritoriality and extraterritorial laws, but also about 
jurisdiction, applicable law, various technical instruments, and about a lot of things 
that, in summary, are of interest from the perspective of private international law. I 
applaud and congratulate the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, for their wisdom 
and the opportunity to realize the event that led to these pages, in such an important 
and groundbreaking arena. 
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1. Introduction 
When considering the issue of civil proceedings before the courts of an EU Member 
State for human rights-related abuses committed elsewhere by branches or sub-
sidiaries of European based companies, two possible scenarios come to mind. On 
 
*  Senior Research Fellow Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, University of Santiago de 
Compostela. This contribution was finished in January 2015; facts concerning the 
Chevron litigation afterwards are not reflected in the text. 
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the one hand, victims may lodge a fresh claim for compensation before the courts 
of a EU Member State; on the other, having been successful in proceedings 
instituted and conducted in another forum, they may come to Europe in order to 
have the foreign decision recognized and/or enforced against the defendant’s assets 
in a Member State. 
According to Guiding Principle 25 of the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, “As part of their duty to protect against business-
related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such 
abuses occur within the territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to 
remedy”. The commentary issued in relation to Operational Principle 26 explains 
that effective judicial mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy and 
that States should ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases 
from being brought before the courts in situations where judicial recourse is an 
essential part of accessing remedy, or where alternative sources of effective remedy 
are unavailable. Scholarly analysis of these statements has mainly focused on the 
difficulties experienced by victims in accessing the courts. The possibility of 
recognition abroad of a judicial decision in view of its enforcement has attracted 
less (in fact almost no) attention, probably due to the very limited number of final 
decisions rendered to date. However, the issue is well worth considering in light of 
the Ecuadorian decision of February 2011 in Aguinda v. Texaco (also known as the 
Lago Agrio or the Chevron/Ecuador litigation)1 and the subsequent juridical 
paraphernalia developed by Chevron Corp., the judgment debtor, to hinder the 
enforcement of the decision in the US or abroad. Indeed, since the defendant 
corporation had no assets in Ecuador, the judgment is de facto not enforceable in 
that country.2 In 2012, the claimants sought the recognition and enforcement of the 
judgment in several locations: Canada, Brazil and Argentina. Separately, they have 
managed to obtain an Ecuadorian order for the seizure of assets of the company in 
Colombia. To the extent that Chevron Corp. conducts business all around the world, 
similar requests in other countries, including some in Europe, should not be ruled 
out. 
A further argument can be put forward to justify addressing the recognition/ 
enforcement perspective: Regulation (EU) n. 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters3 
(Brussels I Recast), which repeals Regulation (EU) n. 44/2001 (Brussels I 
Regulation), is applicable from 10 January 2015. Under the new regime the 
exequatur proceedings have been banished from the system, i.e. enforcement of 
 
1  Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., Judgment of the Superior Court of Nueva Loja, 14.02.2011. 
2  Although in October 2013 some fifty trademarks of Chevrons were seized in Ecuador. 
3  OJ L 351, 21.12.2012. 
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foreign decisions has become automatic within the EU. However, that fact entails 
no real changes as far as the Ecuadorian decision is concerned: first, the Recast only 
applies to Member State decisions – third-State judgments remain subject to 
conventional4 or national rules; second, the Recast provisions on recognition and 
enforcement would not in any event apply to the Lago Agrio decision, due to time 
limitations.5  
In the present study we will analyze the hypothesis of an application for 
recognition/exequatur of the Lago Agrio decision before the court of an EU Member 
State. To the extent that, as we have just recalled, the rules applicable to the 
recognition of third countries’ decisions are not (or not necessarily) shared, our 
remarks, albeit presumably common to most European systems, cannot but be of a 
general nature. As a preliminary step we will recall some data of the 
Chevron/Ecuador litigation, which will help us delimit the subject matter under 
study, restricting ourselves to an examination of the arguments that could most 
likely prevent the success of a request for recognition/exequatur. 
2. Summary of Relevant Facts6  
2.1. Litigation in Ecuador  
The Ecuadorian decision of 14 February 2011 is unusual in the history of civil 
litigation for human rights and human rights-related (via environmental damages) 
violations. The initial claim was lodged against Texaco (predecessor of Chevron 
Corp.) in November 1993 under the Alien Tort Claims Act, with a federal court in 
New York as the place of central administration of the company’s international 
operations – i.e., decisions concerning the oil exploitation in Ecuador were adopted 
there. In December 1993, Texaco sought the dismissal of the lawsuit on the basis of 
three arguments: forum non conveniens, international comity, and lack of standing. 
In November 1996, the district court declared that Ecuador would be a more 
convenient forum and ruled in favor of Texaco; the plaintiffs appealed. Back in the 
district court, the claim was rejected for a second time on 30 May 2001, again on 
grounds of forum non conveniens, with Texaco undertaking to submit to the 
jurisdiction of Ecuador and to the lifting of the statute of limitations in that forum. 
The decision was appealed by the applicants before the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, but on this occasion the court upheld the dismissal. 
 
4  Multilateral or bilateral. Ecuador is part to some multilateral conventions on the 
recognition of foreign judgments on civil and commercial matters, the most relevant 
being the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments 
and Arbitral Awards of 1979 (Montevideo Convention). 
5  See Art. 66 Brussels I Recast, Transitional Provisions. 
6  A detailed overview of the facts may be found in GÓMEZ The Global Chase. 
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The lawsuit was taken up in Ecuador in 2003. In February 2011, a judgment of 
almost 200 pages was rendered in which the court claimed to have found 
undeniable evidence of deliberate dumping of tons of toxic waste in the 
geographically specified area between 1964 and 1993, with severe consequences in 
terms of environmental damage and damage to health, and such an impact on the 
ecosystem that the very survival of the affected community was at stake. 
The decision has actually fallen upon Chevron Corp. as Texaco ceased operating in 
Ecuador in 1992; in 2001 it was acquired by Chevron, the second largest energy 
company in the world. On the basis of considerations relating to the lifting of the 
corporate veil, the Ecuadorian decision dismissed Chevron Corp.’s allegations about 
the nature of its relationship with Texaco. The court awarded the claimants US$18 
billion, half of this was calculated as punitive damages. Chevron Corp.’s appeal was 
unsuccessful: in January 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the entire lower court’s 
decision. In November 2013 the Ecuadorian Cassation Court reaffirmed the 
decision with regard to damages for remediation and costs, totaling US$9.51 
billion, but allowed the appeal in relation to punitive damages. 
2.2. Chevron’s Counterattack: Litigation in the US 
Two weeks before the Ecuadorian decision of 2011, Chevron Corp. began a process 
before the District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Racketeer-
ing and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in which it requested an “anti-
enforcement injunction” aimed at blocking the recognition and enforcement of the 
(at the time, still to be rendered) Ecuadorian decision on a worldwide basis. In 
deciding to grant the injunction, the district court analyzed the likelihood of a future 
Ecuadorian ruling being recognized in the US, emphasizing the corruption of 
Ecuador’s judicial system and its seeming openness to political interference, 
particularly under the leadership of President Correa. The court concluded that 
recognition was not likely to be granted. The court relied heavily on documents 
drafted by the World Bank and the US State Department, the former giving Ecuador 
a low ranking in terms of respect of the rule of law, and the latter pointing out 
specific occasions where the determinations of Ecuadorian judges had been made 
under governmental influences.7 
The anti-enforcement injunction was indeed granted, but voided by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2012, in a unanimous decision noting that 
Chevron Corp. could only challenge the judgment's validity defensively, i.e., once 
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs had actually tried enforcement. However, in a recent 
 
7  Scholars have been very critical of this “systematic approach in evaluating the court 
system of another country, which is based on guidance from the Executive Branch” and 
raised comity concerns as well as concerns relating to the judiciary trespassing the 
domain of the other branches. See LENTO, Will What Happened in Ecuador Stay in 
Ecuador. 
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ruling8 the same US District Court for the Southern District of New York has held 
that the monetary judgment against Chevron Corp. was a product of bribery, fraud 
and racketeering perpetrated by Steven Donziger, the lawyer representing the 
plaintiffs. The decision upheld Chevron Corp.’s allegations of fraud and declared 
the Ecuadorean court judgment unenforceable in the US. Among other, the court 
found that the plaintiffs’ US lawyer, Steven Donziger, together with his Ecuadorean 
co-counsels Hugo Camacho and Javier Piaguaje, had fabricated evidence, tried to 
bribe an Ecuadorean judge, colluded with a court-appointed expert and ghost-
written much of the final judgment.  
The March decision does not set aside the Ecuadorian judgment, nor does it enjoin 
foreign enforcement proceedings. It is addressed against Donziger and the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs’ representatives, and intends to prevent them from profiting from 
the Ecuadorian judgment9 or seeking to enforce it in the US.  
2.3. Investment Arbitration  
In September 2009, against the backdrop of the on-going litigation in Ecuador, 
Chevron Corp. filed a claim against the State arguing the violation of an Ecuador- 
US BIT before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.10 The proceedings 
followed the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Chevron Corp. claimed Ecuador had 
failed to “provide claimant’s investment fair and equitable treatment, full protection 
and security, and treatment non less than that required by international law”, and 
to warrant the investor “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights 
with respect to investment and investment agreements”; charges of discrimination 
were also made. Once the Ecuadorian decision had been rendered, Chevron Corp. 
added a claim for denial of justice consequent to a judgment vitiated by corruption, 
fraud and collusion between the Republic of Ecuador and the plaintiffs. 
Up to February 2013 the arbitral tribunal adopted several interim orders in which it 
asked Ecuador to take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be 
suspended the enforcement or recognition within and outside Ecuador of any 
judgment against Chevron Corp. By a Procedural Order dated 9 April 2012, the 
Tribunal divided the merits of the Parties’ dispute into two parts, entitled “Track I” 
and “Track II”. Only Track I has been addressed so far: it comprises preliminary legal 
issues arising from a 1995 Settlement Agreement between TexPet (a predecessor of 
Chevron Corp.) and Ecuador, namely its legal interpretation and legal effect, in par-
ticular whether or not Chevron Corp. is a “releasee” for the purposes of the 
agreement. In a First Partial Award of September 17, 2013, the tribunal concluded 
 
8  04.03.2014, Chevron v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691 LAK-JCF 126. 
9  The Court imposed a constructive trust for Chevron’s benefit on Donziger’s contractual 
and other rights to fees and other payments and upon his shares on a Gibraltar 
company created to collect the profits of the Ecuadorian decision’s enforcement. 
10  Chevron Corp. v. República de Ecuador, UNCITRAL Art., PCA case n. 2009-23. 
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that it is; also, that “The scope of the releases (…) does not extend to any 
environmental claim made by an individual for personal harm in respect of that 
individual’s rights separate and different from the Respondent; but it does have 
legal effect under Ecuadorian law precluding any “diffuse” claim against the 
[Chevron Corp.] under Article 19-2 of the Constitution made by [Ecuador] and also 
made by any individual not claiming personal harm (…)”. 
To date [of writing], the PCA award is a partial one, of a purely declaratory 
character; the tribunal has made an express reservation “of the full powers and 
discretion” to decide on the formal relief claimed by each party in one or more later 
awards.11 
3. The Application for Recognition and 
Enforcement in Canada  
3.1. Preliminary Remarks 
In the face of the lack of assets of Chevron in Ecuador the claimants are applying for 
the recognition of the Ecuadorian decision in other fora. So far, Canada is the place 
where their request seems most promising.12 
Since Canada is a federal state, each province has authority to make laws that 
govern recognition of foreign judgments in that province. There is nevertheless 
similarity in the laws of the provinces and for all, Supreme Court (SC) case law is a 
fundamental source of common principles. 
The leading Canadian case on recognition and enforcement of (monetary) foreign 
judgments is the SC decision Beals v. Saldanha,13 where the majority held that the 
first condition to be met for the success of an application is a jurisdictional 
requirement, namely that the issuing court has properly asserted jurisdiction. 
Before Beals, and up to 1990, foreign judgments were enforceable in Canada only if 
 
11  Brackets and following remarks by the Editors: According to the Business and Human 
Rights Ressource Center, the Arbitration Tribunal held in March 2015 that the 
settlement between Chevron and Texaco did not preclude residents from suing in the 
future, and, in January 2016, it ruled “in favour of Chevron over Ecuador being bound 
by the US-Ecuador investment agreement. Ecuador said it will appeal the decision.”, 
available athttps://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-
ecuador; see also the press release of Chevron on 22.01.2016 (not mentioning the 2015 
decision), available at https://www.chevron.com/stories/chevron-corp-statement-on-
dutch-court-decision-on-arbitral-awards. 
12  An application filed on 27.06.2012 in Brazil is still pending; on June 2013 the Argentinian 
Supreme Court revoked an embargo of the assets of Chevron’s Argentinian 
subsidiaries. 
13  2003 SCC 72. On the Canadian system see PRIBETIC, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Canada; CAVANAGH & SNIDER, Canada. 
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the defendant had been present in the jurisdiction rendering the judgment at the 
onset of the litigation, or if he had consented to the court’s jurisdiction. In 199014 
the SC introduced the “real and substantial connection” test to assess the appro-
priateness of jurisdiction between the court and the conduct giving rise to the 
action. However, the SC did not decide whether this test would apply only to 
interprovincial judgments, or also to foreign judgments; nor did it elaborate on the 
meaning of “real and substantial connection”. Eventually, in Beals it was decided 
that the “real and substantial connection” test extended to foreign decisions. In 
2012 the SC addressed again the real and substantial connection test,15 however it 
is still unclear whether the findings it made remain restricted to jurisdiction 
simpliciter cases, or whether it extends to applications for recognition and 
enforcement.  
If the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied the debtor may still challenge 
recognition on the bases of one of the defenses available to him according to Beals: 
fraud, denial of natural justice or public policy.16 Corruption or bias of the court of 
origin could be alleged under the coverage of the public policy exception, however 
the defendant would need to prove a specific corruption in the particular case – in 
other words, a general assertion of a reputation of systemic corruption is not 
enough.17  
To resist the recognition of the Lago Agrio decision before the Superior Court of 
Ontario Chevron put forward the failure to comply with the first condition, i.e., the 
lack of jurisdiction: however, it did not claim the deficiency in relation to the 
original court but in relation to the Canadian one. Corruption was not argued. 
3.2. The proceedings in Canada 
3.2.1. Canada (I): The Superior Court’s Decision  
In 2012 the Lago Agrio plaintiffs filed an action in Ontario for the recognition and 
enforcement of the Ecuadorian ruling.18 The application was addressed against 
Chevron Corp. and two Canadian subsidiaries (Chevron Canada Limited and 
 
14  Morguard v DeSavoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
15  Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd, [2012] 343 DLR (4th) 577. 
16  The court identified the defenses of fraud, public policy and denial of natural justice as 
the most recognisable situations in which injustice may arise, but noted that these were 
not exhaustive and that unusual situations may arise that might require the creation of 
a new defense. 
17  See the Ontario Court of Appeal decision Oakwell Engineering Ltd. v. Enernorth 
Industries Inc., [2006] O.J. No 2289 (CA), on the enforcement of a Singapore judgment. 
18  2013 ONSC 2527. 
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Chevron Finance Canada Limited), which the plaintiffs claimed were wholly owned 
by Chevron Corp., and over which Chevron Corp. exerted absolute control.19  
Chevron Corp. argued the lack of any contact with Ontario (residence, business 
activity or assets), as well as the absence of any direct links with the other 
corporations. In turn, these corporations based their defense on the fact that the 
process and the Ecuadorian decision were limited to the American company; 
consequently, they could not be considered debtors of the plaintiffs.  
The Ontario Superior Court stayed the action in May 2013. Its reasoning focused on 
two points: firstly, the question of jurisdiction to rule on an application for 
recognition and enforcement – in other words, whether or not “some real or 
substantial connection to Ontario” was required in order to assume jurisdiction over 
the application. Second, the question of what practical effect a ruling in favor of the 
applicants for recognition/exequatur would have in Ontario. With regard to the 
former the court reviewed different viewpoints in both Canada and the USA and 
concluded that it was not “prepared to adopt (…) a blanket principle that an Ontario 
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a common law action to recognize and enforce 
a foreign judgment against an out-of-jurisdiction judgment debtor in the absence of 
showing that the defendant has some real or substantial connection to Ontario or 
currently possesses assets in Ontario”.20 As to the latter, the Canadian court made a 
detailed examination of the relationship between the defendants, and resolved that 
there was no direct relationship between them in the light of the doctrine of the 
piercing the corporate veil. It therefore decided that “Chevron does not possess any 
assets in this jurisdiction at this time”. Adding that “the evidence also disclosed that 
no realistic prospect exists that Chevron will bring any assets into this jurisdiction 
in the foreseeable future”, the court concluded that “any recognition of the 
Ecuadorian Judgment by this Court would have no practical effect whatsoever” – 
quite the contrary, it would lead to an unjustifiable waste of time, money, and 
judicial resources.21  
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs appealed from the component of the motion’s judge order 
imposing the stay. Chevron and Chevron Canada appealed from the component of 
the motion’s judge order holding that an Ontario court has jurisdiction to consider 
the recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judge’s judgment. 
3.2.2. Canada (II): the Decision on Appeal  
In its decision rendered December 17, 2013,22 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the necessity of a “real and substantial connection” between Ontario 
 
19  The claim against Chevron Finance Canada Limited was subsequently dropped. 
20  At para 85. 
21  See para. 110-111. 
22  2013 ONCA 758. 
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and the subject matter of a controversy, but only in a case of first instance in order 
to respect comity and to ensure that the court’s constitutional authority is not 
exceed. In other words, the test does not apply to claims on the recognition and the 
exequatur of a foreign decision. However, in relation to the Chevron/Ecuador 
litigation the court excluded Chevron Canada from that conclusion: the corporation 
had not been a party to the Ecuadorian litigation (only Chevron had), nor had it 
been found liable under the judgment (only Chevron had). Therefore, in order to 
establish Ontario’s jurisdiction for the purposes of adjudicating the request of 
exequatur against Chevron Canada, relevant links must had to exist between the 
company and the territory, such as (as in the case at hand) a non-transitory place of 
business in Ontario. These links, in addition to the economically significant 
relationship between Chevron and Chevron Canada, led the court to affirm its 
jurisdiction, without prejudice to the right of Chevron Canada to dispute the 
eligibility of its assets to enforce the judgment debts of Chevron: the issue remained 
open to be considered at the pertinent stage of the proceedings –not at the 
jurisdictional stage. 
The stay of the proceedings by the Superior Court was also subject to analysis. In 
this regard the Court of Appeal developed a line of arguments recalling the nemini 
licet venire contra factum proprium principle. Chevron and Chevron Canada had 
chosen not to consent to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court and had therefore 
consciously adopted a limited position and sought limited relief in their motion; this 
precluded them from requesting a discretionary stay on any basis other than 
jurisdiction. The court criticized the inferior judge in that he accorded the stay on 
his own motion, embarking “on a disguised, unrequested and premature Rule 20 
[summary judgment] and/or Rule 21 motion [determination of an issue before 
trial]” to the detriment of the rights of the Ecuadorian claimants, who should be 
given the option to make legal arguments.23  
3.2.3. The Request before the Supreme Court  
In April 2014 the Canadian SC granted Chevron leave to appeal. The arguments 
were heard in December 2014; no decision has been rendered to date. The most 
relevant questions before the Court are whether the real and substantial connection 
test is a universal test for the jurisdiction simpliciter of the Canadian courts in any 
action and applies in a recognition and enforcement case; and whether the doctrine 
of comity dictates against the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign parties in an 
action when the adjudication of the issues will be academic, have no practical 
impact and serve no purpose. Other related questions include: whether the 
presence of assets is a pre-requisite to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment; what is the proper test to determine whether a provincial superior court 
 
23  Para. 57-60. 
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has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment against a non-party to 
the foreign judgment not domiciled in the province; whether carrying on business 
in the province from an office in the province that bears no relation to the subject 
matter of the action and having an “economically significant relationship” with the 
judgment debtor are sufficient for there to be such jurisdiction; to what extent must 
a court faced with a jurisdictional challenge conduct a threshold examination of the 
merits of an allegation essential to jurisdiction; if and in what circumstances can a 
court that does not have jurisdiction to entertain a recognition and enforcement 
action against the judgment debtor, have jurisdiction for recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment against a party which was not a party to the original 
action. 
4. A European Regard  
4.1. Preliminary Remarks  
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the EU uniform regime for recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters – the 
Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels I Recast – only applies only if two Member States 
are involved. Besides, the adagio exequatur sur exequatur ne vaut remains valid, 
meaning that a separate request for recognition of the original decision is needed in 
each country, and that each of them will assess it afresh, independently of the 
outcome reached by the other States concerned. The rules concerning decisions 
from third countries are to be found in multilateral or bilateral conventions, and 
finally in the residual national regimes. 
In spite of the variety of sources, there is a high degree of coherence when it comes 
to the conditions an application for recognition/exequatur must meet, and to the 
obstacles that may hinder the granting of the request. In light of the facts described 
in the preceding pages we will only consider three of these obstacles: judicial 
corruption in the State of origin, irreconcilable decisions and the lack of connection 
between the requested State and the case at hand.  
4.2. Corruption  
4.2.1. General Remarks  
Four out of five EU citizens regard corruption as a major problem in their State; 
corruption has been acknowledged as one of the biggest contemporary challenges. 
At the European level, the Commission has been given a political mandate to 
measure efforts in the fight against corruption and to develop a comprehensive EU 
anti-corruption policy, in close cooperation with the Council of Europe’s Group of 
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States against Corruption (GRECO). A large number of European States have 
ratified the UN Convention against corruption, which entered into force in 2005.24 
The commitment of European countries to the fight against corruption has so far 
produced no direct formal impact in the field of private international law. In this 
regard, the contrast with the US is striking.25 Enforcement and recognition of 
foreign judgments in the US remains a question of state law. However, in an effort 
to unify the regime, a uniform statute was drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962, which was adopted in almost two-
thirds of states. In 2005, a new statute –the Uniform Foreign Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act – was published, aiming to update and supersede the 
1962 one. In the same vein, the works of the American Law Institute towards a 
federal statute that would pre-empt state law, deserve to be mentioned as well.26 
All the texts provide for the possibility to obtain recognition and exequatur, but also 
for exceptions allowing the courts to refuse to grant such a request. For the purposes 
of this study, the relevant rules are those related to the decision having been 
obtained by fraud (in the language of the 1962 statute), which currently, i.e. under 
the 2005 Uniform Act, embraces corruption.27 The two pertinent 2005 provisions 
are para 4(c)(2), on “fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate 
opportunity to present its case”, and para 4(c)(7), which supplements the latter 
adding as a reason not to grant recognition the fact that the judgment “was rendered 
in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering 
court with respect to the judgment”.28 In practice, case law shows that the courts 
are generally cautious in the face of alleged corruption.29 Still, some recent deci-
sions have denied recognition to foreign judgments, accepting the debtor’s claim of 
 
24  However, not all EU Member States are part to the CoE Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, in force since 01.07.2002; neither to the Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption, in force since 01.10.2003. 
25  See WHYTOCK, Faith and Skepticism in Private International Law, p. 116-117, comparing 
the EU and the US. The analysis is restricted to the Brussels system, but the 
conclusions are valid regarding national law. As the author points out, the Commission 
had expressly mentioned corruption of the judiciary as a reason to refrain from 
extending the Brussels regimen of recognition/enforcement to third States’ 
judgments. 
26  The 2005 ALI (Proposed) Federal Statute on the Recognition Federal Statute on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. 
27  Under the 1962 Uniform Act the courts had developed a two-tier distinction between 
extrinsic fraud, comprising bribery or corruption of court officials inducing them to 
grant a decision in favor of the winning party; and intrinsic fraud, meaning the use of 
perjured testimony or foreign documents to obtain judgment. With time only the former 
remained an obstacle to recognition; the foreign court was presumed to be capable to 
deal with the latter and produce a fair decision in spite of the fraudulent party’s 
behavior. See NELSON, Down in Flames, p. 901-902. 
28  Similarly, para 5(a)(ii) of the ALI (Proposed) Federal Statute. 
29  Matching the academic proposals: see TRAYNOR, The Corruption Defense. 
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fraud, meaning that sufficient evidence was given of corruption in the particular 
case with an impact on the judgment.30 Courts have also, albeit more rarely, denied 
recognition on the basis of overall assertions, i.e., accepting that a foreign judicial 
system in its entirety is flawed and does not comport with due process. 31 The 
Ecuadorian decision in the Chevron litigation seems to combine ingredients of both 
approaches.  
The lack of a specific provision on corruption as an obstacle to recognition/ 
enforcement in Europe does not mean that this will not constitute a ground for 
rejecting an application: it certainly can, either embedded in the public policy 
exception, or in terms of violation of the right to due process, which is likely to be 
impaired as a consequence of corruption. To date, however, recognition has been 
rejected in Europe on very few occasions on the basis of corruption.32 The only really 
renowned case is Yukos v. Rosnef, in the Netherlands and in England. 33  
In the Yukos Capital v Rosneft case,34 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal granted Yukos 
leave for enforcement of arbitral awards that had been set aside by the Russian 
courts. Yukos shareholders requested the enforcement of the arbitral awards, 
alleging that the annulment by the Russian court was the result of a trial tainted by 
corruption. According to the Court of Appeal, ‘it is so likely that the judgments of 
the Russian civil court setting aside the arbitral awards are the result of legal 
proceedings that must be qualified as partial and dependent that these judgments 
cannot be recognized in the Netherlands.’ 35 Yukos also asked for the enforcement 
of the void arbitral awards in the UK, claiming that the trial in Russia resulting in 
 
30  De Manez Lopez v. Ford, 470 F.Supp. 2d 917; Transportes Aereos Pegaso SA v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, 623 F. Supp. 2d 518. Actually, in the latter case the court refused 
recognition because the absence of fraud had not been sufficiently proven. 
31  Another example is Brigdway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d. 134, refusing to enforce a 
Liberian judgment. Paraguay and Nicaragua are countries under suspicion too. 
32  Deploring it, KRAMER, Private International Law Responses to Corruption, p. 99. The 
author refers to some cases where corruption was used as an argument in the context 
of the forum necessitatis (see sec. 3.2). ANDREWS, Judging the Independence and 
Integrity, fn. 28, recalls the argument within forum non conveniens motions.  
33  The plea of corruption was rejected by the Constitutional Court (Spain) on 17.06.1991, 
in a recurso de amparo against an Auto granting exequatur in spite of the allegations 
of judiciary corruption by the opposing party. On 30.01.2013, the French Court de 
Cassation rejected to annul the decision of the inferior court and its assessment of 
compatibility of the foreign decision with the ordre public, which the appellants 
contested in terms of lack of independence and impartiality of the Russian judiciary.  
34  Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 28.04.2009, case No. 200.005.269/01, LJN BI2451, JOR 
2009/208, TvA 2010/5. Recently the Dutch courts have been asked to recognize a 
Russian arbitral awards that had been set aside in Russia in Maksimov v. Novolipetsy 
Steel Mill (NLMK). The claimant has argued along the same lines as Yukos – i.e., that 
the Russian annulment judgments were tainted by dependence, bias, corruption and 
other procedural irregularities. 
35  Sec. 3.5. 
E F F E C T I V E  A C C E S S  T O  R E M E D Y :  T H E  L A G O  A G R I O  L I T I G A T I O N  
 105
the annulment was partial and a ‘travesty of justice’; the application was 
successful.36 
Notwithstanding that the Dutch and English courts concurred in the final outcome, 
the issue of corruption seems to have been assessed differently by each of them.37 
In fact, when asked whether “the Defendant is issue estopped by the judgment of 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal dated 28th April 2009 from denying that the 
judgments of the Russian civil courts annulling the arbitral awards which are the 
subject of these claims were the result, or likely to be the result, of a partial and 
dependent judicial process”, the English Court of Appeal answered negatively, 
arguing that ‘it makes a great deal of difference whether the issue is being 
determined by reference to Dutch public order or English public order which is (or 
may well be) different’. In our opinion, at first sight the assertion is correct: what 
pertains to public policy remains a national issue; this is so even within the 
European uniform regime, where only the limits of the concept are a matter of 
interpretation by the CJUE.38 However, as highlighted by other scholars,39 it is 
difficult to imagine that the contents of the public policy exception can differ widely 
when it comes to corruption. It is much more likely that any divergences derive from 
the approach taken to the corruption defense – are general assumptions of 
corruption in the foreign courts sufficient to justify denial of recognition, or does it 
have to occur in these specific proceedings? –, and to the evidence required – 
meaning the standards of proof. Regarding the first point, as mentioned previously, 
the US uniform rules foresee both possibilities. In our view, a refusal to recognize 
or enforce a foreign decision on the basis of systemic corruption is unlikely to occur 
in a European country (even if it would be useful to condemn corruption in a large 
way). Indeed, the idea of a global assessment of a legal system for the purposes of 
recognition is known in the old continent among the EU Member States, but it only 
operates in a positive way, i.e. in favor of easing recognition via the mantra of 
mutual trust. Cases are otherwise examined singularly. The same prevails in the 
wider context of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. In The Hague 
Choice of Court Convention recognition may be refused if the judgment was 
obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure, which according to the 
Explanatory Report includes the situation in which ‘either party seeks to corrupt a 
judge, juror or witness’:40 the relevant corruption is thus the one in the case at hand. 
 
36  Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Company, [2012] EWCA Civ 855. In a more recent 
case, VTB Capital plc v. Nutritek International Corp and others, [2013] UKSC 5, the 
Russian forum was deemed to have offered a fair trial.  
37  KRAMER, Private International Law Responses to Corruption, Sec. 4.3.2. 
38  Case C-7/98, 28.3.2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164. 
39  In this sense ANDREWS, Judging the Independence and Integrity, p. 76-77. 
40  Explanatory Report, No. 188. 
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The second factor possibly accounting for the divergent attitudes in the face of the 
allegations of corruption in European countries is, as mentioned previously, the 
standard of proof required. Corruption is difficult to prove since, on the one hand it 
seldom leaves a trace; on the other hand, there is a common understanding in the 
sense that corruption demands a high standard of proof.41 However, in practice it is 
unclear what this means – a difficult point being whether evidence should be 
measured in terms of a test of “balance of probabilities” or of the “inner conviction” 
of the adjudicator. Agreement exists in the sense that inferences and presumptions 
should only be bestowed a limited evidential value; however, what value should be 
accorded to other means of proof, such as, for instance, the findings of corruption 
by other courts? As we have seen in the Yukos cases before the English courts, one 
possible answer is to refuse the issue estoppel defence. The question would be of a 
particular interest in case of an application for recognition of the Ecuadorian Lago 
Agrio decision in Europe. 
4.2.2. Regarding the Lago Agrio Decision  
The Lago Agrio case was riddled with mutual accusations of professional 
misconduct and corruption, both in Ecuador and subsequently in the US. Chevron’s 
allegations targeted the experts, the counsel for the plaintiffs as well as the judges, 
and led to the US judgment of March 4, 2014.42 In a decision of almost 500 pages 
and after a trial of several weeks, Judge Kaplan of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York deemed corruption to have been sufficiently proven. It is worth 
adding that in January, 2013, Judge Alberto Guerra, who had presided over the 
Ecuadorian court between 2003 and 2004, submitted an affidavit to the above 
mentioned US court whereby he admitted the allegations of corruption against him, 
the plaintiff’s counsel, and his successor Nicolás Zambrano. Although Judge Kaplan 
made clear his skepticism concerning Guerra’s testimony, he has also asserted the 
court’s entitlement to believe (as it did) part or even most of the testimony even of 
one who deliberately has lied under oath as to other particulars. Eventually, Guerra 
was a key witness in Chevron’s case. 
Should the Ecuadorian Lago Agrio decision come before a court of a European coun-
try, the question would arise of the value to be accorded to the findings of the 
American court, as well as to the confession made by former judge Guerra about his 
own implication in the deeds. In this regard it is worth recalling that as a general 
rule foreign judgments are accorded the evidential value inherent to public 
documents, which is actually a privileged one: however the scope of the privilege is 
usually limited to aspects such as the existence of the judgment itself, the date it was 
rendered, or the identity of the parties. In other words, it does not extend to facts 
 
41  This is why it would be difficult to reach a decision similar to the one referred to above, 
fn. 30. 
42  See above, fn. 8. 
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determined to exist by the foreign judge; the foreign judge’s conviction will be 
considered only as an element among others to be taken into account by the court 
to form its own conviction.43  
The sensitivity of the subject matter under discussion –a ruling asserting corruption 
of a foreign judiciary or of a particular judge – is unlikely to be well received in the 
affected country; it is most likely to trigger political and diplomatic reactions. This 
also points toward each court where recognition is requested forming afresh its own 
independent view in light of the arguments and evidence of the parties. This 
viewpoint has received academic support,44 and as we have just mentioned is 
precisely what happened in the Yukos case before the English courts. On the other 
hand, a de facto bestowing an increased force of persuasion to the foreign judge’s 
conclusions, especially in cases of countries with a record of judicial corruption, 
cannot (realistically) be excluded.45  
4.3. Irreconcilability  
4.3.1. Preliminary Remarks 
Conflicting decisions cannot coexist within the same legal order; this is why 
irreconcilability is usually included among the grounds for refusal of 
recognition/exequatur a foreign judgment. 
The difficulty of this self-explaining principle lies with the definition of “irreconcil-
able decisions”.46 Lack of clarity is the predominant feature of this issue, even within 
the framework of uniform regimes such as the Brussels I System. To a certain extent, 
this is not surprising. Irreconcilability is invoked as something to be avoided in a 
number of scenarios: preventively, i.e. as a risk, in cases of connected claims against 
several defendants, and also in parallel proceedings and related actions before 
different jurisdictions; and once conflicting decisions have already been rendered 
by different courts. While there is a common understanding in the sense that the 
 
43  This is the situation under the Spanish system and the like. We would like to recall the 
caveat we made in the introductory words to this paper in the sense that to the extent 
that rules applicable to the recognition of third countries’ decisions are not (or not 
necessarily) common, our remarks, albeit presumably shared by most European 
systems, cannot be anything but general in nature, and obviously they might not 
correspond to a particular system. 
44  ANDREWS, Judging the Independence and Integrity, p. 75-76. 
45  More formalistic, ANDREWS Judging the Independence and Integrity, p. 88, proposes 
that “foreign determinations (…) might have some slight persuasive effect” that should 
nevertheless not be raised to the level of presumptive force. 
46  Even what constitutes a “decision” can be debated: because of their contractual nature 
settlements have been excluded from art. 34(3) Brussels I Regulation: Case C- 414/92, 
02.06.1994, ECLI: EU:C:1994:221. No ruling has been made so far on arbitral awards; 
the general view is that they deserve to be considered equivalent to court judgments. 
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approach to irreconcilability should be flexible for the situations mentioned in the 
first place,47 it is still disputed whether the same notion applies to all included 
therein. As for the second setting – i.e. actual contradictory decisions – it is not 
unusual to resort to the res iudicata doctrine in order to determine the elements of 
irreconcilability; this actually implies that the divergent conceptions and 
uncertainties surrounding res iudicata impregnate the latter notion as well.48 
One of Chevron Corp.’s key strategies in the Chevron/Ecuador litigation appears to 
have been to exploit the fragmented nature of the controversy: while discussions 
are finally taking place, these are occurring before courts of different jurisdictions 
(including international ones)49 and those courts even vary in their nature. The 
disagreements among the actors in the game (courts, arbitral tribunal) are seriously 
threatening the expectations of the Lago Agrio claimants to collect the judgment. It 
is legitimate to fear, for instance, that the PCA arbitral award would work as an 
obstacle to the recognition of the Ecuadorian decision in a third State. The 
possibility is not just a theoretical one: Chevron Corp. has already opposed 
enforcement in Ecuador, relying on an interim measure issued by the arbitral 
tribunal requesting Ecuador “to take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause 
to be suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador of any 
judgment against [the First Claimant] in the Lago Agrio Case”.50  
Should Chevron try to block recognition of the Lago Agrio judgment in a third State, 
it could resort to the First Partial award on Track I rendered September 17, 2013, 
and argue irreconcilability between them.51 Several scenarios can be conceived: 
first, the “competition” between the arbitral award and the foreign judgment may 
start without any of them having been yet recognized in the forum – the attempt to 
have one recognized triggers the reaction of opposing the other. Second, the 
“competition” may occur between a national decision and a foreign one, the latter 
being the object of the request for recognition/enforcement. We will only address 
 
47  Meaning the notion should be a broad one. 
48  In a cross-border scenario doubts also arise from the hesitations in respect to the 
effects to be accorded to a foreign decision (the ones it has in the State of origin; those 
accorded to similar judgments in the State of recognition; common ones). 
49  On February 2009, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs asked the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to adopt measures against Ecuador aiming to prevent the execution of 
arbitral interim orders (that in turn compelled Ecuador to take all the steps necessary 
to avoid the enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment). 
50  PCA Case No. 2009-23. Order for Interim Measures, 9 February 2011, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0167.pdf.  
51  The American decision of March 4, 2014, could of course be helpful for the same 
defensive purpose. We have chosen to address the hypothesis of irreconcilability with 
the arbitral award in light of the (generally predominant) pro-enforcement bias 
towards this kind of decisions – even more in the framework of investment arbitration. 
The recognition of the American decision in a European country in order to use is as a 
means to oppose the Lago Agrio judgment seems to us less certain. 
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here the second setting.52 In this regard, in order for the arbitral award rendered at 
The Hague to be considered as a national decision, it needs to be recognized itself; 
the assessment of its compatibility or incompatibility with the Ecuadorian decision 
would come at a subsequent stage. 
4.3.2. The Recognition of the Award  
The Chevron v. Ecuador litigation at The Hague is an investment arbitration 
proceeding instituted under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, pursuant to Article 
VI(3)(a) of the bilateral Treaty between United States of America and the Republic 
of Ecuador concerning the Protection of lnvestments. A request for recognition of 
the award would therefore fall within the scope of the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, of 1958 (NYC). Art. V 
NYC enumerates several grounds that may hinder recognition: some only if put 
forward by the interested party, others to be assessed by the requested court on its 
own motion. In light of the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention and of the 
award itself it is difficult to see why it should not be recognized. The fact that it is 
partial,53 therefore it only resolves some of the (substantive) issues in dispute 
between the parties, should not be an obstacle, as it has been conceived as final: art. 
34(I) UNCITRAL rules provide expressly for such a possibility (“The arbitral 
tribunal may make separate awards on different issues at different times”). In 
addition, under Art. V(1)(e) NYC the award has to be binding on the parties: the 
condition is usually understood as meaning that there is no way of bringing an 
appeal on the merits – for the sake of the argument we will take this condition as 
satisfied. In fact, the only reason why one could imagine doubts interfering in the 
swift recognition of the award would be placed under art. V(1)(b) NYC, i.e. lack of 
fairness in the process, in view of Ecuador’s attempt of October 24, 2014, to chal-
lenge the arbitrators for failure to act on the country’s request;54 the State accused 
all three arbitrators of not acting impartially, fairly and equitably. In November 
2014 the PCA Secretary-General dismissed the challenge. 
4.3.3. Irreconcilability with the Arbitral Award  
Once the arbitral award has been recognized, the probability that it hinders the 
recognition of the Lago Agrio judgment, even if not extremely high, should not be 
underestimated. In terms of what could be viewed as “issue estoppel”, there is an 
 
52  For the purposes of the present study, the question would have been the same under 
the first setting: whether each decision reciprocally bars the recognition of the other 
on grounds of mutual contradiction. If they do, both of them being foreign from the 
point of view of the forum the usual solution is in favor of the decision first rendered 
(prior in tempore rule). 
53  A finality requirement as such does not appear in the conventional text, however there 
does not appear to be any doubt that it is compulsory. 
54  In particular, failure to make a site visit requested by the state for over three years. 
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obvious contradiction: the issue is the interpretation of a Settlement Agreement 
between the Texaco, predecessor of Chevron, and the Republic of Ecuador, 
releasing Texaco of its contractual obligations regarding the oil concession. In 
Chevron’s view the agreement had been made in the name and on behalf of all the 
citizens, as a governmental act. The trial court concluded otherwise, i.e., in the 
sense that Ecuador’s release could not be binding on third parties who had not taken 
part in the negotiations; the release only affected government agencies.55 In turn, 
as we saw under II.3, the arbitral tribunal arrived at a different outcome: “The scope 
of the releases in Article 5 of the 1995 Settlement Agreement and Article IV of the 
1998 Final Release made by [Ecuador] to [Chevron Corp.] does not extend to any 
environmental claim made by an individual for personal harm in respect of that 
individual’s rights separate and different from [Ecuador]; but it does have legal 
effect under Ecuadorian law precluding any diffuse claim against [Chevron Corp.] 
under Article 19-2 of the Constitution made by the [Ecuador]and also made by any 
individual not claiming personal harm (actual or threatened).” The award does not 
(and can not) directly impose any restriction on the Ecuadorian citizens. However, 
a logical consequence of the arbitrators’ interpretation would be the lack of standing 
of the claimants in the Lago Agrio litigation – which actually would also entail lack 
of standing as regards the application for recognition. The non-identity of the 
parties involved in each process could of course be resorted to in order to object the 
previous assertion; but irreconcilability is not necessarily conditional upon this fact. 
What really matters is whether all the litigants have had the opportunity to discuss 
the issue at stake. To the extent that the arguments before the different tribunals 
coincide, it could be contended that all of them had such opportunity in the case 
under exam, albeit in separate scenarios. 
As mentioned previously, the 2013 PCA award is a partial one, of a purely declara-
tory character; the tribunal has made an express reservation “of the full powers and 
discretion” to decide on the formal relief claimed by each party in one or more later 
awards. In this respect, Chevron has asked for injunctive relief; among other things, 
for an order that Ecuador use all measures necessary to prevent the Lago Agrio 
Judgment from becoming final, conclusive, or enforceable in Ecuador or in any 
other country. If the order is granted, it would be for Ecuador to implement the 
adequate measures to comply; should it fail –meaning the Lago Agrio decision is 
actually enforced against Chevron, in Ecuador or else, in spite of the arbitral 
injunction – the obligation on Chevron would become one of compensation. As 
such, the injunction would not be incompatible with the Lago Agrio decision; 
therefore, even if it (the order) is recognized in a third country prior to any attempt 
to have the Ecuadorian decision enforced there, it would not constitute an obstacle 
to the enforcement request. However, considering who would finally bear the costs 
 
55  Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., Judgment of the Superior Court of Nueva Loja, 14.02.2011, 
p. 34-35. 
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of compensating Chevron in such setting,56 the final outcome does not make much 
sense from an economic perspective. 
4.4. Lack of Jurisdiction  
Chevron’s main argument before the Canadian courts lies with the absence of a real 
and substantial connection between the case and Canada. The reasoning is not 
groundbreaking in the context of strategies to resist enforcement: in fact, there are 
numerous case law examples relating to the recognition of foreign arbitral awards, 
but also of foreign judgments.57 The debate seems nevertheless to be perceived as 
more of an issue in common law countries. As we have highlighted elsewhere,58 the 
usual starting point is rather the theoretical freedom of the creditor to seek a 
declaration of enforceability based on a foreign resolution wherever he wishes. It is 
assumed, however, that in practice a risk of “enforcement shopping” does not exist, 
because no rational creditor will invest his time and money in an application for 
enforcement in a place where the judgment debtor has no assets. As a result, the 
issue is largely a self-regulating one.  
At the same time, the need for some kind of connection is embedded in all national 
rules on recognition/exequatur. By way of example, Art. 955 of the Spanish Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Civil, 188159 establishes venue and there is a common under-
standing that the reasons underlying venue (i.e., territorial competence) are 
different from those explaining the grounds for international jurisdiction: the 
criteria on territorial competence do presume a link between the application for 
recognition/exequatur and the national jurisdiction where it is lodged. The 
question is how narrowly (or widely) this requirement should be interpreted; also, 
the relevant standard of proof required for the elements constituting grounds of 
jurisdiction in the framework of recognition/exequatur proceedings. 
 
56  In one way or another the final payment would be made by the people of Ecuador.  
57  See Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co, 284 F.3d 1114; Base 
Metal Trading Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory”, 283 F.3d 2008, both in 
relation to the enforcement of arbitral awards; also in England, interpreting the 
condition of sufficient connection, Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings [2014] EWHC 3131 
(Comm). Parada Jimenez v. Mobil Oil Co. de Venezuela, SA., 1991 WL 64186, provides 
an example in relation to a foreign country judgment. 
58  REQUEJO ISIDRO, The Last Struggle for Redress, p. 71. 
59  “Without prejudice to the provisions of treaties and other international conventions, the 
jurisdiction to hear applications for recognition and enforcement of judgments and 
other foreign decisions and foreign mediation agreements, corresponds to the Courts 
of first Instance of the domicile or place of residence of the party against whom 
recognition or execution is sought (…); alternatively, jurisdiction shall be determined 
by the place of enforcement, or by the place where those decisions should produce 
their effects.” 
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In our view, international jurisdiction to recognize and to declare the enforceability 
of a foreign resolution should not be excluded even if the judgment debtor has 
neither domicile nor assets in the territory of the requested State at the moment the 
application is filed, provided that the applicant demonstrates that he/she still has a 
legitimate interest in that place. For instance, defendants that do not presently have 
assets in the jurisdiction may nevertheless have them in the future: claimants should 
be given the opportunity to pursue the enforcement steps in futuro.60 It thus seems 
reasonable to support a broad understanding of the criteria of connection:61 for the 
purposes of the declaration of enforceability, the “place of enforcement” may be 
every place where the debtor has potentially enforceable assets (including portions 
of an estate, or claims against third parties). A place that a creditor reasonably 
anticipates as a “place of enforcement” may also be an acceptable jurisdiction, even 
though at the time of the application for a declaration of enforceability this may not 
be obvious. There are several reasons in favor of this proposal, starting with purely 
operational ones, namely the limited nature of the procedure for recognition/ 
exequatur. Indeed, the applicant may be required to indicate at the time of 
application the property upon which he intends to carry out the execution; 
however, other activities related to the identification of this property (such as an 
injunction to force the debtor to declare or exhibit his property; or to compel third 
parties to do so) do not fit within the narrow context of the procedure for 
recognition/exequatur. 
In addition, it should not be ruled out that the plaintiff, even if able to claim that the 
debtor possesses local property within the forum, may find it difficult to identify 
specific assets at the time of the filing the application for recognition.62 In such a 
situation, the only limit to the application should be abuse of process. Furthermore, 
the absence of property or of the domicile/residence of the judgment debtor should 
not automatically remove the legitimacy of a request for recognition/exequatur. On 
the one hand, time is often of the outmost importance in enforcement proceedings: 
to require the creditor to wait for the arrival of any assets of the debtor before 
applying for the recognition and declaration of enforceability may well affect his 
ability to collect, given the ease with which assets currently move. Again, as in the 
previous setting, the only limit should be the abuse of process. On the other hand, 
being granted recognition/exequatur in a foreign country may prove to have an 
 
60  As stated in Lenchyshyn v. Pelki Electric Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285. 
61  In as far as the elasticity of the concept allows it. For instance, the notion of “domicile” 
may not be seen as particularly easy to interpret in a broad way –although allegedly it 
could also mean residence, center of interests, center of principal activities.  
62  Being at the same time compelled to do so in order to avoid losing the opportunity, for 
instance because the action for recognition/exequatur is subject to a prescription of “x” 
years after the date of the judgment. 
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added value besides the typical one: it provides applicant with an additional 
argument in support of their rights on the merits. 
5. Conclusion 
In its decision on appeal from the Superior Court of Ontario the Court reflected on 
the asymmetry of powers between the claimants and the plaintiffs. It refers to 
Chevron and Chevron Canada as “sophisticated parties with excellent legal 
representation”, while the Ecuadorian plaintiffs are described as “poor and 
vulnerable foreign residents”.63 The Court subsequently recalls the overall attitude 
of Chevron during the whole, lengthy proceedings that resulted in the award of 
2011 before the Sucumbíos Court: the acceptance of the conditions, the promises 
and undertakings given in exchange for the dismissal of the claim before the 
Southern District Court of New York court, and how all this was later forgotten, with 
Chevron asking for (and obtaining, albeit briefly) an injunction from a New York 
court in order to bar the enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment in any country in 
the world.64 Eventually, the Canadian Court of Appeal built upon all these reasons 
to reach a conclusion in favor of the plaintiffs: they should at least be given the 
opportunity of a fair process on the merits of their request for recognition and 
exequatur. In the words of the court itself, “this case cries out for assistance, not for 
unsolicited and premature barriers.” 
The assertions of the Ontario Court of Appeal have found favour within academic 
circles. Regarding the efficacity of another decision pertaining to the same saga, the 
American decision of March 4, 2014, Prof. Muir Watt says:  
“On se doute en tout cas que la position plus ou moins accueillante au fond des pays tiers à 
l'égard de l'efficacité substantielle du jugement américain, dépendra de (…) et, peut-être, de 
la sympathie qu'ils éprouvent à l'égard de la cause de fond des victimes de Lago Agrio” 
(emphasis added).65  
Realistically, Prof. Muir Watt is probably correct. However, that the fate of any 
judicial decision could be dependent upon the personal preferences is inacceptable 
from a legal point of view; within the framework of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, particularly Guiding Principle 25 and 26, it is simply 
offensive. On the other hand, what remains true with regard the Lago Agrio decision 
is the essential role played by third States; their willingness to be considered as 
countries where the assets of Chevron Corp. may be found and enforcement 
attempted, and how they assess the interplay and mutual influences among the all 
the decisions at stake, will be crucial. 
 
63  See para. 45, 53. 
64  Para. 65-69. 
65  MUIR-WATT, Revenus provenant de l’exécution du jugement de l’exequatur, p. 397.  
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1. Introduction  
The subject presented here is of great relevance for Switzerland as the host state of 
many major transnational corporations that also operate in countries with 
challenging human rights environments. In spite of its relevance, the subject of 
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“Transnational Human Rights Litigation” has not yet entered the daily debate of 
legal discussions in Switzerland.1 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has noted this 
fact: 
“[…] la jurisprudence et la doctrine n’apportent guère d’enseignement pour ce qui est d’une 
action en responsabilité civile pour la réparation des dommages consécutifs à des crimes 
contre l’humanité […] et l’intégrité corporelle, commis à l’étranger […].”2 
This essay seeks to encourage discussion on Transnational Civil Human Rights 
Litigation against Corporations in the context of Swiss Private International Law. 
Within the scope of this paper, arguments are presented in the form of theses. For 
further deliberations and reference, please refer to my dissertation.3 
Given that the existing law in this field is as yet untested in practice, the study 
focuses on considerations de lege lata. Suggestions de lege ferenda are given only on 
the basis of a brief overview. 
The study begins with a short overview of public international law as a framework. 
Based on this, the subsequent chapters focus on Swiss private international law. 
2. Public International Law as a Framework 
The human rights liability of transnationally operating companies derives from the 
framework of international law. This raises two key issues: the horizontal effect and 
the extraterritorial effect of human rights. 
2.1. Indirect Horizontal Effect 
This title considers the question of how human rights may act between individuals, 
meaning between companies and those individuals affected by human rights 
violations. The UN Special Representative on business and human rights John 
Ruggie has thoroughly addressed this question in relation to businesses. He 
developed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)4, an 
internationally accepted framework for states and corporations. The provisions in 
 
1  The only notable case is “Gypsy International Recognition and Compensation Action v. 
IBM”: DSC 131 II 153 et seq.; DSC 132 III 661 et seq. (for a critical appraisal see GEISSER, 
Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverlet-
zungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 586 et seq.). 
2  Decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 22.05.2007, 4C.379/2006, consideration 
3.4. 
3  GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten. 
4  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21.03.2011. 
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question derive in part from hard law and partly from soft law; they are based on 
three pillars: 
1) State duty to protect: States must protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business enterprises (Princ. 1 et seq.). 
2) Corporate responsibility to respect: Business enterprises should respect human 
rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address any adverse human rights impacts in which they are 
involved (Princ. 11 et seq.). 
3) Access to remedies; reparation: States must take appropriate steps to ensure that 
when abuses occur those affected have access to effective remedies and 
appropriate reparation (Princ. 25 et seq.). 
The state has a duty to develop and interpret national laws to protect individuals 
from human rights violations by other private entities. This understanding of an 
indirect horizontal effect of human rights between individuals is recognized 
internationally; Switzerland has incorporated its obligations in Art. 35 of the Swiss 
Federal Constitution. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court particularly recognizes soft 
law as a guideline to interpreting national law.5 
In the event that abuses already have occurred, in Switzerland as in other countries, 
the law of non-contractual obligations is used to implement the duty to protect. In 
the situation of transnational cases, private international law is also essential. The 
non-contractual obligations law protects rights such as life, liberty, physical and 
mental integrity or property and awards the victims adequate reparation.6 
2.2. Extraterritorial Effect 
In the cases at hand, the human rights violations typically occurred outside 
Switzerland. As a result, the question arises to what extent a Swiss court may and 
should exercise jurisdiction. 
The answer lies within an international conceptual framework that is located at the 
intersection of private and public international law.7 This co-ordination framework 
is founded on two principles of justice: 
 
5  See et al. DSC 122 IV 349, consideration 4c. 
6  For reference see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 138 et seq. 
7  For a basic understanding see MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private 
International Law, passim (et al. terminology: “conflicts justice” and “material 
justice”); LEIBLE & RUFFERT, Einführung, p. 19 et seq.; GEISSER, Ausservertragliche 
Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei 
internationalen Sachverhalten, N 178 et seq. with further references. 
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1) Firstly, conflicts of law justice: “fair” in PIL means first and foremost the applica-
tion of the territorially appropriate legal order (Principle of the closest 
connection). On the one hand, this principle stands in the interest of certainty 
and predictability of legal and economic relations between private individuals.8 
On the other hand, it stands for the interest for a most appropriate and conflict 
free allocation of the legal competence to regulate national authority.9 
2) Secondly, substantive justice: material judgments in PIL serve a complementary 
and corrective function. Internationally recognized human rights are an 
example of such a common interest. 
On the basis of this conceptual framework, human rights lead to the following 
responsibilities: State X, in which the abuses have occurred, is bound by an actual 
duty to protect. The supplementary responsibility of Switzerland to protect, as the 
country of the court seized, to a large extent has no legally binding nature. 
 
Duty to protect of State X in which the human rights 




 Responsibility to protect of Switzerland in the case of a 
filed lawsuit10 
 
Switzerland’s responsibility to protect must be balanced against the conflicts of law 
justice of territorial adequacy of the applicable law. The primacy of human rights 
law before other legally protected rights, such as that of state sovereignty, is thus 
one on the basis of value. These principles have to be taken into account by Swiss 
courts in their exercise of discretion.11 
 
8  Cf. DUBINSKY, Human Rights Law meets Private Law Harmonization, p. 212 et seq.,  
p. 234 and 237 et seq.; BLECKMANN, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen des internatio-
nalen Kollisionsrechts, p. 34. 
9  See MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, p. 228 et seq.; 
MANSEL, Staatlichkeit des Internationalen Privatrechts und Völkerrecht, p. 119 et seq. 
10  Inspired by the UN principle “R2P” (UN-Resolution 60/1, “2005 World Summit 
Outcome”, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1, 24.10.2005, N 138). 
11  Cf. DSC 123 II 595 et seq. (consideration 7c); in the present context see: Khulumani v. 
Barclay National Bank Ltd.et al., 504 F.3d 254, 263 (C.A. 2nd Cir. 2007); DE SCHUTTER, 
The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law,  
p. 49; MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, p. 110; ZERK, 
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, p. 136 et seq. 
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Based on this framework of international law, we now turn to the key issues of Swiss 
private international law, i.e. the international jurisdiction of Swiss courts and the 
applicable law. 
3. International Jurisdiction of Swiss Courts 
3.1. General Grounds of Jurisdiction (Overview)  
The facts of a case are typically to be understood as claims based on the law of non-
contractual obligations (tort law);12 the jurisdiction rules which apply to such 
claims are included either in the Lugano Convention (LugC; SR 0.275.12) or in 
Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL; SR 291) depending 
on their respective territorial scope. Switzerland grants victims of violations that 
have taken place abroad a certain scope of possible jurisdictions. These include 
jurisdiction:13 
− at the defendant’s place of domicile (see Art. 2 [1] and Art. 60 [1] LugC), 
− at the place of its domestic branch (see Art. 5 [5] LugC and Art. 129 par. 1 CPIL), 
− Switzerland as a place where a tortious act was committed (see Art. 5 [3] LugC 
and Art. 129 par. 1 CPIL); and 
− as exorbitant jurisdiction the forum arresti (see Art. 4 CPIL). 
From a comparative law perspective, these possible jurisdictions are far from 
comprehensive. 
For example, there is a significant gap in the case of a multinational corporation: in 
a case where alleged human rights violations have occurred at the seat of a 
subsidiary, the claimants may reasonably wish to sue the parent corporation at its 
seat in Switzerland and the foreign subsidiary based on the same facts and legal 
grounds. The jurisdiction of Swiss courts to assess claims against the parent 
corporation is confirmed by the Lugano Convention (see Art. 2 [1] LugC). 
However, according to the relevant case-law and prevailing doctrine, a lawsuit 
against the parent corporation and its subsidiary is only possible if the subsidiary is 
domiciled in a member state of the LugC (see Art. 6 [1] LugC).14 Swiss private 
 
12  For differentiations see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger 
Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten,  
N 27. 
13  For further information see c.l. above, N 270 et seq. 
14  For the parallel agreement [Regulation (EC) No 44/2001] see Judgment of the ECJ of 
11.04.2013 in the case C-645/11, Ellen Mirjam Sapir et al., N 49 et seq. [55]: “[…] in 
order to sue a co-defendant before the courts of a Member State on the basis of Article 
6.1 of Regulation No 44/2001, it is necessary that that person should be domiciled in 
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international law fails to provide for international jurisdiction over a defendant to 
be joined to the proceedings in Switzerland for a closely connected claim (see Art. 
8a par. 1 CPIL e contrario). If the subsidiary is domiciled in a non-Lugano 
Convention State (non-European State), Swiss courts generally do not have any 
jurisdiction over the subsidiary. Compared to other states15 this constitutes a major 
limitation on jurisdiction. 
3.2. Forum of Necessity Exception  
3.2.1. Theory 
To close such gaps in jurisdiction in the existing law, the forum of necessity needs 
to be considered. 
Art. 3 CPIL states: “If this Code [= CPIL] does not provide for jurisdiction in 
Switzerland and if proceedings abroad are impossible or cannot reasonably be 
required to be brought, the Swiss judicial […] authorities at the place with which 
the facts of the case are sufficiently connected shall have jurisdiction.” 
Applicants can therefore rely on the forum of necessity in the event that: 
1) there is no other international jurisdiction in Switzerland;  
2) proceedings abroad are impossible or unreasonable; and  
3) the facts of the case are sufficiently connected to Switzerland.  
The forum of necessity in this sense takes the two principles of international law in 
PIL into account (see above section 2.2): conflicts of law and substantive justice. On 
the one hand, it serves the right to effective remedy (see the above third pillar of the 
UN Guiding Principles). Art. 3 CPIL seeks to avoid an international denial of justice. 
As a result, this provision emphasizes the protection of international human rights. 
On the other hand, the forum of necessity requires the exhaustion of legal remedies 
with a close connection to the facts of the case (“local remedy rule”) as well as a 
certain connection between the litigation and Switzerland. In this regard, conflicts 
of law justice is also respected. With this kind of balance, Art. 3 CPIL is a model for 
functional comparable jurisdiction to other states.16 
 
another Member State.“ For Swiss doctrine see e.g. GEIER, Die Streitgenossenschaft 
im internationalen Verhältnis, p. 77 et seq. 
15  For the Netherlands see e.g. Judgment of the Rechtbank of Den Haag, 30.12.2009, HA 
ZA 09-579, Oguru et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell and Shell Nigeria. 
16  For reference see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 365 et seq., N 371 
et seq., N 400 et seq.; ARROYO, compétence exorbitante, p. 73 et seq.; Art. 18 par. 3 of 
the “Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 2001 ”available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/ 
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As a general clause, Art. 3 CPIL provides Swiss courts with a broad flexibility to 
interpret the provision as they see fit. The decisive factor is therefore that the 
judiciary exercises its discretion in individual cases in a just and equitable manner. 
To establish an equitable balance between substantive and conflicts-of-law justice 
principles, I suggest that Art. 3 CPIL is interpreted as follows: 
The question, whether or not it is “impossible or unreasonable” to file a lawsuit in State X, 
should be answered, first and foremost, in considering human rights guarantees binding not 
only on Switzerland but also on State X, where the “violation” occurred. 
State X therefore cannot invoke its sovereignty, if Switzerland provides an 
emergency jurisdiction to protect universal human rights. And the defendant 
company will be estopped from arguing that the application of such international 
standards was not foreseeable. In this regard, the connection factor provided for in 
Art. 3 CPIL loses its significance and needs only to be observed for effective decision-
making and enforcement efficiency.17 Under this approach, not only the protection 
of international human rights law, but also the principles of conflicts-of-law of PIL 
are duly taken into account. 
3.2.2. Practice 
By way of example, we can apply this abstract knowledge to the previously 
mentioned case: consider that the parent corporation has its seat in Switzerland. 
The subsidiary is based in a LugC-third-country. As mentioned, the Swiss courts 
may not have any general ground of jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary. The 
exorbitant jurisdiction of Art. 3 CPIL remains to be considered. 
Assuming that State X, in which the human rights violation occurred and where the 
subsidiary has its domicile, does not have a functioning rule of law capable of 
ensuring sufficient legal protection for the evaluation of a claim against the 
subsidiary. Thus there is no legal remedy with a genuine possibility of being 
successfully invoked. State X has failed in its duty to protect as it has not adequately 
protected individuals against human rights abuse by third parties; it has not ensured 
that when abuses occur those affected have access to effective remedy and 
appropriate reparation. This fundamental duty is based on customary international 
law, therefore these guarantees are binding on all states, including State X.18 In 
 
hague.html (09.09.2015); the Canadian PIL adopted Art. 3 of the Swiss CPIL; in the 
present context see INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Princ. 2.3 (p. 32 et seq.). 
17  Cf. GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 377. 
18  With regard to public international law see reference, l.c. above, N 126 et seq. and  
N 379; BERTI &DROESE, in: BSK IPRG, Art. 3 N 9; SCHÜTZE, Die Notzuständigkeit, p. 572; 
UITERWAAL, Extraterritorial Civil Jurisdiction with Respect to Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights, p. 86; from a comparative law perspective see Mushikiwabo et al. v. 
Barayagwiza, No. 96 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
G R E G O R  G E I S S E R  /  A L E X A N D R E  M Ü L L E R  
 126
these circumstances, it should not surprise a corporation if Switzerland accepts a 
case with a view to avoiding an international denial of justice. This is even more 
likely where there is sufficient connection with the Swiss jurisdiction through the 
seat of the parent corporation. The assessment of related claims in one place also 
serves the conflict of laws justice, specifically for an effective decision-making; in 
such a case submissions only need to be drafted once and evidence is only gathered 
once. Moreover, this approach avoids the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings in different countries.19 Based on the views taken here, 
Swiss courts may consider jurisdiction against the foreign subsidiary based on Art. 3 
CPIL. 
Unfortunately, this proposed solution to the interpretation of Art. 3 CPIL seems like 
to be an arduous journey given the rather restrictive jurisprudence of the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court.20 
4. Applicable Law (“lex causae”) 
This section considers which substantive law applies to the facts of the case 
considered. 
4.1. General Choice of Law Rules (Overview) 
As a matter of principle, the CPIL typically refers tortious claims to the law of the 
place where the parties have their common habitual residence or, where there is no 
such place, to the law of the place where the injury occurred (see Art. 133 CPIL). As 
a result, Swiss private international law generally refers to applying the foreign law 
of State X. 
The reference to foreign substantive law appears adequate from a conflict of law 
perspective; accordingly it is widespread internationally. Thus the connecting 
factor of a joint habitual residence of the parties corresponds to an embedding of 
the tortious act in their legal and social surroundings.21 Also, the place where the 
 
19  In the context of business and human rights see Judgment of the Rechtbank of Den 
Haag, 30.12.2009, HA ZA 09-579, Oguru et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell and Shell Nigeria., 
consideration 3; House of Lords‘ Judgment, 20.07.2000, Lubbe et al. v. Cape Plc., [2000] 
UKHL 41, N 20.  
20  See e.g. Decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 22.05.2007, 4C.379/2006. For a 
critical appraisal cf. GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen 
für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 403. 
21  See “Botschaft zum IPRG vom 10.11.1982”, BBl 1983 I 424 et seq.; DSC 99 II 315 et seq. 
At the European level see Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11.07.2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II), Art. 4 par. 2 and 3. 
S W I S S  P E R S P E C T I V E S  
 127
injury occurred represents a close territorial connection of the case to the law of the 
respective state.22 
However, the application of the foreign substantive law can, from a human rights 
perspective, lead to an unacceptable result in individual cases. For example, this is 
the case when the applicable law of State X does not provide any compensation for 
the committed human rights violation. The correction in such a case is mainly an 
issue of substantive justice. For this, the existing Swiss private international law 
primarily relies on the public policy clause of Art. 17 CPIL. 
4.2. Public Policy Clause  
4.2.1. Theory 
The public policy provision in existing law is the crucial gateway for human rights 
into PIL.23 
Art. 17 CPIL states: “The application of provisions of foreign law shall be precluded 
if it would produce a result which is incompatible with Swiss public policy.” 
The Court should therefore, as an exception, correct the reference to foreign law, if 
this would lead to a result which Switzerland considers contrary to its basic values. 
The public policy clause has – as does the forum of necessity – the potential to 
establish an equitable balance between both basic principles in PIL, the conflict-of-
law substantive and justice. This is particularly true with regard to increased 
reference to international guarantees for the concretization of the public policy 
clause: with more universally accepted human rights as barriers to foreign domestic 
law, there is less which allows Art. 17 CPIL to interrupt the sound operation of an 
internationally consistent legal system.24 
 
22  For the case, where place of the act and place of the effect diverge, see GEISSER, 
Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechts-
verletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 448. 
23  To mention in a footnote are furthermore mandatory rules of the forum pursuant to 
Art. 18 CPIL: “This Code is subject to those mandatory provisions of Swiss law which, 
by reason of their particular purpose, are applicable regardless of the law designated 
by this Code.” In the present context see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat 
tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen 
Sachverhalten, N 518 et seq. 
24  See MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, p. 275 et seq.; VOLTZ, 
Menschenrechte und ordre public im Internationalen Privatrecht, p. 2 et seq., 285  
et seq. and 312; KOKOTT, Grund- und Menschenrechte als Inhalt eines internationalen 
ordre public, p. 99 et seq.; Judgment of the ECJ of 28.03.2000, Krombach, in the case 
of C-7/98; GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 469 et seq. 
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To establish an equitable balance between substantive and conflicts justice, I 
suggest that25 Art. 17 CPIL is interpreted as follows:  
The “Public Policy” should be, first and foremost, determined based on human rights 
guarantees, binding not only on Switzerland but also on State X, where the “violation” 
occurred. 
Under this interpretation of Art. 17 CPIL, with an emphasis on public international 
law, Switzerland fulfils its state responsibility to protect (see above section 2.2). 
There could even be seen to be a duty, based on Art. 16 ILC/Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,26 to deny the application of foreign law.27 At the 
same time, the principles of the conflicts of law justice remain untouched. The 
corporation carries a minimal responsibility to respect the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, coupled with the principles concerning fundamental rights in the 
eight ILO core conventions as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (see UNGPs, Princ. 12). As a result, it may not surprise a corporation 
if Swiss courts consider human rights standards for the interpretation of Art. 17 
 
25  There is an ongoing discussion in doctrine, whether national or international values 
should firstly be considered for interpretation of Art. 17 CPIL. (A) See on the one hand: 
e.g. MÄCHLER-ERNE & WOLF-METTIER, in: BSK IPRG, Art. 17 N 12 and 18; GIRSBERGER & 
MRAZ, Sittenwidrigkeit der Finanzierung von internationalen Waffengeschäften, p. 549; 
DSC 103 Ia 204 et seq., consideration 4; in the present context see Decision of the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court 4C.172/2000, 28.03.2001 – better, according to the view 
represented here, see “Urteil des Zürcher Handelsgerichts”, 05.04.2000, ZR 100 (2001), 
p. 166 et seq. – for a critical appraisal see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat 
tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen 
Sachverhalten, N 516. (B) See on the other hand: KOKOTT, Grund- und Menschenrechte 
als Inhalt eines internationalen ordre public, p. 104 et seq.; DANNEMANN, Die ungewollte 
Diskriminierung in der internationalen Rechtsanwendung, p. 350; MILLS, The 
Confluence of Public and Private International Law, p. 274 et seq.; VOLTZ, Menschen–
rechte und ordre public im Internationalen Privatrecht, p. 312 et seq. (314); SCHWANDER, 
Einführung in das internationale Privatrecht, N 476; KREN KOSTKIEWICZ, Grundriss des 
schweizerischen Internationalen Privatrechts, N 941 et seq.; SCHWENZER & HOSANG, 
Menschen- ˗rechtsverletzungen  Schadenersatz vor Schweizer Gerichten, p. 289. 
26  Text reproduced as it appears in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 
12.12.2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 
27  Art. 16 ILC says: “A state which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.“ For a respective Swiss duty to protect in order to refuse the application of 
foreign law, which contradicts guarantees binding on Switzerland as the forum state 
and State X, where the violation occurred, see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung 
privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen 
Sachverhalten, N 475 with further reference. 
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CPIL, that are relevant for the lex causae, even if the particular regulation is 
contradictory to the international guarantees.28 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) clarify that: “A State’s 
failure either to enforce relevant domestic laws, or to implement international 
human rights obligations […] does not diminish the expectation that enterprises 
respect human rights.”29 
4.2.2. Practice 
An impressive example of this consideration is found in the earlier decisions of the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, namely the case “Elkan v. Rentenanstalt” (DSC 79 II 
193 et seq.). This case concerned an insurance agreement between a Jewish person 
and an insurance company domiciled in Switzerland with a branch in Germany. The 
former Nazi-Regime requested the insurance corporation to pay the insurance sum 
of Jewish insurance holders directly to the German state. The Swiss insurance 
complied with the request. The insured person later sued the insurance company in 
Swiss courts for payment of the insured capital. 
According to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, German law was applicable, 
including the so-called “racial laws”. A correction employing the public policy clause 
was denied by the court. The reasons given were firstly, that such an intrusion into 
the law, which was realized by using the applicable territorial law, could not be 
reversed. Accordingly, the public policy clause was not applicable. From the 
perspective of the private parties, the court secondly took the point of view that the 
insurance had expired by payment of the insurance sum to the Nazi-Regime. An 
obligation for a second payment would lead to a “deprivation of rights” for the 
company. This deprivation could not be justified by the harm done to the victims. It 
would not matter if the applicant was compensated by relevant compensation funds 
or not. Lastly, the court held that the German branch was under no obligation to 
oppose the request of the German authorities. 
 
28  See l.c. above, N 498 et seq.; KINSCH, Droits de l‘homme, droits fondamentaux et droit 
international privé, p. 257 et seq.; MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private 
International Law, p. 286; BAADE, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises, p. 18 et seq. and 40 et seq.; OHCHR, Human Rights 
˗Translated  A Business Reference Guide, p. 6 (e.g. with regard to UN-Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples); NOLLKAEMPER, Public International Law in 
Transnational Litigation Against Multinational Corporations, p. 274 et seq. 
29  L.c, chapter “Human Rights”, N 38 (emphasis added). See above chapter 2.1 Soft Law 
as a guideline to interpret domestic law.  
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This judgment has, in my view correctly, been criticized by the doctrine.30 The 
simple statement that the legal intrusions (i.e. expropriation) that were realized 
abroad had to be accepted by the Swiss forum as a legal fact is not convincing in 
light of today’s understanding of international law.31 Swiss courts dealing with 
transnational issues with specific ties to Switzerland have it at their disposal to 
protect individual rights over foreign sovereign rights.32 Expropriation based on a 
systematic racial discrimination belongs to a narrow circle of ius cogens violations. 
These core elements of international law are binding on all states, including 
Switzerland and Germany, without limitation or reservation.33 Under these 
circumstances Switzerland carries, as discussed,34 a responsibility or even a duty to 
protect, and to refuse the application of foreign law. In view of the thereby 
prevented injustice, it would have been reasonable for a corporation domiciled in 
Switzerland to either not pay the insurance sum to the Nazi-Regime or take the risk 
of a double payment. Such a responsibility to respect human rights (i.e. to make no 
allowance in any way to aid or assist in systematic racial discrimination) does not 
overstretch the areas of responsibility of transnational corporations.35 According to 
the view taken here, the public policy clause should have been applied in this case. 
An example of the unconditional validity of such human rights by comparative law 
is found in the case “Oppenheimer v. Cattermole” (Judgment of the House of Lords 
on 13 December 1973).36 This ruling also dealt with the public policy clause 
regarding German racial laws. Lord Cross plausibly held: 
 
30  VISCHER, Das nationalsozialistische Recht im Spiegel einiger Entscheidungen 
schweizerischer Gerichte, p. 459 et seq. (463); see also ruling to the contrary by the 
previous instance (“Zürcher Obergericht”, 27.05.1952“). 
31  With regard to the abandonment of positivism in public international law see GEISSER, 
Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 176 et seq. and 241 et seq. 
with further reference; VISCHER, Das nationalsozialistische Recht im Spiegel einiger 
Entscheidungen schweizerischer Gerichte, p. 462: «Ich würde aus heutiger Sicht dem 
radikalen, fast naturrechtlichen Standpunkt des Zürcher Obergerichts [= Vorinstanz] 
den Vorzug geben». See also the change in doctrine in TOMUSCHAT, Die Vertreibung der 
Sudetendeutschen, p. 19 et seq. (22); SPICKHOFF, Der völkerrechtsbezogene ordre 
public, p. 288 et seq. and MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, 
p. 281 et seq. 
32  See SPICKHOFF, Der völkerrechtsbezogene ordre public, p. 290; VISCHER, Das 
nationalsozialistische Recht im Spiegel einiger Entscheidungen schweizerischer 
Gerichte, p. 462; Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249, 277 et seq. 
33  Vgl. SPICKHOFF, Der völkerrechtsbezogene ordre public, p. 278. For discriminatory 
infringments of the property guarantee see also MRA, Simunek et al. v. Czech Republic, 
516/1992 (1995), N 11.3. 
34  See section 2.2 and 4.2.1 above. 
35  For the same result see VISCHER, Das nationalsozialistische Recht im Spiegel einiger 
Entscheidungen schweizerischer Gerichte, p. 463. 
36  [1976] A.C. 249. 
S W I S S  P E R S P E C T I V E S  
 131
“Whether […] legislation of a particular type is contrary to international law because it is 
̔confiscatory̕ is a question upon which there may well be wide differences of opinion between 
communist and capitalist countries. But what we are concerned with here is legislation which 
takes away without compensation from a section of the citizen body singled out on racial 
grounds all their property on which the state passing the legislation can lay its hands and, in 
addition, deprives them of their citizenship. To my mind a law of this sort constitutes so grave 
an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country [= United Kingdom] ought 
to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.”37 
The legal situation is less clear however, if the fundamental principles or values in 
question are only binding on Switzerland but not on State X. An example would be if, 
in order to correct the outcome under a foreign law, a Swiss court chooses to apply 
its own liability standards which go beyond the internationally recognized 
guarantees (such as the provisions of the Swiss labour law, which are above the ILO 
guarantees, or certain strict liabilities such as product liability).38 In this case, the 
principles of legal certainty of the conflicts justice between private and sovereign 
rights are challenged. Courts need to tactfully deal with the question of whether to 
apply foreign law to an individual case or not. In order to rationalize their decision-
making, the courts could, based on the aforementioned international conceptual 
framework, consider the following criteria:39 
− forum connection of the case: the closer the facts of the case are connected to 
Switzerland, the more a correction is called for; 
− territorial scope of the guarantee in question:40 it is necessary to distinguish if for 
instance a guarantee based on European Human Rights Convention or [simply] 
one on the Swiss Federal Constitution is in question; 
 
37  L.c., 278 (emphasis added); BYERS, English Courts and Serious Human Rights Violations 
Abroad, p. 246; DE SCHUTTER, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights 
Violations in European Law, p. 274; KINSCH, Droits de l‘homme, droits fondamentaux et 
droit international privé, p. 224. 
38  From a comparative law perspective see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 864  
et seq. (D.C.N.Y. 1984): “punitive damages” see also Brief of the Governments of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation and The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the petitioner, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), 23 and 25. 
39  See GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat tätiger Unternehmen für Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sachverhalten, N 506 et seq. 
40  See VOLTZ, Menschenrechte und ordre public im Internationalen Privatrecht, p. 299; 
BUCHER, L‘ordre public et le but social des lois en droit international privé, p. 55; 
COESTER-WALTJEN, Die Wirkungskraft der Grundrechte bei Fällen mit Auslands-
berührung, p. 28; in the context of transnational civil human rights litigation see 
HALFMEIER, Menschenrechte und Internationales Privatrecht im Kontext der 
Globalisierung, p. 680; FISCHER, Schadenersatzansprüche wegen Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen im Internationalen Privat- und Prozessrecht, p. 454 et seq.; 
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− gravity of the violation and the harm suffered: it depends whether a core value of 
a certain right is touched or not;  
− conduct of State X: Has the state, for instance, implemented specific justice pro-
cedures and mechanisms to deal with certain violations or not? An amnesty law 
with a compensation fund may serve as a specific conflict resolution. In such a 
case, State X would view a jurisdiction by Switzerland rather as an intervention 
into its sovereignty, rather than if State X would remain passive towards human 
rights violations by a corporation.41 
Depending on the answers to these questions, a correction of the applicable law from a 
supranational point of view is more or less evident. 
With respect to the above-mentioned example, the following distinction may be 
important for the criteria of the connection factor: a domestic act of a Swiss parent 
corporation (i.e. the instruction to increase the production of hazardous resources) 
would rather point towards correcting foreign law in favor of Swiss strict liability 
than the foreign actions of a subsidiary domiciled in State X. With this insight, the 
soft law standards would be taken into account. These call for more attention by 
Switzerland to regulate foreign activities of corporations that are based here (see UN 
Guiding Principles, Princ. 2).42 
5. Overview − Guidelines to Interpret the Forum 
of Necessity Exception and Public Policy 
Exception  
Considered human rights standards 
 
to substantiate „impossibility or 
unacceptability“ of a lawsuit 
abroad; or “public policy” 
respectively 
Consideration of conflicts of law justice 
principles  
to substantiate the „sufficient connection to 
the forum“ of the facts of the case to 
Switzerland 
 
AUGENSTEIN, European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union, N 225 in 
fine, with reference to Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249, 277. 
41  From a comparative law perspective see Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.et al. 
(504 F.3d 254, C.A. 2nd Cir. 2007); see South Africa’s objection: “[T]he United States 
would interfere with the foreign sovereign’s effort to address matters in which [South 
Africa] has the predominant interest.” 
42  See furthermore Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 14, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11.08.2000, N 39; General Comment No. 19, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, 04.02.2008, N 54. 
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General Rule: The broader the agreement of a human rights guarantee within the interna-
tional community of states is, the weaker the forum connection can be in order to exercise 
emergency jurisdiction or to apply the public policy exception. 
  
Authoritative human rights 
standards also in State X where the 
human rights violation occurred 
Legal certainty and predictability is not 
affected, because the relevant human rights of 
jurisdiction X, with a close connection to the 
facts of the case, are taken into account and 
therefore could be predicted by the parties.  
 
The sovereign rights of State X virtually 
remain untouched, as the relevant human 
rights for this state are taken into account.  
(1) ius cogens 
(2) customary international law 
(3) human rights treaties (binding 
on State X) 
Authoritative human rights 
standards only for Switzerland as 
place of jurisdiction (but in the case 
in question not for State X) 
Legal certainty and predictability is affected 
where consideration of the specific guarantees 
could not be predicted by the parties. The 
predictability depends on the respective 
territorial scope of the guarantee in question. 
The sovereign rights of State X are affected, 
because only Standards of the Swiss 
jurisdiction and not of State X with a close 
connection to the facts of the case are taken 
into account. Possible criteria for the exercise 
of the jurisdiction: (1) forum connection of 
the case; (2) territorial scope of the guarantee 
in question; (3) value of the guarantee for the 
forum; (4) gravity of the violation and the 
harm suffered; (5) conduct of State X. 
(5) “quasi” universal level (e.g. 
ICCPR) 
(6) regional level (e.g EHCR) 
(7) as a solely national 
fundamental right  
6. Conclusion  
6.1. Chances “de lege lata“  
The existing law of Switzerland (and other countries) certainly has a certain 
potential to do justice in transnational civil human rights litigation. However, this 
depends largely on the jurisdiction and the applicable law. Legal and practical 
barriers in civil procedure remain, which may cause difficulties for claimants. These 
may include the high costs of litigation or the burden of proof of the injured party. 
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In must also be stressed that the generally restrictive “catch-all” clause of the “forum 
of necessity” and the “public policy exception” in current law bear the major burden 
for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles. The courts should apply the 
provisions in a just and equitable manner, which certainly requires a less restrictive 
approach that we have seen to date. It follows that, as is articulated in this essay, a 
dialogue between private and public international law is essential. With this 
approach, state practice on one hand acts as creator of international law, either with 
the development of general principles of international law or with further 
solidifying of customary international law up to the conclusion of treaties. On the 
other hand, state practice functions as an implementer of already existing 
international law requirements in national law (so-called «dédoublement 
fonctionnel»).43 There must be a strong focus on the difficult translation work 
between private and public international law which inevitibly lies ahead:44 For 
example, there is the question of how far individuals may have the right to 
protection from certain human rights regarding their relation to a corporation.  
6.2. Challenges “de lege lata” 
A case-by-case approach brings certain challenges, including the juxtaposition of 
individual justice with legal certainty. Particularly in the interpretation of general 
clauses, the court is not spared from exercising its discretion on the basis of values. 
With regard to case law, it is crucial that the doctrine develops guidelines for a more 
predicable jurisprudence (so-called „topoi“)45. These can be found in norms of public 
 
43  This concept dates back to SCELLE, G., Précis de droit des gens, Bd. I, Paris 1932, cited 
from VITZTHUM, W., in idem (ed.), Völkerrecht, 4 ed. [!], Berlin 2007, p. 29. See 
furthermore WÜGER, Anwendbarkeit und Justiziabilität völkerrechtlicher Normen im 
schweizerischen Recht, p. 55. In the context of PIL see MILLS, p. 92, 226 and 230; 
MANSEL, Staatlichkeit des Internationalen Privatrechts und Völkerrecht, p. 99; MORAN, 
The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law, p. 680; SCOTT, Translating Torture 
into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability 
for Human Rights Harms, p. 61; ZERK, Multinationals and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, p. 116. BLECKMANN, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen des 
internationalen Kollisionsrechts, p. 6 et seq. 
44  See ZUMBANSEN, Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the Message of Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation, passim. 
45  PIL is not unterstood as a consistent system, but as a “Collage” of partly coordinated, 
partly conflicting domestic legal orders (see MAKAROV, Internationales Privatrecht und 
Völkerrecht, p. 130; MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, p. 
234 and 308; BÄR, Extraterritoriale Wirkung von Gesetzen, p. 11; FLESSNER, 
Interessenjurisprudenz im internationalen Privatrecht, p. 51; INTERNATIONAL BAR 
ASSOCIATION, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, p. 130). 
Therefore, there are limits for systemic thinking from an international perspective. 
That is why convincing doctrine stipulates, that the “topic thinking” (“topisches 
Denken”) should given more attention (see SCHWANDER, Einführung in das 
internationale Privatrecht, N 56; HYLAND, International Human Rights Law and the Tort 
of Torture, p. 434 et seq.; MORAN, The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law,  
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international law, general principles of international law, soft law or comparative law 
analysis. Of great importance at this point are comparative analyses and recommen-
dations of internationally recognised think tanks, such as the “Ruggie-Principles”,46 
specific civil law papers from the International Commission of Jurists47 and 
specifically for PIL-issues, the relevant principles of the International Law 
Association.48 
6.3. Prospects of Legislative Measures 
This investigation has confined itself to seeking out opportunities in existing 
legislation. Nevertheless, a provisional assessment may be permitted regarding 
possible legal measures. Specifically with regard to human rights litigation, an 
introduction of a human rights statute with specific rules with regard to the 
applicable law could be envisaged. Another possibility could be to create a 
mandatory rule of the forum within the meaning of Art. 18 CPIL.49 Within a stricter 
legal framework regulating human rights complaints, less judicial discretion would 
apply. With a higher degree of predictability comes a higher level of democratic 
legitimacy. It therefore makes sense to consider a revision of private international 
law. However, any special provision for human rights violations would have to be 
very careful to not treat all violations in the same way. It would have to leave 
enough room for differentiated solutions depending on the nature of the right in 
question and the severity of violation. Otherwise, justice would not be achieved in 
international human rights protection. Moreover, an overly general approach 
would result in “favor laesi” being inadequately reflected. A special Swiss provision, 
which categorically would impose itself on the international level, could eventually 
be viewed as an insensitive export of its own social and liability standards. 
 
p. 683: “The task of the advocate, the judge, and the law-maker no longer seems 
adequately captured – if it ever was – by the notion of discrete mutually exclusive 
spheres of binding law, conjoined through a set of rules premised on conflict and 
choice. And indeed, what the [transnational civil human rights litigation cases] show is 
a subtle, yet distinct, move away from this model and towards a more multi-faceted 
integrative understanding of sources and a broader persuasive approach to 
authority.”). 
46  See the UN Guiding Principles and furthermore the preliminary work in the form of 
various reports, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Transnational 
Corporations/Pages/Reports.aspx (11.02.2015). 
47  INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, Report of the Expert Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes (2008), Vol. 3, Civil Remedies. 
48  INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Final Conference Report Sofia - International Civil 
Litigation for Human Rights Violations (2012); further reports are available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1021 (11.02.2015). 
49  With regard to the mandatory rules in existing law and the connection to the public 
policy exception in the present context see GEISSER, Ausservertragliche Haftung privat 
tätiger Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei internationalen Sach-
verhalten, N 518 et seq. 
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Consequently for example, a regulation would seem to general when it provides the 
same limitation periods for compensation claims for a simple corporate intrusion 
into a property guarantee, as for corporate intrusions which are based on systematic 
racial discrimination. In this sense, every legislative initiative requires either further 
human rights typification or must remain sufficiently open to allow adequate room 
for the judiciary to exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis. 
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European perspectives on the implementation of the UN Principles on Business and 
Human Rights in Private International Law may be a non-topic, at least for private 
international issues and at least for some time.  
Indeed, if one considers the audition of Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourovà 
before the European Parliament (in the fall of 2014), there was not a single word 
about civil actions for Human Rights violations, whether in her speech or in the 
questions asked by the Members of the European Parliament. This was probably a 
missed opportunity, particularly in view of the study commissioned by the 
European Parliament on the future of Private International Law in the European 
Union1 that contains a suggestion that some work should be done on the Private 
International Law aspects of civil actions for Human Rights violations. 
In fact, if one wants to take cognizance of the policy of the European Commission 
on these topics, the amicus brief it filed before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Kiobel case may be a good starting point. It looks like the European 
 
*  Professor; Deputy Director of the European College of Paris; President of the French 
Branch of the International Law Association. This paper was finalized in early 2015 and 
has not been updated. 
1  Study undertaken under the direction of X. KRAMER, A European Framework for 
Private International law: current gaps and future perspectives, 2012. 
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Commission is of the opinion that International Law has nothing to do with private 
actors, a somewhat outdated position.2 Coupled with the statement found in the 
introduction to the Corporate Social Responsibility (‘CSR’) public consultation,3 
according to which “the Commission’s approach to CSR follows the assumption that 
the development of the CSR should be led by enterprises themselves”, there may be 
some incoherence in the position of the Commission on these issues.4 
The second reason why the topic may not be a promising one in European Law has 
to do with the fact that Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (referred to as 
“Brussels I (recast) Regulation”),5 which is applicable as of 10 January 2015, has 
already been modified once to adapt it to the European patent reform6 and is 
unlikely to be reopened, even if one concludes that it is not entirely adapted to those 
specific actions (this remains to be demonstrated – see below). 
Third, it has been a very long and difficult process to adapt the 1988 Lugano 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters to the EC Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (referred to as “Brussels 
I Regulation”) and it is unclear whether negotiations will resume soon on the new 
 
2  Some judges in some Member States have the same opinion. See the decisions 
rendered by French jurisdictions in the case Tramway of Jerusalem: TGI Nanterre, 30 
May 2011, R.G. 10/02629; Court of Appeals of Versailles, 22 March 2013, R.G. 11/05331; 
Court of cassation, 25 June 2014.  
3  Communication of the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions, A 
renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 0681 
final. 
4  The Commission further explains: “Public authorities should play a supporting role 
through a smart mix of voluntary policy measures and, where necessary, 
complementary regulation, for example to promote transparency, create market 
incentives for responsible business conduct, and to ensure corporate accountability” 
(see n. 3). It is clear that, during the period 2011-2014, the Commission has essentially 
followed the self-regulation route, apart from the adoption of the Directive on 
disclosure of non-financial information (Directive 2014/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as 
regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups Text with EEA relevance, OJEU, 15 Nov. 2014, L330, p.1.). 
5  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast), OJEU 20 Dec. 2012, L351, p.1. 
6  Regulation (EU) No 542/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as regards the rules to be applied with 
respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice, OJEU 29 May 
2014, L163, p.1. 
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adaptation needed as a result of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. So, it is im-
probable that the exercise, even if opened, will consider this type of actions. This is 
particularly true because Switzerland has already adopted some rules in the field, 
as shown in other contributions in this book.  
Finally, it is also very unlikely that Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (referred to as “Rome II Regulation” or 
“Rome II”)7 will be reopened any time soon. If one considers the long period of time 
that has been necessary to adopt the directive on private enforcement in 
competition matters,8 it seems very unlikely that we will have soon the equivalent 
for human rights violations. But if this somehow eventuates, then it must be 
assessed whether we need to incorporate it in legislation. 
Do we need to reform European Law? 
I am not going to deal with substantive law, rather just note that several 
communications by the Commission have tackled issues of Corporate Social 
Responsibility that may be a step forward. A new Communication is awaited and 
was prepared in February 2015 by a multi-stakeholder meeting in Brussels. In 
addition, several Member States are preparing action plans to put in place measures 
to implement the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (referred 
to as the “Ruggie Principles”).9 In addition, some Member States have legislation 
pending in their Parliament attempting to deal with a parent company’s 
responsibility for actions of its direct or indirect subsidiaries, or a company’s liability 
for acts perpetrated by their sub-contractors or other companies under their 
influence.10 It is always difficult to know when is the appropriate time to develop 
 
7  Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations  
(JO L 199 31 July 2007, p. 40-49). We mention Rome II Regulation only because it is 
undisputed that civil actions for Human Rights violations are tort actions. It is still open 
whether we need a special category of tort actions with adapted rules. It is the 
assumption of this paper that European Law does offer already many possibilities and 
that, before contemplating special rules, European rules should be used to their 
maximum effect. 
8  Directive 2014/104/UE of the European Parliament and the Council, of 26 November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, OJEU L349/1, 5 December 2014. In any case, the “model” of Directive 
2014/104 may not be entirely pertinent in the area of Business and Human Rights 
because the regulation which forms the basis for the right to compensation is not, for 
the time being, a uniform European regulation, in contrast to competition law. 
9  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
10  See, for example, the bill (n°1524) proposed before the French National Assembly in 
2014, which was withdrawn and replaced by Bill n°2578 on 11 February 2015 available 
at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2578.asp (01.09.2016). The 
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rules at the European level when so much is happening at the international and the 
national levels. 
Let’s see what European Private International Law does offer and what is needed. 
We will look first at jurisdiction and then at applicable law. 
1. Jurisdiction 
In terms of jurisdiction, we need to look at two sets of rules. The first set is for 
“European Companies” defendants, i.e. any company registered under the laws of 
one of the Member States of the European Union (referred to as “EU”) that comport 
with the criteria of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (referred to 
as “TFEU”) and hence are “domiciled” in the EU in the jargon of Brussels I 
Regulation / Brussels I (recast) Regulation (jointly referred to as “Brussels I”).11 The 
second set deal with companies defendants domiciled in a third State. 
1.1. Actions against European Companies 
The most frequent scenario consists of victims located outside the EU, sometimes in 
ill-functioning States, where the direct causal event occurred and the damages have 
been suffered in that country. There may be cases where some activity may have 
taken place within Europe, because the company in the foreign country, whose acts 
have caused the damages suffered by the victims, is a subsidiary or a branch of the 
European company, or a company “within its influence”.12  
In such a scenario, the company being located in the EU, the victims have the choice 
of suing that Company at home. Indeed, this is the easiest option since the domicile 
of the defendant is the one strong principle of European Law on International 
jurisdiction (art 2 of Regulation Brussels I). The theory of forum non conveniens 
being unavailable under European law,13 the victims may not be thrown away from 
 
bill has been adopted by the National Assembly in March 2015 but voted against by the 
Senate. 
11  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 
16.1.2001, p. 1–23. 
12  The present debate follows two lines: (1) whether the right criterion is the “control” by 
one company over another company, or is the “sphere of influence”; (2) what is the 
definition of the two concepts “control” and “sphere of influence”. It is probably better 
to say that the two criteria are not mutually exclusive and may be used either 
alternatively or in complementarity one with the other. It is also clear that the present 
doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” is not useful in that discussion. Finally, it would 
be useful to develop a number of practical and concrete scenario to help courts to apply 
these concepts.  
13  ECJ, C-281/02, Owusu, 1st March 2005. 
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the defendant’s forum under the pretext that all the events occurred in a foreign 
country and that it would be more convenient to try the dispute outside the 
defendant’s forum. 
The availability of the defendant’s forum is recognized as conforming with the 
Ruggie Principles and the duty of States to protect and offer remedies (first and 
third pillars). This was recognized also by the International Law Association (ILA), 
as may be seen in the resolution adopted in Sofia in 2012.14 This is also conform 
with the home country control principle under which a State may not tolerate that 
a company registered under its laws act on a foreign territory in a manner that 
would be forbidden if the acts were taking place on its own territory. 
Now, very often, the company registered in State A, may not have acted directly but 
via a joint venture locally registered in State B (where the events and damages 
occurred), or via a subsidiary or another establishment. Currently, under art 6-1 of 
Brussels I Regulation (article 8-1 under Brussels I (recast) Regulation), it is possible 
to join several defendants who are located in the EU before the court of the domicile 
of one of them. This rule may not be entirely satisfactory because, in most cases of 
human rights abuses, the mother company or the donneur d’ordre may be located in 
Europe, but the subsidiary or sub-contractor is located in a third State. Art. 6.1/8.1 
is not applicable per se in such cases.15 Some Member States do have the same rule 
in their Private International Law body of norms. France is one of them and it would 
be good to amend Brussels I to allow the joinder of defendants whether established 
within or outside the EU. 
The second issue concerning the application of art 6.1/8.1 of Brussels I is that of 
connexité, i.e. that not all claims may be suited for joinder of several defendants in 
the same suit. The claims must be linked, at least factually, so that if they were tried 
separately there would be a risk of contradictory decisions. It is our opinion that, in 
cases of human rights violations, the link may be appreciated with more tolerance 
than in classic civil or commercial litigation. The ILA Sofia 2012 Resolution showed 
the kind of link that may be accepted in order to try several defendants before the 
same court. It is worth repeating here the rule the ILA Committee has included in 
the resolution. 
Article 2.2. provides: 
“Connected claims 
2.2(1) The courts of the State where one of a number of defendants is domiciled shall have 
jurisdiction over all of the defendants in respect of closely connected claims. 
 
14  ILA, Resolution n°2, Report of the Seventy-Fifth Conference of the International Law 
Association, 2012, p.23, and the accompanying report, p.321. The author of this paper 
was the chair of the Committee which prepared the resolution and the report. 
15  ECJ, C-51/97, La Réunion européenne, 27 Oct. 1998. 
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2.2(2) Claims are closely connected in the sense of paragraph 2.2(1) if: 
(a) it is efficient to hear and determine them together; and 
(b) the defendants are related. 
2.2(3) Defendants are related in the sense of paragraph 2.2(2)(b), in particular if at the 
time the cause of action arose: 
(a) they formed part of the same corporate group; 
(b) one defendant controlled another defendant; 
(c) one defendant directed the litigious acts of another defendant; or 
(d) they took part in a concerted manner in the activity giving rise to the cause of action.”.16 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no need to go through the route of piercing the 
corporate veil that is always a very difficult matter to do, particularly for victims that 
are exterior to the corporate structure. It is enough for the victim to prove one of the 
links enumerated in paragraph 2.2(3) of the ILA Sofia 2012 Resolution mentioned 
above. For example, the fact that the defendants are members of the same group is 
enough, per se, to trigger the application of the provision. And it is a bit easier to 
prove that fact for third parties exterior to the group. 
The situation of the donneur d’ordre and its sub-contractors is solved by sub para-
graphs (b) (c) or (d) of proposed article 2.2(3), depending on the factual 
circumstances of each case. The court will have to enter into some analysis before it 
can confirm its jurisdiction. The Committee considered that if none of the three 
alternative facts was present in a given case, it meant that the co-defendants were 
not close enough one with the other and could not be tried together under the most 
common due process principles. 
Whether the civil action is a stand-alone law suit or is an “annex” to a criminal action 
does not matter, since Brussels I allows, if the law of the court seized of the matter 
allows it, to join a civil action to a criminal action.17 This may be efficient when using 
universal criminal jurisdiction.18 A court located in a Member State of the European 
Union may decide to open proceedings on the basis of universal criminal 
jurisdiction. The victims may then attach their civil action for compensation to the 
criminal proceedings. The judgment rendered will circulate under Brussels I and 
 
16  ILA, Resolution n°2, Report of the Seventy-Fifth Conference of the International Law 
Association, 2012, p.23. 
17  Article 5.4 of Brussels I Regulation / Article 7.3 of Brussels I (recast) Regulation 
provides: “as regards a civil claim for damages or restitution which is based on an act 
giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court seized of those proceedings, to the 
extent that that court has jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings.”. 
18  On universal jurisdiction: BUCHER, La compétence universelle civile en matière de 
réparation pour crimes internationaux; BUCHER, La compétence universelle civile. 
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victims may enforce the civil part of the judgment rendered in all the other 27 
Member States of the European Union. 
1.2. Actions against Companies Located in Third States 
When discussions started to reform Brussels I Regulation, the Commission 
attempted to “internationalize” the regulation i.e. to make it applicable to 
defendants located outside the EU. If that attempt had been successful, the new 
rules would have prevented Member States to keep two sets of jurisdictional rules,19 
one for European defendants and the other one for non-EU defendants. The attempt 
by the Commission to “internationalize” Brussels I Regulation20 failed, therefore, 
Brussels I does not apply to defendants located outside the EU. Hence, if a company 
registered in a third State committed the Human Rights violation, Brussels I does 
not apply but each Member State will apply its own rules on international 
jurisdiction. 
As discussed above, we need an art 6.1Brussels I Regulation / art. 8.1 Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation applicable across Europe for co-defendants domiciled outside 
Europe.  
As a result of the fact that these types of offenses are often committed in a 
dysfunctional State, it may be necessary to apply a kind of forum necessitatis. This 
rule, known by a number of Member States,21 is very useful to fight against a denial 
of justice. It would be preferable to have a uniform European rule on forum 
necessitatis, which is not currently the case. It was proposed by the European 
Commission when the discussions on the recast of Brussels I Regulation started, but 
was considered dependent upon the internationalization of the Regulation and 
therefore was deleted from Brussels I (recast) Regulation. It has been proposed by 
the ILA in the same resolution mentioned above as follows: 
 
 
19  The Commission had limited its proposal to jurisdiction and did not include foreign 
judgments. The European Group of Private International Law (referred to as “EGPIL”), 
on the contrary, without deciding on the policy of the extension, proposed rules for both 
jurisdiction and judgments (See: Resolutions of the EGPIL, list of documents from the 
Group, Hamburg 2007 and Bergen 2008, available at http://www.gedip-egpil.eu/ 
gedip_documents.html (01.09.2016). 
20  This move proposed by the European Commission was voted down by the Member 
States, possibly in an attempt to keep their own jurisdictional policy towards third 
States. 
21  Ten Member States of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Romania) have a rule 
of forum necessitatis either statutory based or organised by case law (Nuyts, Study on 
residual jurisdiction, p.64-66). 
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“2.3 Forum of necessity 
2.3(1) The courts of any State with a sufficient connection to the dispute shall have jurisdiction 
in order to avert a denial of justice. 
2.3(2) A denial of justice in the sense of paragraph 2.3(1) occurs if the court concludes upon 
hearing all interested parties, and after taking into account of reliable public sources of 
information, that: 
(a) no other court is available; or 
(b) the claimant cannot reasonably be expected to seize another court. 
2.3(3) A sufficient connection in the sense of paragraph 2.3(1) consists in particular in: 
(a) the presence of the claimant; 
(b) the nationality of claimant or the defendant; 
(c) the presence of assets of the defendant; 
(d) some activity of the defendant; or 
(e) a civil claim based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings in the court seized of those 
proceedings, to the extent that the court has jurisdiction available under its own law to 
entertain civil proceedings.”.22 
The explanatory report states: “the Committee unanimously considered that a 
forum of necessity was essential to the effectiveness of civil actions for human rights 
violations”23. The report further explains the balance that the Committee aimed at 
striking between the interests of the victims to get compensation and that of the 
defendant not to be sued in a court completely unrelated with the matter. This is 
why the rule requires some link between the parties, the case and the State in which 
is located the court seized of the matter under the rule of forum of necessity. The 
link need not be very strong,24 but must be satisfied before the court is allowed to 
exercise jurisdiction. This rule is believed to protect victims from a dysfunctional 
court system in the State where the events occurred. 
2. Applicable Law 
For applicable law, as is well known by the readers of this book, there is only one set 
of rules in the European Member States, since Rome II25 is of “universal application” 
 
22  ILA, Resolution n°2, Report of the Seventy-Fifth Conference of the International Law 
Association, 2012, p.23. 
23  ILA, Report of the Seventy-fifth conference, Sofia, 2012, p.363. 
24  Ibidem, p.365. 
25  There is no doubt that cases brought by victims of human rights violations are 
characterized as “tort” cases. This is not to say that some actions may not take place 
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(art. 2). This means that Member States had to repeal their own conflict of laws 
rules in tort for all cases covered by Rome II whether they are “purely European” or 
whether they include litigants located outside Europe. The debate for applicable 
law is really twofold: 1) Should we create a specific rule for civil actions for human 
rights violations or are the present rules satisfactory? 2) Independent of the answer 
given to the first question, are the rules on mandatory norms, lois de police and the 
public policy exception sufficient for this area of the law? 
2.1. Appraisal of the lex loci delicti and the Special Rules 
under Rome II 
We will not spend time discussing party autonomy, although there is room for 
choice of law in Rome II, since it is very unlikely that victims of human rights viola-
tions will be able to agree with the tortfeasor(s) on the law to be applied to the case. 
Therefore, the analysis starts with article 4.1 of Rome II, which leads to the 
application of the lex loci delicti, in the most narrow meaning of the expression, since 
art. 4.1. provides:  
“the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law 
of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur”.  
Because the examples we know of human rights violations show that, most of the 
time, the damage occurs in a State with weak laws, it is necessary to adapt Rome II 
and allow the plaintiff/victim to choose what law is more favorable to its 
compensation between the lex loci delicti, that of the causal event and that of the 
defendant, meaning the law under which the perpetrator is established. This is why 
a reform of Rome II would be preferable. 
There are already some alternative rules in Rome II. For example, art. 7 for 
environmental damages provides:  
 “The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental damage or 
damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law deter-
mined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses 
to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred”.  
However, we would propose to go one step further for human rights violations and 
allow the application of the law of the tortfeasor. Indeed, if a link can be proven 
between the event and the parent company, applying the law of the parent company 
 
within the contractual realm, for example when a sub-contractor has violated 
contractually imposed CSR rules, but these are not the focus of this paper. 
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may be much better for the victims than applying the law of the damage or even of 
the causal event that may have been perpetrated also in the host State. By providing 
an alternative with the law of the defendant, we make sure that the home country 
control principle applies. The defendant cannot complain for the application of the 
law of the country where it is located since it must be knowledgeable of that law, 
which should come as no surprise to him. It is indeed the law that should have 
framed the defendant’s activities. Let’s imagine that the French bill n°2578 becomes 
law and that victims prove that the mother company has not established a due 
diligence plan or that its due diligence plan is faulty or incomplete. By applying 
French law to the tort case brought against that company, it can hardly pretend not 
to be aware of the obligations of French law in that respect. This is also conform 
with the substantive principles which are emerging from both international and 
European law: the obligation of due diligence and of prevention of the harm; the 
principle “comply or explain”; the presumption of liability of a mother company for 
the acts of its subsidiaries or sub-contractors, to list only a few.  
The following rules in Rome II are harmful for our topic and should be neutralized: 
a) Article 4.2 provides: “However, where the person claimed to be liable and the 
person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country 
at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply”. It is well 
known that the harmful event is typically perpetrated by a separate company 
located in the host State, where the victims are themselves also located. If 
applied literally, art. 4.2. leads to the application of the lex loci delicti, without 
the possibility to demonstrate a better link with another law. Hence, contrary to 
what may be the case in usual torts, 4.2. won’t give the victim an extra and 
easiest choice, which is the purpose of the rule. 
b) Article 17 which, under the title “Rules of safety and conduct” provides: “In 
assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, as a 
matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which 
were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the liability”. As already 
stated, most host countries have deficient rules of safety and conduct; as a result, 
article 17 should not be activated in cases of human rights violations. 
2.2. Mandatory Rules, Loi de police and the Public Policy 
Exception 
Since these matters deal with human rights or fundamental rights, the issues related 
to this area of the law may easily fall within either one of the three possibilities 
which exist in private international law to oblige companies to respect these norms. 
They may be falling under mandatory rules, which cannot be departed from even if 
some foreign law may be held applicable to the dispute. In other words, they may 
be considered as a minimum standard, which must be respected no matter what and 
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even if a foreign law is held applicable. Mandatory norms “displace” the normally 
applicable norm and are applicable in lieu of the rules normally applicable. This is 
also the function of the public policy exception, notably art. 26 of Rome II 
Regulation, although under the public policy exception only the public policy of the 
forum State may be upheld. It may be relevant to note that the public policy 
applicable under this provision may stem from international law even if not fully 
integrated in the law of the forum State. This would not apply if the forum State is 
more advanced on CSR rules than what international law requires. 
An even stronger norm is that of loi de police or, now in the jargon of European 
private international law, the overriding mandatory rules (art. 16 of Rome II). If the 
French Parliament finally adopts the proposed bill n°2578 on the liability of mother 
companies for the acts of its subsidiary or sub-contractor,26 it could be considered 
as a loi de police which curtails the using of the conflict of laws rules and hence the 
potential application of a foreign law. This is certainly more favourable to victims 
of human rights violations if applied correctly by judges. However, it does not cover 
all the possible cases which may give rise to litigation in practice. 
3. Conclusion 
To conclude, I would like to stress three of the biggest challenges faced by the 
European Union and its Member States. The first is the strengthening of civil society 
and the rule of law in countries outside the EU which are fragile and where human 
rights violations are more likely to occur. The second one is the training of judges in 
courts located within the European Union. The first one is a difficult goal; it will 
take time and a lot of effort. The second one is urgent and easy to achieve. The 
European Union already has the organization to fulfil this goal, namely the 
Academy of European Law (ERA) in Trier. The Union should urgently finance a 
cycle of training on CSR/Human Rights issues (both substantive and private 
international law aspects) for judges across the Union. This is not a very expensive 
exercise, but it is one without which the third pillar of the Ruggie Principles will 
remain a dead letter. We should not see again in court decisions declarations to the 
 
26  Bill n°2578 applies to companies that are present on the French territory or outside; 
for companies which are only present on the French territory, the threshold is at least 
5000 employees (which is a very high threshold); for companies which are present both 
in France and in foreign countries, the threshold is at least 10000 employees. They 
must prevent damages to occur by due diligence. They must issue a due diligence plan 
and make it publicly available. Any interested person may act to force companies to 
issue a plan and take corrective and precautionary measure. The pecuniary sanction in 
form of a civil penalty may go up to 10 million euros. In addition, publication and 
dissemination of the decision rendered may be ordered by the judge. 
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effect that Public International Law does not deal with private parties and that 
unilateral codes of conduct published by companies do not carry legal effects. 
Finally, the third challenge turns around the question whether there is a place for 
alternative dispute resolution (referred to as “ADR”) in CSR matters. The challenge 
is particularly difficult since what works today in CSR is the reputational risk for 
companies. Companies seem to be more concerned about their image than by legal 
risks and potential financial sanctions. If that is correct, then using ADR defeats the 
only usefulness of disputes resolution since ADR mechanisms are confidential. 
Therefore, if ADR has a future in CSR matters, the rule of confidentiality may have 
to be lifted. In any case, this topic needs further study and consideration. 
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Epilogue 
Throughout this book we have had the chance to face various and interesting 
aspects of the problems linked to the impact on Human Rights of the activities 
carried out in practice by multinational corporations. The Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights sponsored by the United Nations illustrate an increased 
awareness of those setbacks on a global basis. 
But evidently we have not been able to develop many other aspects that of course 
require an in-depth analysis. Among them, we may cite: the definite impact of 
corruption as well as the necessary measures to tackle it; the control of supply 
chains and the fight against modern slavery, with a relevant  supportive legislative 
framework, and, for instance, the hopeful Canadian precedent related to the Nevsun 
case; the degree of concern of Human Rights because of climate change and the role 
played by corporations in this process, with the significant public initiative recently 
launched to this respect by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the 
Philippines; environmental pollution, in general, interwoven with business 
activities; the incidence of measures of privatization over the enjoyment of public 
goods; the corporate concentration operations brought into line in key sectors such 
as seeds and fertilizers, serving as an example the recent corporate takeover on 
Monsanto by Bayer; the central core of issues in connection with land and water 
grabbings, a real and relevant concern that could give rise to persecution requests 
according to the position taken and announced by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) or, in the same regard, by the initiative operated by Amnesty International 
and the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) based on a 
recent and extensive document entitled “The Corporate Crimes Principles”; or, 
finally, the search for ways of alternative dispute resolutions and the improvements 
of the judicial mechanisms in the different legal systems, etc. 
And all this not forgetting other similar points of interest in relation to the above 
mentioned increased awareness illustrated by the establishment of a legally binding 
legislative framework currently under discussion in the United Nations, or the 
interplay of the problems examined here concerning Sustainable Development aims 
derived from the truly universal International Organization, or the pressing need 
for protection of Human Rights defenders and indigenous peoples, a task also 
assumed by the UN through different means of implementation. 
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In spite of the fact that this agenda is not exhaustive it reveals the size of the 
challenge we face. It is the real future commitment of Humanity and, of course, I 
believe it is worthy of a great and continuous effort on the side of the international 
community as well as on the part of players and stakeholders. 
Castellón, 15.10.2016 
Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot 
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